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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a study of medieval papal government and the Holy Land crusades 
under Pope Honorius III (1216-27). Based on the systematic study of the 
unpublished manuscripts of Honorius’s papal registers (Vatican City, Archivio 
Segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticana 9-13) and supplemented with contemporary 
diplomatic evidence and chronicles, it examines the institutions of papal 
government that were central to Honorius’s administration of crusade affairs in 
the East and the West. 
This thesis seeks to repair the significant historiographical gap for 
Honorius III’s pontificate and to analyse the pope’s reign on its own terms. It also 
puts forward a new view of the nature of papal crusade government, arguing that 
Honorius’s administration of the Holy Land crusades was primarily responsive 
rather than proactive in its operation. This thesis contends the prevailing view in 
the current historiography that the papacy played a proactive role in formulating, 
implementing, and modifying a coherent and premeditated crusade policy. Instead 
it is demonstrated that Honorius pursued his crusade policy responsively, which 
was defined by input from outside the papal curia. It is established that the 
direction of most papal crusade decisions was determined in an ad hoc fashion in 
response to petitioners and diplomats presenting business at the curia. 
Part one of the thesis is formed of three chapters which provide a 
chronological framework and propound a detailed political narrative of 
4 
 
Honorius’s diplomacy with the lay powers between 1216 and 1227. Part two of 
the thesis consists of three chapters arranged thematically to consider the 
institutions of papal government under Honorius, investigating the theology in his 
letter arengae, his deployment of papal legates, and the management of the 
crusade tax respectively. 
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Introduction 
 
Contribution to the Historiography 
This thesis is a study of the organisation of the Holy Land crusades under Pope 
Honorius III (1216-27), namely the Fifth Crusade (1217-21) and the preparation 
of the Crusade of Frederick II (1228-29).  It has two main aims: the first is to help 
repair the significant gap in the historiography that exists for Honorius III’s 
pontificate; the second is to put forward a different understanding of the way that 
papal government operated in its administration of the Holy Land crusades to that 
commonly propounded in the historiography. 
 To begin by addressing the first aim, Honorius III’s pontificate has long 
been overshadowed by his more famous predecessor, Pope Innocent III (1198-
1216), and his successor, Pope Gregory IX (1227-41).
1
 Next to these two 
seemingly more dynamic and assertive popes, Honorius appeared less significant. 
He did not intervene decisively to remove candidates for the imperial throne who 
threatened the papacy, such as Innocent did, nor did he excommunicate and go to 
war with Emperor Frederick II (king of Sicily, 1208-50; king of Germany, 1211-
20; Roman-German Emperor, 1220-50), as Gregory did. Honorius’s pontificate 
has often been viewed as an historical backwater in which nothing really 
                                                 
1
 Raoul Manselli, ‘Onorio III e Federico II: revisione d’un giudizio?’, Studi Romani, 11 (1963), 
142. 
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happened, and he is often given short shrift in general textbooks on the papacy.
2
 
Honorius does appear - sometimes only as a cameo - in histories of the 
Dominicans and Franciscans, in which he played an important role by recognising 
the orders in 1216 and 1223 respectively, and also in studies of Frederick II.
3
 
Works that did mention Honorius often did so disparagingly. Horace 
Mann famously said that Honorius’s pontificate was nothing more than ‘an echo’ 
of Innocent III’s.4 Honorius has regularly been labelled as weak, mild, gentle, 
simple, and peace-loving.
5
 Recently however, the tide has begun to turn, and a 
more sympathetic appraisal has started to emerge from the historiography, 
particularly in the work of Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt and Rebecca Rist on 
Honorius’s involvement in crusading within Europe.6  
                                                 
2
 See for instance: Geoffrey Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy (London, 1968), 110, 130; Walter 
Ullmann, A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (London, 1972; repr. with additions, 
1974), 236, 242, 248, 255. 
3
 For instance, Honorius’s role in the Dominicans’ institutional history has received attention in 
Patrick Zutshi, ‘Pope Honorius III’s Gratiarum Omnium and the Beginnings of the Dominican 
Order’, in Anne J. Duggan, Joan Greatrex, and Brenda Bolton, eds., Omnia disce: Medieval 
Studies in Memory of Leonard Boyle, O.P. (Aldershot, 2005), 199-210. Honorius’s role in 
confirming the Franciscans is mentioned in passing in Michael Robson, The Franciscans in the 
Middle Ages (Woodbridge, 2006), 18. Treatments of varying degrees are given of Honorius in 
works focusing on Frederick, see for example: David Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor 
(London, 1988); Wolfgang Stürner, Friedrich II., 1194-1250, 2 vols (1992-2000; repr. in one vol., 
Darmstadt, 2009). See also Francesco Dall’Aglio, ‘Crusading in a Nearer East: The Balkan 
Politics of Honorius III and Gregory IX (1221-1241)’, in Michel Balard, ed., La Papauté et les 
croisades/The Papacy and the Crusades: Actes du VIIe Congrès de la Society for the Study of the 
Crusades and the Latin East/Proceedings of the VIIth Conference of the Society for the Study of 
the Crusades and the Latin East (Farnham, 2011), 173-83. 
4
 Horace K. Mann, The Lives of the Popes in the Middle Ages, xiii (London, 1914), 20. 
5
 See the unsympathetic views of Honorius in: Adalbert Keutner, Papsttum und Krieg unter dem 
Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III. (1216-1227) (Münster, 1935), 12; Ernst Kantorowicz, 
Frederick the Second, 1194-1254, trans. E.O. Lorimer (New York, 1931), 96; Joseph P. Donovan, 
Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade (Philadelphia, PA, 1950), 105; Steven Runciman, A History of the 
Crusades, iii (Cambridge, 1954), 164; Thomas Curtis Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick II of 
Hohenstaufen: Immutator Mundi (Oxford, 1972), 108-09; Peter Partner, The Lands of St Peter: 
The Papal State in the Middle Ages and the Early Renaissance (London, 1972), 244; Hans 
Eberhard Mayer, The Crusades, trans. John Gillingham (2nd edn, Oxford, 1988), 220; J.N.D. 
Kelly, The Oxford Dictionary of Popes, rev. Michael J. Walsh (2nd edn, Oxford, 2010), 190. 
6
 Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, 1147-1254 (Leiden, 2007), 149-
53; Rebecca Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245 (London, 2009), 82-83. 
Manselli was the one to spearhead this view, and painted a positive picture of Honorius, arguing 
14 
 
The historiography on Honorius is thus fragmented and uneven in 
coverage; his pontificate has not received anything like the comprehensive 
treatment afforded to Innocent III, which is surely one of the reasons he has been 
portrayed poorly in the past.
7
 To date only three monographs and a slender 
libellus have been published on Honorius. In 1895 a German book, Papst 
Honorius III. (1216-1227): Eine Monographie, was published by Johannes 
Clausen - who had only printed sources to work from - which is now greatly 
outdated.
8
 Adalbert Keutner published his slim libellus on the papacy and war 
under Honorius III in 1935, entitled Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des 
Papstes Honorius III. (1216-1227), but was also reliant on printed sources, and 
attempted a broad sweep in his short work of only sixty-three pages; as a result his 
study lacks detail.
9
 Jane Sayers published an important study of papal government 
and England under Honorius in 1984, Papal Government and England during the 
Pontificate of Honorius III (1216-1227), which focused on his chancery and its 
products, but not on his wider diplomatic affairs.
10
 Most recently, in 2013, Pierre-
Vincent Claverie published the monograph emanating from his habilitation thesis, 
entitled Honorius III et l’Oriente (1216-1227): Étude et publication de sources 
                                                                                                                                     
that he was not weak and submissive but wise and prudent. Manselli’s analysis, however, had a 
limited impact on the historiography: Manselli, ‘Onorio’, 159. 
7
 See for example: Andrea Sommerlechner, ed., Innocenzo III: Urbs et Orbis, Atti del Congresso 
Internazionale Roma, 9-15 settembre 1998, 2 vols (Rome, 2003); John C. Moore, Pope Innocent 
III (1160/61-1216): To Root Up and to Plant (Leiden, 2003); idem, ed., Pope Innocent III and his 
World (Aldershot, 1999); Brenda Bolton, Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral 
Care (Aldershot, 1995); Jane Sayers, Innocent III: Leader of Europe, 1198-1216 (London, 1994); 
James M. Powell, ed., Innocent III: Vicar of Christ or Lord of the World? (2nd edn, Washington, 
DC, 1994). 
8
 Johannes Clausen, Papst Honorius III. (1216-1227): Eine Monographie (Bonn, 1895). Clausen’s 
work is predominantly descriptive, and has been superseded by more recent works. 
9
 Keutner, Papsttum. 
10
 Jane E. Sayers, Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of Honorius III (1216-
1227) (Cambridge, 1984). 
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inédites des Archives vaticanes (ASV), although unfortunately it appeared too late 
to take account of in this thesis.
11
 
 Honorius’s involvement in crusading to the Holy Land has featured in a 
number of works, most significantly those of James Powell. In his 1986 work 
Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221 - which remains the most comprehensive study 
of the campaign of the Fifth Crusade - Powell analysed a number of aspects of 
Honorius’s ‘crusade government’, including the preaching, diplomacy, use of 
legates, and financing of the Fifth Crusade.
12
 This thesis focuses not on the 
campaign of the Fifth Crusade itself, but on the papal crusade diplomacy and 
administration in the West. As a result, closer attention is given to the operation of 
papal government. This thesis confirms many of Powell’s findings and offers 
some nuances as well as new directions, such as the study of Honorius’s 
theological statements in the arengae of his letters. In addition, whilst Powell’s 
monograph ended with the Fifth Crusade’s failure in 1221, this study covers 
Honorius’s entire pontificate. Though the topic of this thesis is Honorius’s 
involvement in the Holy Land crusades, it is hoped that the focus on the how his 
curia operated will be of interest to those working on the early thirteenth-century 
Church more broadly, which the second aim of the thesis addresses. 
Turning then to the second aim, a common trend in the historiography is to 
treat the medieval papacy as a proactive policy-making, and alternately, policy-
                                                 
11
 Pierre-Vincent Claverie, Honorius III et l’Oriente (1216-1227): Étude et publication de sources 
inédites des Archives vaticanes (ASV) (Leiden, 2013). I am extremely grateful to Dr Claverie for 
sending me a copy of his book which I received during the last weeks of writing up this thesis; Dr 
Claverie and I have worked entirely independently of each other. 
12
 James M. Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221 (Philadelphia, PA, 1986). 
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following, body.
13
 Works often state that the popes took the initiative in 
formulating policies with their cardinals at the curia, and then imposed them on 
Christendom through letters despatched from the papal chancery. Furthermore, it 
is often stated that popes were reluctant to deviate from the policies laid down by 
their predecessors, and that it was a significant event when these policies were 
modified or changed (see the works cited in the note above, in particular those by 
Fonnesberg-Schmidt and Rist). Many research questions have focused on whether 
Honorius followed Innocent III’s policies, whether he altered them, or if he 
created his own policies. 
 To adopt such an approach - championing the pope as a proactive policy-
maker - is problematic. The evidence from Honorius’s reign instead suggests that 
rather than proactively formulating and implementing papal policy regarding the 
Holy Land crusades, he was actually much more reactive and most often made 
policy decisions in response to input from outside the curia, which came in the 
form of petitions and letters from lay powers. Moves towards such an 
interpretation of papal crusade government have been aired in the most recent 
                                                 
13
 On the papacy as a policy-making and policy-following institution, see: Palmer A. Throop, 
Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda (Amsterdam, 
1940), 113, 276; Partner, Lands, 244; Ullmann, Papacy, 225; Maureen Purcell, Papal Crusading 
Policy, 1244-1291: The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy 
Land from the Final Loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre (Leiden, 1975), 3, 5-6, 18, 30; James M. 
Powell, ‘Honorius III and the Leadership of the Crusade’, Catholic Historical Review, 63 (1977), 
522-23, 533, 535-36; I.S. Robinson, The Papacy, 1073-1198: Continuity and Innovation 
(Cambridge, 1990), 10, 170, 389; Rebecca Rist, ‘Papal Policy and the Albigensian Crusades: 
Continuity or Change?’, Crusades, 2 (2003), 99, 107; eadem, Papacy, pp. vii-viii, 3, 16-19, 84, 
105-06, 119, 202, 223; Nikolaos G. Chrissis, Crusading in Frankish Greece: A Study of Byzantine-
Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204-1282 (Turnhout, 2012), pp. xxxvii-xl, 79, 82, 252-54, 262-
63. In support of policy-making, but also with an emphasis on petitioning, see: Fonnesberg-
Schmidt, Popes, 1-2, 12, 16, 21, 149-51, 247-48; eadem, ‘Pope Honorius III and Mission and 
Crusades in the Baltic Region’, in Alan V. Murray, ed., The Clash of Cultures on the Medieval 
Baltic Frontier (Farnham, 2009), 106, 120-21; and eadem, ‘Alexander III and the Crusades’, in 
Peter D. Clarke and Anne J. Duggan, eds., Pope Alexander III (1159-81): The Art of Survival 
(Farnham, 2012), 341, 348. 
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historiography. In 2004 Andrew Jotischky argued that Innocent III’s crusade 
policy can be thought of as ad hoc problem solving: 
 
Because so much of lasting significance was articulated in Innocent’s 
pontificate, it is easy to see him as an idealist who created new ways of 
formulating papal primacy. But Innocent’s crusading policy can just as 
convincingly be interpreted as a series of pragmatic reactions to problems 
as they arose. Some of these problems were chronic, others the result of 
fortuitous circumstances; but all were inherited, rather than being of 
Innocent’s own making.14 
 
Such a way of thinking about papal government spotlights outside initiative in the 
processes of decision-making. In 2012 Anne Duggan picked up this thread and 
emphasised the importance of petitions and outside initiative on the crusade 
decision-making of Pope Alexander III (1159-81), stating that: 
 
Petitioners from the Holy Land, no less than bishops, religious houses and 
secular lords, also sought support for their attempts to attract more 
substantial military assistance from the West. To them he [Alexander III] 
gave letters granting ‘crusading privileges’ and authorizing their quests for 
men and money for the defence of the Latin kingdom, and tried, 
unsuccessfully, to engage the kingdom of France in a crusading effort. 
None of these letters represented papal initiative, however, and it is 
difficult to see in them anything approaching the development of a 
‘crusading policy’.15 
 
Duggan does not rule out the popes taking the initiative in making decisions, but 
her argument cuts to the heart of the historiographical problem: scholars need to 
take more care in judging which decisions were made on the pope’s initiative and 
                                                 
14
 Andrew Jotischky, Crusading and the Crusader States (Harlow, 2004), 171. 
15
 Anne J. Duggan, ‘Alexander ille meus: The Papacy of Alexander III’, in Clarke and Duggan, 
eds., Alexander, 44-45. 
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which were made responsively. It is an attractively simple approach to bundle all 
papal crusade decisions into a supposedly coherent policy, the development of 
which can easily be measured, and compared against other pontificates. Yet this 
does not do justice to the nature of papal government, which was heavily 
influenced by input from diplomats and petitioners: their varied entreaties 
complicated papal decision-making.       
The idea that the popes were more reactive than proactive in their political 
affairs is only just beginning to emerge from the historiography. Aside from a few 
early attempts to argue for responsive papal government, the concept has yet to 
take proper hold in the historiography.
16
 In 2012 Barbara Bombi made the clearest 
exposition of this view: 
                                                 
16
 Historians were warned against looking for a single over-arching papal policy in: Barraclough, 
Papacy, 9-10, although cf. 100; and idem, Papal Provisions: Aspects of Church History 
Constitutional, Legal and Administrative in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1935), 128-30. For an 
early view of totally responsive papal government, see Ernst Pitz, Papstreskript und Kaiserreskript 
im Mittelalter (Tübingen, 1971), 135-36. Pitz has also demonstrated how responsive Pope Gregory 
I’s government was - of the surviving 866 documents issued by Gregory, Pitz has identified 536 of 
them (61.9%) as rescripts: idem, Papstreskripte im frühen Mittelalter: Diplomatische und 
rechtsgeschichtliche Studien zum Brief-Corpus Gregors des Grossen (Sigmaringen, 1990), 241. 
Responsive papal government features alongside policy-making in Colin Morris, The Papal 
Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250 (Oxford, 1989), 212-13, 217-19, 571. More 
recently, in favour of responsive government, see Barbara Bombi, Novella plantatio fidei: 
Missione e crociata nel nord Europa tra la fine del XII e i primi decenni del XIII secolo (Rome, 
2007), 24, and eadem, ‘The Teutonic Order and the Papacy’, in Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes, 
ed., As Ordens Militares: Freires, Guerreiros, Cavaleiros, Actas do VI Encontro sobre Ordens 
Militares, i (Palmela, 2012), 457-58. I have addressed the responsive nature of Honorius’s crusade 
decision-making and the limited influence of the memory of his predecessors in Thomas W. 
Smith, ‘Honorius III and the Crusade: Responsive Papal Government versus the Memory of his 
Predecessors’, in Peter D. Clarke and Charlotte Methuen, eds., The Church on its Past, Studies in 
Church History, 49 (Woodbridge, 2013), 99-109. Also on the responsive papal government, 
although specifically excluding crusades, see Patrick Zutshi, ‘Petitioners, Popes, Proctors: The 
Development of Curial Institutions, c.1150-1250’, in Giancarlo Andenna, ed., Pensiero e 
sperimentazioni istituzionali nella ‘Societas Christiana’ (1046-1250) (Milan, 2007), 268, 293. On 
responsive papal government, see also D.L. d’Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities: A 
Weberian Analysis (Cambridge, 2010), 143. On the importance of outside initiative in shaping 
canon law, see: Anne J. Duggan, ‘De consultationibus: The Role of Episcopal Consultation in the 
Shaping of Canon Law in the Twelfth Century’, in Bruce C. Brasington and Kathleen G. Cushing, 
eds., Bishops, Texts and the Use of Canon Law around 1100: Essays in Honour of Martin Brett 
(Aldershot, 2008), 191; eadem, ‘Making Law or Not? The Function of Papal Decretals in the 
Twelfth Century’, in Peter Erdö and SZ. A. Szuromi, eds., Proceedings of the Thirteenth 
19 
 
 
‘Papal policy’ was hardly ever imposed from above and the extent to 
which from a modern perspective we can assess papal strategies either as 
successful or unsuccessful is often inadequate. Indeed, we should focus on 
the machinery of government and administrative practices that lie behind 
such policies. Arguably, the medieval papacy pursued its interests and 
legislated within its jurisdiction through what we can define ‘responsive 
forms of government’, namely the papacy was approving or rejecting 
requests and petitions according to religious, political, social and 
economic circumstances.
17
 
 
On the subject of medieval diplomacy more broadly, Björn Weiler 
sounded a similar note of caution in 2006:  
 
When considering thirteenth-century diplomatic exchanges, it is important 
to remember that decisions were frequently made on an ad hoc basis. We 
should avoid seeing a detailed and finely thought-out ‘grand strategy’ 
behind every move, without necessarily claiming, as the other extreme, 
that medieval kings had no underlying aims and ambitions at all.
18
 
 
There is thus a balance to be struck between claiming that the papacy was a 
proactive policy-maker and arguing for a totally reactive operation which lacked 
any initiative on the part of the pope. 
Colin Morris and Patrick Zutshi have made significant contributions in 
favour of responsive papal government. In 1989, Morris wrote that: 
                                                                                                                                     
International Congress of Medieval Canon Law, Esztergom, 3-8 August 2008 (Vatican City, 
2010), 41; and eadem, ‘Alexander’, 46. Malcolm Barber made the point that Innocent III 
‘sometimes seems to have formulated policy on the basis of the views of the most recent lobbyist 
to have gained access to him’: Malcolm Barber, The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in 
the High Middle Ages (Harlow, 2000), 136. 
17
 Bombi, ‘Teutonic’, 457-58. 
18
 Björn K.U. Weiler, Henry III of England and the Staufen Empire, 1216-1272 (Woodbridge, 
2006), 14. 
20 
 
 
Papal activity was the outstanding example of what has been called 
‘rescript’ government. This means that letters or rescripts were issued in 
response to petitions from outside the curia, and that they often simply 
echoed the wording of the request ... This administration by response left 
most of the initiative in the hands of petitioners and meant that a vast 
amount of paperwork might imply only a minimum of true policy-making 
... At the heart of what may seem a very active administration the pope or 
king was passive, responding to applications without, in many cases, any 
real capacity to assess the situation. A picture of this kind helps us to 
understand the popes’ remarkable failure (as it has seemed to historians) to 
carry through a systematic reform of the western church. This was not 
mainly because the Roman curia was itself corrupt but because the 
structure was not designed for the exercise of major initiatives or the 
application of consistent policies.
19
 
 
In 2007 Zutshi built upon Morris’s view, stating that: 
 
Historians have tended to see papal decisions as exemplifications or 
reflections of ‘policy’, even when they were in fact responses to requests 
made to the pope and did not result from the pope’s own initiative.20 
  
Morris and Zutshi, however, have both explicitly excluded the crusades from their 
models. Morris thought that the crusade was a vehicle through which the popes 
could indeed introduce policies: 
 
There were ways ... in which the popes could take the initiative in 
introducing policies to the church as a whole ... The custom that a crusade 
was originated by a papal bull was widely accepted in the [twelfth] 
century. It did not mean that the pope’s policy always prevailed ... But it 
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did give the pope the opportunity to originate and plan crusades and to 
publicize his theology of crusading.
21
 
 
Whilst Honorius took the opportunity to propound his theological stance on 
crusading in his letters (see chapter four), his role in planning the Holy Land 
crusades more broadly was much less proactive. Building on the view of Morris, 
Zutshi argued that crusading was of such importance to the popes that this was 
one of the few areas in which they took the initiative in decision-making: 
 
There were areas such as the crusades and the fight against heresy to 
which the popes gave high priority and where one cannot see their actions 
primarily as response to initiatives from outside.
22
  
 
This thesis seeks to extend the model of responsive papal government - from 
which Morris and Zutshi excluded crusading - to include the papacy’s crusade 
organisation.
23
 Whilst recognising that the crusades were of the highest priority to 
Honorius, and that he took more personal initiative regarding crusading than in 
the issue of common letters, it will be argued that the pope’s involvement in the 
Holy Land crusades was almost as responsive to outside initiative as his other 
curial business, such as the granting of privileges and settlement of legal disputes. 
It should therefore form a cornerstone of the model of responsive papal 
government.  
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Honorius did have aims and attitudes towards particular issues and lay 
powers: the objectives of his crusade policy were to recover the Holy Land by 
cooperating with Frederick II in order to secure an imperial crusade, whilst 
simultaneously attempting to safeguard the integrity of the Papal State. Yet, as 
this thesis argues, this policy was pursued responsively and was defined through 
input from outside the papal curia in the form of petitions and political missives, 
not by Honorius functioning as a proactive policy-maker. While Honorius aimed 
to persuade Frederick to depart on crusade, the agenda of negotiations, and the 
course that they took, was very much determined by the initiative of the emperor 
rather than the pope. The pope took the initiative when possible but he was not 
consciously formulating and then implementing a defined crusade policy from the 
curia. 
 Top level political negotiations were inextricably entwined with 
petitioning for privileges, exemptions, and other favours. It obscures the character 
of papal government to draw too rigid a distinction between the issue of curial and 
common letters. Requests from lay powers were often included in their political 
correspondence, to which the pope would reply in a curial letter. Diplomats at the 
curia acting on behalf of lay powers would also request and receive common 
letters whilst conducting political negotiations, such as the archdeacon employed 
by King Andrew II of Hungary (1205-35) in the run up to his crusade (see chapter 
one). As Robert Swanson pointed out, petitions for papal provisions allowed 
‘scope for the play of royal politics’.24 The more powerful the lay ruler, the more 
likely the pope was to grant their wishes. When one studies the papal registers 
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from Honorius’s reign, it quickly becomes clear that while he did issue curial 
letters regarding the crusades on his own initiative, many were actually responses 
to petitions, political letters, and written reports. 
Even Innocent III himself - held to be the most powerful and 
interventionist of medieval popes - admitted the great pressures he was under 
from petitioners in a letter prefacing his sermon collection that he sent to Abbot 
Arnald of Citeaux, probably at some point between 1201 and 1205: 
 
While if only in the office of preaching I might have done that which I say, 
but I am hindered by the assaults [incursibus] of so many legal cases, 
entangled by so many obligations of business, that inevitably I find myself 
divided among many things. Indeed I am not permitted time to think, nor 
allowed space to breathe; I am surrendered to others in such a way that my 
very self seems to have been carried off.
25
 
 
Here then, from no less a figure than Innocent III, is the admission that he was 
perhaps not the primum mobile in the issue of legal documents at least; rather, the 
balance of power appears to have been in favour of the clamouring masses of 
supplicants hammering on the doors of the papal residences. The anonymous 
continuator of The Song of the Cathar Wars, writing between 1218 and 1219, told 
of the pressure put on Innocent by delegates at the Fourth Lateran Council 
(November 1215) over the lands conquered by the Albigensian Crusade. The 
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press of these supplicants was so great that even after an exasperated Innocent 
retired from his palace to a garden to escape their demands, the clergy concerned 
simply burst into the garden and resumed their lobbying.
26
   
Although the personalities of different popes (and their cardinals) must 
have affected the way in which the papacy conducted its political diplomacy - and 
perhaps Honorius took the initiative less than Innocent - the dynamic of papal 
government driven by response appears fundamental to the early thirteenth-
century papacy. 
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Illustration 1. Fresco of St Francis preaching before Pope Honorius III, Basilica of San 
Francesco d’Assisi, Assisi (Wikimedia.org) 
 
26 
 
 
Illustration 2. Mosaic featuring Pope Honorius III in the apse of the Basilica of San Paolo 
fuori le mura, Rome (Wikimedia.org) 
 
The Career of Cencius from Chamberlain to Pope  
The man elected as Pope Honorius III, Cencius, is best known to the 
historiography as Cencius camerarius (chamberlain), a position he first held at the 
curia under Pope Clement III (1187-91). He is regularly claimed to have belonged 
to the Roman noble family of Savelli, but this attribution was demonstrated to be 
27 
 
baseless several years ago.
27
 Rather, we know very little of Cencius’s background 
and early life. We do not even know which decade of the twelfth century he was 
born in. One can only establish a rough date of birth as a matter of conjecture. 
Judging from his known career history before becoming pope, and that the 
curialist Jacques de Vitry, bishop of Acre (1216-28, d.1240), referred to him as 
senex (mature) in 1216, a date in the middle decades of the twelfth century seems 
certain. This can probably be narrowed down to the 1150s, or possibly the early 
1160s.
28
 Raoul Manselli posited a date circa 1160, which is plausible.
29
  
The famous image of Honorius III in the St Francis Cycle at the Basilica 
of San Francesco d’Assisi in Assisi shows a misleadingly youthful pope 
(Illustration 1, p. 25). Fierce controversy swirls around the date of composition 
and the master who accomplished the work, but it was probably executed in the 
last decade of the thirteenth century or the first decade of the fourteenth, and 
scholars have noticed that Honorius’s image is the same as those of Innocent III 
and Gregory IX in the same cycle - they were probably modelled on a portrait of 
Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303).
30
 More trustworthy is the contemporary image 
of Honorius in the mosaic decorating the apse of the Basilica of San Paolo fuori le 
mura in Rome, which portrays the pope with grey-white hair cut in a short style 
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and a short grey beard (Illustration 2, p. 26).
31
 Here, then, is Jacques de Vitry’s 
senex: Honorius - the donor of the image, who admittedly, was unlikely to request 
an unflattering depiction - is depicted as mature and humble, and cuts the figure 
more of a sophisticated statesman than the frail relic that the earlier historiography 
would have us believe. This is presumably how the pope saw himself, and it is 
consistent with his view of the papal office (see chapter four). 
 That Cencius’s family is unknown, and that he acknowledged in one of his 
great works, the Liber censuum (an administrative work he completed in 1192 that 
listed payments due to the Roman Church), that everything he had in life he owed 
to the Church, points to humble parentage and a self-made man.
32
 Matthias 
Thumser has made a case for Cencius belonging to the Capocci family, although 
this attribution was questioned by Sandro Carocci, and one must conclude that 
Cencius’s background remains obscure; in the face of such uncertainty, the 
humble origins still seem most likely.
33
 
 Cencius first features for certain in the historical record in the 1180s, when 
he was appointed chamberlain by Clement III in 1188.
34
 Cencius held a canonry at 
S. Maria Maggiore probably around the same time. Subsequently, he was made 
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cardinal-deacon of S. Lucia in Orthea by Pope Celestine III (1191-98) in 1193.
35
 
In 1194, Celestine promoted Cencius again to become joint chancellor and 
chamberlain. Between 1191 and 1198 he acted as an auditor, hearing litigation 
presented at the curia, which suggests that he had some training in canon law. In 
1196 Cencius gained important diplomatic experience when he was chosen to 
negotiate with Emperor Henry VI (1191-97).
36
 Although his powerful dual role of 
chamberlain-chancellor was abolished by Innocent III on his accession, Cencius 
was promoted to cardinal-priest of SS. Giovanni e Paolo in 1200, perhaps as 
something of a consolation prize.
37
  
 Cencius’s curial career under Innocent III was somewhat unremarkable, 
although this was not necessarily a sign of disfavour as has been claimed.
38
 This 
all changed when Innocent died on 16 July 1216. At Perugia on 18 July Cencius 
was elected by compromise as the successor to Innocent, taking the name 
Honorius III; he was consecrated on 24 July.
39
 Arguably the Holy Land crusade 
was the defining theme of Honorius’s pontificate and the cause to which he was 
most committed, which makes it such a good lens to examine his pontificate as a 
whole. From his accession in 1216 until his death in 1227, Honorius was heavily 
involved in organising the Fifth Crusade, which he had inherited from Innocent, 
and, following its failure, the Crusade of Frederick II. For much of this period, the 
pope’s involvement focused around trying to secure the departure of Frederick II 
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on crusade, and coordinating other lay powers in response to Frederick’s changing 
promises. Papal-imperial negotiations were generally cooperative and fruitful - 
Honorius was of a different mettle to his successor, Gregory IX. 
Honorius also played an instrumental role in ensuring the success of the 
Dominicans, Franciscans, and Carmelites by recognising their Rules in 1216, 
1223, and 1226 respectively, and prohibiting the study of civil law at Paris 
(possibly to encourage the study of theology).
40
 Although not traditionally 
renowned as an author, Honorius was involved in the production of a number of 
important works. Aside from compiling the Liber censuum, he made several 
different recensions of his sermon collection, composed an Ordo Romanus (a 
liturgical work for use at the curia) whilst chamberlain, and near the end of his 
pontificate he ordered the compilation of a new canon law collection from the 
decretal letters in his registers, the Compilatio quinta, which was promulgated 
circa 1226.
41
 
 Honorius was therefore a figure of some note at the papal curia: a 
seasoned administrator, a not insignificant author, and a man with diplomatic 
experience of dealing with the emperors. He was by no means an unworthy 
successor to Innocent III. Indeed, that Honorius experienced a different 
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upbringing to noble, university-educated men like Innocent, may offer a clue to 
the innovative theological stance revealed in chapter four.  
 
Sources and Methodology 
Honorius’s pontificate is ill-served by chronicle evidence, which is sparse and 
cursory in nature, and unfortunately there is no known biographical account such 
as the Gesta Innocentii III for Innocent III’s reign.42 There are, however, much 
fuller accounts of the Fifth Crusade by participants which can shed some 
(indirect) light on Honorius - these and other chronicles are drawn on where 
relevant throughout this thesis to contextualise the diplomatic correspondence.
43
 
As for most medieval popes, the main sources for the reign of Honorius are his 
letters, and specifically for Honorius, the copies of outgoing letters entered into 
his registers. The manuscripts of Honorius’s registers, Vatican City, Archivio 
Segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticana 9-13, have never been printed in full.  
A number of editors have printed selections of letters from the registers. 
C.A. Horoy collected a large part of Honorius’s letters and sermons in his Opera 
Omnia, published between 1879 and 1882.
44
 Horoy’s title, however, belies the 
fact that this collection is far from complete: a large number of important letters 
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are missing. He was also merely reprinting the texts of others, and many letters 
are presented in a mutilated form, lacking whole clauses, and featuring 
transcriptional errors. In 1883, Carl Rodenberg made a good edition of the letters 
from the papal registers regarding the papacy and the Empire.
45
 Rodenberg’s 
selection of letters, however, is obviously far from an accurate reflection of the 
content of Honorius’s register as a whole, and there are some minor errors of 
transcription. Petrus Pressutti calendared Honorius’s registers in two volumes 
published in 1888 and 1895.
46
 Pressutti’s calendar remains an excellent finding 
aid when used in conjunction with the manuscripts, but his extracts alone cannot 
be relied upon as a guide to the content of Honorius’s letters. In 1965 Demetrio 
Mansilla printed a collection of documents from Honorius’s pontificate that 
regarded Spain.
47
 Most recently, in 2013, Claverie appended his study of 
Honorius with the texts of one hundred and fifty letters from the registers.
48
  
Because Honorius’s registers lack a complete modern edition, it is 
necessary to go back to the manuscripts. This thesis is based upon the study of the 
register manuscripts, along with Pressutti’s calendar as a finding aid, and 
references are given to these in the notes. Pressutti’s calendar lists printed 
versions of letters where they exist (up to his time of writing at the end of the 
nineteenth century). Where original letters (letters that were not copied into the 
registers) have been consulted in print, the Horoy edition - which is easier to find 
than some of the obscure volumes he was reprinting letters from - is cited for ease 
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of reference. The evidence from Honorius’s letters is contextualised with imperial 
and royal letters and chronicles, which have been accessed in printed versions (I 
have also examined the manuscripts wherever possible); references are given to 
the best or most easily available editions. 
The nature of the thirteenth-century papal registers is well known to 
scholars. Nevertheless, as the most important source material for this thesis, it is 
necessary to provide a summary here. Honorius’s registers form some of the 
precious early survivals from the Registra Vaticana series: volumes of copies of 
outgoing papal documents. Apart from an eleventh-century copy of parts of the 
register of Pope John VIII (872-82), that of Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) is the 
only one to survive before those of Innocent III, which begin an almost unbroken 
series throughout the Middle Ages.
49
 
Registra Vaticana is the only series of registers that was kept during 
Honorius’s reign. There does not seem to have been a special register kept for 
political affairs in the fashion of Innocent III’s Regestum Innocentii III papae 
super negotio Romani imperii.
50
 Geoffrey Barraclough has noted that aside from 
the Registra Vaticana series, it was not until the beginning of the fourteenth 
century that the inception of almost all the series of curial registers was 
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witnessed.
51
 From the start of Pope Clement VI’s reign (1342), we have a register 
of successful petitions submitted to the papacy in the Registra Supplicationum 
series. Zutshi has commented critically on the tenuous evidence held up by others 
as evidence of a register of petitions under Popes Clement V (1305-14) and John 
XXII (1316-34), but does state that the registration of petitions could have begun 
under Pope Benedict XII (1334-42).
52
 There was thus no archiving of 
supplications during Honorius’s pontificate (see below). 
Registration - the act of copying ‘original’ outgoing papal letters into a 
register - was a selective practice under Honorius: there was no system for 
deciding which letters to enregister.
53
 When supplemented with surviving original 
papal letters, the registers provide us with an extremely valuable source for the 
study of Honorius’s reign, but one that is far from complete. Petitioners who were 
willing to pay could have their document registered as a safeguard in case of the 
loss of the original, but the demand for registration at the request of supplicants 
was kept deliberately low by high costs. The papacy wanted to deter registration 
because the costs outweighed the benefits: it was cheaper to continue detecting 
forged letters by long-winded tests than to begin a system of total registration.
54
 
Increased demand for registration would have further burdened chancery officials. 
Papal complaints about the weight of business they had to deal with are a frequent 
occurrence in papal letters, and Honorius himself complained that he was required 
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to have a superhuman memory when he was but a man (although ironically, total 
registration of outgoing letters would have eased this burden).
55
 
Registration at the papacy’s behest was reserved for letters that were 
deemed important enough to keep a record of. Paradoxically, although the fact 
that a letter was enregistered suggests its significance, many such letters were not 
enregistered.
56
 It has been estimated that no more than one-tenth of medieval 
papal letters were registered, and Sayers gives a greater estimate of around one-
quarter for Honorius’s pontificate.57 
What appears to be at least a representative corpus, if not the majority, of 
Honorius’s letters on the Holy Land crusades were entered into his registers for 
safe-keeping, but one must acknowledge that there may be gaps that cannot be 
identified and partially filled in with other evidence (such as the lost papal crusade 
call that was clearly sent to Frederick II at the end of 1218, the existence of which 
can be established through Frederick’s extant reply of 12 January 1219 - see 
chapter one). This is in line with Harry Bresslau and Paul Rabikauskas’s 
statements that while many important political letters were frequently registered, 
this was by no means the rule, and the registers do not represent a complete record 
of the popes’ political correspondence.58 
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Pressutti calendared 6,288 letters issued by Honorius, of which 5,144 
letters were entered into the papal registers.
59
 Sayers has multiplied the average 
number of letters registered per year (482.5) by four to give a potential total 
yearly chancery output of somewhere around 1,930 letters. Taking this figure and 
multiplying it by the ten years and eight months of Honorius’s reign gives a 
potential total output of around 20,573.8 letters for the whole of Honorius’s 
pontificate. This figure seems plausible and is supported by Sayers’ count of 
scribes employed under Honorius: somewhere between sixty-four and seventy-
three in total, perhaps with some twenty-five to thirty employed at once and each 
producing some five documents a day.
60
 Therefore it is abundantly clear that 
many letters are missing from the registers: at least some of them must concern 
the Holy Land crusades. 
The letters copied into the registers were not entered in a strict 
chronological order but a seemingly erratic series of rough groupings of letters 
issued on similar dates which was frequently disrupted.
61
 Letters concerning the 
same or related matters might also be gathered together, and were sometimes 
enregistered as a group once a final decision had been made. These groupings 
stemmed predominantly from the nature of papal government. When batches of 
petitions were accepted and subsequently selected for registration, they would 
often be registered together. 
                                                 
59
 Sayers, Government, 50-51. 
60
 Ibid., 56, 50-52. 
61
 Ibid., 84; Bresslau, Handbuch, i, 124; Carl Rodenberg, ‘Ueber die Register Honorius III., 
Gregors IX. und Innocenz IV.’, Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche 
Geschichtskunde, 10 (1885), 516.  
37 
 
Letters that were selected were often ruthlessly abbreviated during 
registration to save space.
62
 Nevertheless, this did not affect the internal contents 
of the letter, and despite the abbreviation of words and some protocols, the text 
should be a trustworthy representation of the original.
63
 The greeting protocol is 
always abridged, or omitted altogether, and the addressee’s name is written in the 
margin. Common clauses are abbreviated, along with the main body of text.
64
 
Rabikauskas has stated that chancery scribes would often abbreviate the 
dating clause of letters to ‘Dat[um] ut supra’ to signify that a letter was issued on 
the same day as the letter registered immediately before it.
65
 This was regularly 
then further abbreviated simply to ‘Dat’, and often even this was omitted to save 
time. No letter would have been purposely entered into the register without a date 
except in the case of scribal error. Where possible, and depending on the internal 
evidence of the letters in question, in this thesis some of the letters which Pressutti 
calendared as ‘undated’ are therefore attributed dates according to this system. 
There are, nevertheless, a number of threats to the accuracy of the texts. 
There is the possibility that a register copy was made from a letter draft that was 
subsequently altered before engrossment, but without being updated in the 
register.
66
 Because the pope often sent letters to distant delegates that were only to 
be enacted under certain circumstances, there is also the possibility that letters 
could be countermanded after registration and not noted in the registers. Similarly, 
just because a letter was despatched from the curia does not mean that it reached 
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its destination, or that the circumstances which brought about its production had 
not changed, thus precluding its enactment.
67
 The less glamorous spectre of 
scribal error is also a possibility, and Friedrich Bock has identified examples of 
divergences between extant original letters and Honorius’s register copies.68 
Honorius’s registers contain many letters which were the end products of 
petitioning, yet the petitions themselves - which were so important to the 
operation of papal government - do not survive. One extant petition which may 
date from Honorius’s reign (Franco Bartoloni dated it to 1223 x 1231) was 
submitted by the cathedral chapter of Spoleto.
69
 It concerns their dispute with the 
bishop, and requests absolution from the interdict that the bishop had placed them 
under for omitting a ceremony during the liturgy. Another rare survival is a 
petition from late January or February 1224, in which King Louis VIII of France 
(1223-26) requested certain conditions prior to leading an expedition against 
heretics in the Languedoc.
70
  Fortunately, despite the loss of the original petitions 
en masse, their influence can still be traced through the extant source material: 
requests from lay powers submitted in the form of political letters survive more 
regularly, and the content of successful petitions can be established with some 
certainty from the narratio clauses of the resulting papal documents, which 
summarise their requests. 
Petitions have recently become the focus of scholarly attention, although 
early thirteenth-century petitions to the papacy have not featured heavily in this 
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research, presumably because of the lack of sources.
71
 Zutshi has stated that ‘the 
vast majority of papal letters were issued in response to petitions, rather than on 
the initiative of the pope or the papal government.’72 They represented the 
‘demand’ rather than the ‘supply’ side of medieval government, although in the 
case of Honorius’s pontificate, as for all medieval popes before the mid-fourteenth 
century, the ‘demand’ side is massively under-represented in the surviving 
sources.
73
 Petitions do not survive in any great numbers because after being 
granted or rejected by the papacy, they were of little value. The letter that resulted 
from the petition was important, not the petition itself. A petition which had been 
rejected was of even less worth.
74
  
The different types of petition (petitio or supplicatio) that Zutshi has 
identified for the fourteenth century can also be found in the early thirteenth 
century: petitions for graces; petitions for letters of justice - these often sought the 
appointment of judges delegate to hear cases outside the curia; petitions for 
expectatives - essentially an advance reservation for benefices before they were 
available; petitions for the appointment of an auditor to hear a case at the curia; 
and petitions to the penitentiary.
75
 In this thesis entreaties preserved in political 
missives and framed in the language of petitioning, employing verbs such as 
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supplicare or petere, are analysed alongside the more formal categories outlined 
above under the lexical umbrella of ‘petitions’ because they had exactly the same 
impact upon the processes of papal government. Although these political letters 
were different in terms of diplomatic and would bypass most of the petitioning 
procedures outlined directly below, the intention and purpose of the documents 
were, nevertheless, the same. 
To stand any chance of being granted, petitions had to be composed in the 
correct style required by the chancery and therefore took on a common, 
regimented form.
76
 The words used in the successful petition were frequently 
repeated in the resultant papal letter.
77
 Two formularies survive from Honorius’s 
reign that were used as guides to help supplicants compose petitions.
78
 Cardinal 
Guala Bicchieri’s formulary dates from 1226 x 1227, and actually received 
Honorius’s approval.79 The other survival is the Rhetorica antiqua, composed by 
Master Boncompagno da Signa sometime between c.1215 and c.1226.
80
 
Boncompagno’s formulary is arranged under forty-five headings on subjects such 
as mandates, applying for vacant benefices, and absolution from 
excommunication, and begins by defining a petition: ‘Petitio est brevis et 
expressus dicendi modus, qui principalia tangit et accessoria non omittit’.81 
Formularies such as these - particularly Guala’s, according to Zutshi - were 
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probably aimed at poor supplicants, to help them compose their petitions without 
paying for the services of a professional, as was becoming common during the 
early thirteenth century.
82
  
Despite the existence of these formularies, most petitioners would still 
have sought the services of a professional to give their petition a better chance of 
succeeding.
83
 Employing a third party to deal with one’s business at the curia also 
saved the supplicant the difficulties involved in seeking out the curia on the move 
and the potentially dangerous journey - traversing the normal land route from 
England to Rome, for instance, took around six weeks.
84
 Even those who were 
presenting themselves in person at the curia could still benefit from the proctors’ 
expertise.
85
 The increasing number of petitions and their complexity led to 
changes in petitioning practice in the thirteenth century.
86
 One of these changes 
was the widespread employment of proctors to impetrate on behalf of supplicants. 
Often (but not always) Italian, proctors utilised personal relationships and 
unofficial networks that they had developed over a long period of service at the 
curia to the advantage of the fee-paying supplicants who made up their clientele.
87
 
Proctors (appointed by a procuratorium letter) acted as the main intermediaries 
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between petitioners and the curia.
88
 Zutshi has described the three categories of 
proctor that were active at the curia in the thirteenth century: non-resident 
proctors, who were sent to acquire a single or small number of documents for the 
supplicant and tended to act on behalf of one or a handful of clients; resident 
proctors, who acted in a professional or semi-professional capacity, and 
represented a larger number of clients over a longer period; and general proctors, 
who were resident proctors which represented religious orders (and usually 
belonged to the order themselves).
89
  
The resident (also called ‘standing’) proctors would follow the movements 
of the curia from Rome to the other papal residences.
90
 Because they were 
conducting regular rather than ‘one-off’ business at the curia, their services were 
employed by lay powers and religious orders.
91
 However, both Innocent III and 
Honorius III tried to clamp down on the actions of resident proctors. Honorius 
ordered away any resident proctors who had been present at his curia for longer 
than two years, and tried to prevent ecclesiastical and secular petitioners from 
employing them; instead they were to present their petitions personally in one 
go.
92
 
The particular attraction of employing a proctor lay in their talents for 
navigating the offices of the curia and dealing with the technical and legal 
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complexities of petitioning.
93
 The familiarity of proctors with (and at) the curia 
benefitted supplicants in two ways. Firstly, proctors were well placed to advise 
their clients on whether the general circumstances of the curia would be 
favourable to their petition.
94
 Secondly, the proctors had access to their own 
unofficial personal networks, built up over their time at court and unavailable to 
petitioners themselves, which they could exploit to help ease a petition’s journey 
through the system.
95
 The work of proctors was not of a merely mechanical 
nature, but was an occupation which ‘required skill and persistence.’96 We can 
assume that the chances of achieving the successful issue of a papal document 
depended to some extent on the quality of the proctor selected and the extent of 
his network of contacts.  
Much of the activity of proctors in the reign of Honorius is obscure 
because of a scarcity of evidence. We know they existed and they can sometimes 
be identified in the impetration of documents. For instance, the Teutonic Order - 
which was extremely successful in exploiting its position as a papal-imperial go-
between to acquire privileges - made good use of proctors at Honorius’s curia (see 
chapter two). Sayers has noted another exception, Master Stephen of Ecton, who 
dealt with diplomatic affairs for King Henry III of England (1216-72).
97
 It is clear 
that although Italian proctors dominated the curia in the thirteenth century, they 
did not have a monopoly.
98
 The sources for fourteenth-century proctors are much 
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more plentiful however, and Bombi has demonstrated how important ‘the creation 
of a network of unofficial contacts’ was to the English Crown’s success in 
communicating with and petitioning the papacy in the first half of the fourteenth 
century, a political reality which must surely also have existed in Honorius’s 
time.
99
 It is therefore important to be aware of these personnel and the diplomatic 
processes that were occurring behind the scenes in the issue of Honorius’s letters. 
Where possible I have brought these aspects to the fore of my analysis, such as the 
archdeacon employed by Andrew II (see chapter one) and the Teutonic Order’s 
proctors (see chapter two). 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The three chapters of part one provide a 
detailed analysis of Honorius III’s relations with the lay powers on the subject of 
the Holy Land crusades, focusing on a close study of the diplomatic evidence, 
contextualised where relevant by narrative sources. The chapters in part one are 
arranged chronologically and divided according to the different ‘phases’ of 
Honorius’s involvement in the Holy Land crusades. Chapter one addresses the 
years 1216-18, when Honorius was handling the takeover of the organisation of 
the Fifth Crusade from his predecessor. At this time he was working towards the 
launch of the first crusade contingents, which departed in 1217. Between 1216 
and 1218, Honorius’s diplomacy centred on negotiations with King Andrew II of 
Hungary, and it is argued for the first time that Andrew was Honorius’s favoured 
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choice of leader for the Fifth Crusade. Chapter two tackles the years of the Fifth 
Crusade proper, from 1218 to 1221. After Andrew II’s abandonment of the 
crusade in early 1218, the focus of papal diplomacy shifted to securing the 
participation of the emperor-elect Frederick II, which it is contended was made in 
response to an entreaty from the crusaders. The date of Honorius’s approach to 
Frederick is also pushed back to the very end of 1218. Chapter three covers the 
years from the aftermath of the Fifth Crusade to the end of Honorius’s pontificate, 
1221-27, which witnessed renewed efforts to achieve a successful imperial 
crusade. It is asserted that the gaps in papal crusade correspondence between the 
three papal-imperial colloquia that trisect the period testify to the responsive 
nature of papal government: without interaction with the lay powers, Honorius 
was not taking important crusade decisions on his own initiative. 
A chronological approach has been selected for part one for a number of 
reasons. In addition to providing a chronological framework in which the thematic 
chapters of part two can easily be located, it is also better suited to the 
presentation of the evidence. A chronological structure brings into sharper focus 
the responsive day-to-day nature of business being conducted at Honorius’s curia 
and the ebb and flow of petitioners and diplomats. Such an approach was 
successfully adopted by John Moore in his biography of Innocent III, who sought 
‘to recapture events as Innocent experienced them and to look for their impact on 
him personally and on the decisions he made.’100 Chapters one to three 
demonstrate how responsive the curia was to outside initiative in taking policy 
decisions on the crusade. 
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 Part two of the thesis is made up of three thematic chapters on aspects of 
papal government under Honorius which extend the study of responsive papal 
government, whilst also demonstrating some more proactive aspects. Chapter four 
addresses the arengae of Honorius’s letters. It represents the first study of his 
arengae to be undertaken, and reveals aspects of continuity and innovation in 
papal diplomatic, as well as a pope who was proactively propounding an original 
and distinct theological conception of his office to that of Innocent III. Chapter 
five examines Honorius’s deployment of legates to support the Holy Land 
crusades. Rather than merely being instruments through which curial policy was 
implemented, this chapter shows that Honorius was often responding to the 
initiative of these largely autonomous agents. Chapter six is the first 
comprehensive investigation of the 1215 tax of a twentieth on ecclesiastical 
income levied to fund the Fifth Crusade. Honorius’s administration of the tax 
witnessed both responsive papal government and policy-making operating in 
tandem. The occasions of Honorius taking a more proactive stance help to define 
the limits of the model of responsive papal government. 
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PART I 
PAPAL DIPLOMACY, 1216-1227 
48 
 
Chapter 1 
The Preparation of the Fifth Crusade, 1216-1218 
 
The originator of the Fifth Crusade, Pope Innocent III, died at Perugia on 16 July 
1216. Less than a year later, in May 1217, the first contingents of the expedition 
armed themselves and boarded ships bound for the Holy Land. After the crusaders 
assembled in the kingdom of Jerusalem at Acre and skirmished around Mount 
Thabor during the winter of 1217-18, one of the expedition’s most prominent and 
promising leaders, King Andrew II of Hungary, cut short his campaign and 
returned to the West in early 1218. 
From July 1216 onwards, Honorius took over the preparation of the 
crusade, and with it the responsibility of transforming Innocent’s vision into 
reality. He had inherited the deadline (1 June 1217) and departure ports (Brindisi 
and Messina) circulated by Innocent in Ad liberandam - the constitution appended 
to the decrees of Lateran IV. Otherwise, Honorius’s role in the preparation of the 
first stages of the Fifth Crusade was shaped more by the ever-changing political 
context than a concern to adhere to an Innocentian policy. This chapter charts the 
course of papal diplomacy with the lay powers over the period 1216 to 1218 and 
demonstrates Honorius’s level of responsiveness to outside initiative - chiefly the 
receipt of entreaties from lay powers - in making crusade decisions. 
Beginning with the immediate assumption of Innocent’s crusade business 
and the negotiations with Andrew II over his vow, this chapter then considers the 
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significance of the imperial delegation sent to the curia by Frederick, king of 
Sicily and emperor-elect of Germany, before finally analysing Andrew’s 
expedition and its aftermath. Analysis of papal diplomacy from between 1216 and 
1218 reveals the hitherto unappreciated importance of Andrew II in the Fifth 
Crusade. Though he has been neglected and maligned in the historiography, 
examination of the papal registers reveals Andrew to have been the most 
significant leader in the crusade’s early stages. The chapter will also reassess the 
role of Frederick in papal crusade diplomacy and will propound an argument that 
pushes back the date of his involvement as the crusade’s commander-in-waiting to 
the very end of 1218: after Andrew’s abandonment of the crusade.  
 Honorius’s reputation for diplomacy with the lay powers has received 
mixed reviews in the historiography. In 1931 Ernst Kantorowicz wrote that 
Honorius seemed a ‘pigmy’ in comparison to Innocent, and claimed that he was 
old, frail, and inclined towards gentleness.
1
 Joseph Donovan put forward a much 
more sympathetic appraisal of Honorius in 1950, writing that he ‘ably seconded’ 
Innocent’s involvement in crusading.2 Steven Runciman noted in 1954 that on his 
accession to the papal throne ‘Honorius eagerly took over his great predecessor’s 
programme.’3 These more positive opinions found support in Raoul Manselli’s 
article of 1963, which judged Honorius not as weak and submissive, but wise and 
prudent, noting perceptibly that he compares favourably with the ‘great’ popes of 
his time.
4
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 This positive assessment was tempered by Thomas Van Cleve. In 1969 he 
regarded the pope as ‘aged but vigorous’, but in 1972 wrote that Innocent had 
been ‘inflexible’ - thereby implying strong - whereas Honorius was ‘mild and 
conciliatory’ - character traits which Frederick took advantage of.5 Powell’s 1977 
article on Honorius and the leadership of the crusade found that the pope’s 
negotiations with Frederick were marked by cooperation and conciliation rather 
than exploitation on either side.
6
 Powell also defined Honorius’s crusade policy as 
being Innocent’s crusade ‘program’ coupled with a revival of the model of papal-
imperial cooperation witnessed in Clement III’s reign.7 Powell developed this 
view in his 1986 monograph on the Fifth Crusade, in which he considered 
Honorius to have been a vigorous successor of Innocent.
8
 
 Hans Mayer took a somewhat dim view of Honorius in 1988, criticising 
him as ‘a lesser man [than Innocent], lacking the political strength and energy of 
his great predecessor.’9 Mayer took this unfavourable comparison one step further 
and claimed that Honorius’s own successor, Gregory IX, was ‘made of sterner 
stuff’.10 In the same year, and in a similar vein to Powell, David Abulafia 
highlighted Honorius’s willingness to cooperate with Frederick, and thought that 
although conciliatory by nature, Honorius possessed a resolute grip on papal 
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rights, something demonstrated in his letters, which Abulafia judged to be 
respectful but firm in tone.
11
 
 Morris stated in 1989 that Honorius was not a mere ‘pale and senile 
shadow of Innocent’.12 He remained critical, however, of Honorius’s crusade 
organisation, arguing that Innocent’s ‘direction would have been more forceful 
than that of his successor, Honorius, and he was much more likely to secure the 
participation of Frederick.’13 Wolfgang Stürner adopted a similar position to 
Powell and Abulafia in 1992 when he wrote that continuing the Fifth Crusade’s 
preparations was the central concern of Honorius’s pontificate, and that, compared 
to Innocent, he adopted a more flexible attitude towards the lay powers.
14
  
This more positive portrayal of Honorius has been built upon most 
recently by Fonnesberg-Schmidt, who in 2007 portrayed Honorius as an 
innovative successor to Innocent.
15
 Likewise, in 2009, Rist drew attention to 
Honorius’s stinging rebukes of southern French lay powers, drawing into question 
his perhaps unwarranted reputation for mildness.
16
 Nevertheless, it was 
maintained in the second edition of The Oxford Dictionary of Popes in 2010 that 
Honorius was ‘outmanoeuvred politically by the emperor’.17 
 This chapter and the two that follow seek to demonstrate that Honorius’s 
diplomacy with the lay powers defies explanation as simply conciliatory or mild. 
There were occasions when Honorius was cooperative and lenient, but at other 
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times the pope adopted a more robust stance. These fluctuations can be interpreted 
largely as specific responses to changes in the political situation.   
 
 
Map 1. The Holy Land (taken from Powell, Anatomy, 129) 
 
Andrew II’s Negotiations 
The Fifth Crusade appears to be the first issue that Honorius dealt with on his 
accession to the papal throne. The first document registered in his pontificate was 
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a letter dated at Perugia on 25 July 1216 - the very day after Honorius’s 
consecration - and sent to the king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne (1210-25, 
d.1237), the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch, the masters of the Hospitallers 
and Templars, and the Christian faithful of the Holy Land.
18
 The letter announced 
the death of Innocent and the succession of Honorius. The new pope urged the 
inhabitants of the rump kingdom of Jerusalem not to fear, because despite 
Innocent’s death the crusade was still coming to the Holy Land. Innocent III had 
sent a similar ‘mail-shot’ when he succeeded Celestine III, which included a letter 
to Patriarch Aimery of Jerusalem (1194/97-1202).
19
 But while Innocent’s letter 
only pledged ‘that one of his many future duties as pope would be to attempt a 
resolution of the Holy Land problem’, Honorius had inherited the outcome of that 
resolution - the Fifth Crusade - which was on the verge of becoming a reality.
20
 
 The Franks of the kingdom of Jerusalem had no reason to be apprehensive 
about the change in pope. Honorius was quite capable of coordinating the coming 
crusade, and besides, a large carryover of the members of the College of Cardinals 
from Innocent’s pontificate meant that Honorius was surrounded by experienced 
advisers who had dealt with preparations for the expedition under his predecessor. 
Although the character of the College could be changed with the appointment of 
new cardinals, there does not seem to have been a great sea-change under 
Honorius: only two new cardinals were appointed in December 1216, and 
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Honorius only made a total of six appointments over his entire pontificate.
21
 
Therefore most of the cardinals at Honorius’s curia were those appointed by 
Innocent. The influence of the cardinals and the nature of Honorius’s discussions 
with them cannot be gleaned from the extant source material. Whether the papacy 
responded as one man (the pope) or collectively (the pope and his cardinals), 
however, does not undermine the argument that the crusade decisions of the curia 
were influenced more by external initiative than internal policy formulation; 
indeed, the impact of the latter is difficult to find in the papal registers. 
John Watts has written that medieval politics may be better understood by 
arguing for the importance of political structures rather than individuals, whilst 
recognising that individuals were not unimportant.
22
 Although the influence of 
curialists cannot be discerned from the sources, and it is relatively rare for the 
College of Cardinals to be explicitly mentioned in papal letters, it should be 
remembered that they played an instrumental role in the day-to-day issue of papal 
documents. 
 Shortly after the letter of 25 July, Honorius continued in his crusade 
administration by despatching a letter on 7 August to the episcopate and crusaders 
of France, including Odo, duke of Burgundy, Hugh, count of La Marche, Drogo 
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de Merlo, constable of France, and Simon de Joinville, seneschal of Champagne.
23
 
The pope urged the recipients to prepare for Innocent’s deadline, and hoped that 
by making ready they might inspire others to do so as well. If the Fifth Crusade 
was to avoid becoming a fiasco in its opening stages, Honorius could not alter the 
inherited deadline.
24
 
Honorius also spurred on the monarchs of the West to crusade, and in 
early 1217 he was engaged in negotiations with Andrew II to fulfil the crusade 
vow inherited from his father, Béla III (1172-96). On the sidelines of this 
correspondence was a papal letter sent to the young Henry III of England on 20 
January 1217.
25
 Honorius offered his condolences to the nine-year-old boy on the 
death of his father, King John (1199-1216), and congratulated him on his 
coronation. Like Andrew, Henry had also inherited an unfulfilled crusade vow 
from his father, but as the letter acknowledged, Honorius did not expect him to 
carry it out at such a young age. Rather, the pope was anxious to shore up the 
vulnerable kingdom of England, which was in the throes of civil war, and the 
same letter also laid out the role of the papal legate, Guala, cardinal-priest of S. 
Martino (1211-27), as the king’s personal protector. 
 In addition to inheriting John’s crusade vow, the young Henry had also 
made his own at his coronation in October 1216, in a conscious bid to add the 
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further layer of papal protection awarded to crusaders.
26
 Honorius must have 
hoped that Henry would fulfil this eventually, presumably after the Fifth Crusade, 
which saw an English contingent depart under Earl Ranulf of Chester in 1218.
27
 
 The pope thus had no realistic hope of English royal participation in the 
Fifth Crusade. In addition, after his service on the Third Crusade (1189-92), the 
king of France, Philip Augustus (1180-1223), remained uninterested in crusading 
to either the Holy Land or southern France, and the young emperor-elect 
Frederick was consolidating his position as king of the Romans (Germany).
28
 The 
king of Hungary was, however, a viable target. Hungary has often been 
overlooked by historians of the crusades, despite the fact that its monarchy had 
traditionally been closely associated with the papacy.
29
 By the early thirteenth 
century Hungary was a ‘politically mature’ nation that was responsive to the 
crusade call.
30
 Early thirteenth-century Hungary was a country that had the 
leadership, financial machinery, and popular support to successfully prosecute a 
crusade, combined with a royal house experienced in diplomacy with the papal 
curia. It is not surprising then, although it is certainly underappreciated, that 
Honorius looked to Andrew II as a significant leader of the Fifth Crusade, if not 
the leader of the expedition. 
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 Honorius and Andrew were in close contact prior to his crusade, and the 
pope appears to have been impatient for the king to fulfil his vow. Attempting to 
coordinate the different western crusade contingents, which were all preparing at 
different speeds, was a difficult task. This was made readily apparent in a letter 
Honorius despatched to the crusaders of Cologne on 27 January 1217.
31
 The pope 
urged them to depart by the June deadline because Andrew was ‘preparing 
himself splendidly’.32 There is, however, reason to believe that the pope’s letter to 
Cologne may have put an optimistic spin on Andrew’s true situation so as to 
encourage the Germans to leave. In a letter addressed to the king issued only a 
few days later on 30 January, the pope revealed his true opinion of Andrew’s 
readiness. This was a reply to a letter of Andrew’s that claimed he was unprepared 
to leave on account of his candidacy for the throne of the Latin Empire.
33
 While 
the pope accepted the general tenor of Andrew’s claims that he still desired to 
rescue the Holy Land, Honorius pushed him to leave by Easter.
34
 
The papal letter continued that Andrew’s delays were an affront to the 
pope that could not be tolerated with patience. As a result of which, Honorius was 
sending Hugolino, cardinal-bishop of Ostia (1206-27), with full papal authority to 
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investigate Andrew’s circumstances and to deal with the other matters requested 
in his letter.
35
 
Hugolino never actually reached Hungary. Possibly this was on account of 
his peacemaking mission in northern Italy (see chapter five), or because the threat 
of a papal representative intervening in his affairs persuaded Andrew to stop 
stalling for time. In any case, the selection of such an important legate, one of the 
most prominent in the College of Cardinals - who would later be elected in 1227 
as Honorius’s successor, Gregory IX - implies the importance which the pope 
attached to Andrew’s crusade. 
The other requests that Andrew made in his letter fit into the context of 
certain concessions that the king was petitioning for in January prior to his 
crusade. So as to circumvent delays and secure his participation, Honorius is 
recorded to have granted (at least some of) his supplications. Crusading was a 
risky undertaking and the king was justified in requesting the confirmation of the 
succession to the Hungarian throne in the event of his death. A papal document 
issued on 11 February confirmed that Andrew, his family, kingdom and goods 
were all taken under papal protection and that Andrew’s firstborn son, Béla, 
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would succeed to the throne should certain news be received of the king’s death 
on crusade.
36
 
Honorius granted another concession in a letter of 25 February, sent to the 
archbishop of Kalocsa and the bishop of Veszprém, which allowed them to 
absolve five or six of the guardians of Andrew’s sons from their crusade vows.37 
A small amount of papal leverage over the king was exerted with the condition 
that should the monarch fail to depart, this concession would be rendered null and 
void. This letter also allows a glimpse into the events at the curia that led to its 
creation and likely that of the other documents issued to, or relating to, Andrew 
around this time. Although the previous papal letters revealed that the king had 
despatched written entreaties to the papacy, that of 25 February demonstrated that 
Andrew was also using a representative to present his petitions at the curia 
(‘supplicavit’), an unknown archdeacon with the initial D. 
It is probable that this archdeacon was involved in the issue of all the 
letters regarding Andrew’s crusade, having been sent from Hungary bearing a 
number of written letters and petitions, which the representative could supplement 
orally with information supplied by Andrew. D could then carry back (or send 
through a third party) any papal documents that might be issued to the Hungarian 
royal court. The first letter in the batch of four that related to Andrew was that 
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sent to Cologne and dated 27 January, and the last was the letter of 25 February (it 
is of course possible that more were issued but not registered). There are no more 
letters recorded leaving the curia bound for Hungary until the end of July 1217, 
and these were not sought by Andrew, but were instead issued in response to the 
unforeseen capture of the newly crowned Latin Emperor, Peter II (d. circa 1217), 
in the mountains of Albania.
38
 The archdeacon could therefore have arrived at the 
curia sometime around mid-January and left with documents in hand at the end of 
February.  
 At the same time Honorius was trying to speed Andrew to the Holy Land, 
a petition arrived from Albert of Orlamünde, count of Holstein, requesting that a 
number of his vassals be allowed to commute their Holy Land crusade vows to 
fight with him against pagans in Livonia instead. In a letter issued on 25 January 
that granted Albert’s petition, Honorius wrote back that he was despatching letters 
which permitted the bishop of Schleswig and the abbot of Aurea Insula in the 
diocese of Schleswig to allow ten of Albert’s knights to commute their vows if 
they thought it would benefit the land of Livonia.
39
 Honorius’s justification, that it 
made no sense to fight enemies of Christ in one region while leaving other regions 
open to their attacks, was perhaps glossing the situation.
40
 Whilst supportive of 
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the crusade in Livonia it is unlikely that Honorius would have elected to divert a 
small but powerful contingent of crusaders from the Fifth Crusade, for which 
preparations were in full swing. This episode ably demonstrates the power that 
petitions could have over the processes of papal government.
41
 
 
Frederick II’s Imperial Delegation 
Early 1217 was a busy time at the curia for crusade preparations. Soon after 
dealing with Andrew’s requests the pope also received an official delegation from 
Frederick II, emperor-elect.
42
 The purpose of this delegation can be approximated 
from the contents of Honorius’s written response, which the pope addressed to 
Frederick on 8 April.
43
 The letter explained that the delegation (the abbot of St 
Gall, William, marquis of Montferrat, the dean of Speyer, and the castellanus of 
San Miniato) had raised the issue of Frederick’s crusade vow, taken at his 
coronation as King of the Romans at Aachen in 1215, and Stürner suggests the 
possibility that they may also have discussed the imperial coronation.
44
 Honorius 
                                                                                                                                     
Kehr (Berlin, 1926), 288: ‘Neque enim virtutis est alibi a Saracenis christianos eruere, alibi 
christianos Saracenorum tyrannidi oppressionique exponere.’ 
41
 Smith, ‘Honorius’, 105. 
42
 Stürner, Friedrich, i, 231. 
43
 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 93r: ‘Nos ergo ad ea que Dei et ecclesie Romane honorem ac exaltationem 
tuam respiciant apirantes, ad te legatum nostrum disponimus destinare, per quem tam super hiis 
que ex parte tua nobis fuere proposita, quam super Terre Sancte succursu celsitudini regie 
secundum quod expedire viderimus curabimus respondere. Monemus igitur serenitatem tuam et 
exhortamur in Domino, quatinus in devotione sancte Romane ecclesie matris tue firmiter 
perserverans te talem exhibere studeas erga ipsam quod ipsius erga te caritas tepere non debeat, set 
de die in diem suscipere potius incrementum.’; Pressutti 482. 
44
 Stürner, Friedrich, i, 231. Frederick’s motives in taking the crusade vow appear to have been a 
combination of piety and kingly ambition: Bodo Hechelhammer, ‘Der Diplomat: Kaiser Friedrich 
II. (*1194, †1250)’, in Hans-Jürgen Kotzur, ed., Die Kreuzzüge: Kein Krieg ist heilig (Mainz, 
2004), 308. A parallel can be drawn with Henry III of England’s crusade vow on his succession - it 
seems likely that Frederick sought to strengthen his position in Germany against Otto IV by 
securing the papal protection afforded to crusaders: G.A. Loud, ‘The Papal “Crusade” against 
Frederick II in 1228-1230’, in Balard, ed., Papauté, 93-94.  
62 
 
wrote that he was sending an unnamed legate back to discuss matters.
45
 The letter 
ended by exhorting Frederick to persevere in his devotion to the Church. The next 
day, another letter was addressed to the German princes, asking them to remain 
faithful to Frederick.
46
 
Powell thought that the papal letter of 8 April was proof that negotiations 
for Frederick’s participation in the Fifth Crusade were underway.47 He wrote that 
by summer 1217 some form of agreement had been reached that Frederick would 
lead the crusade, and that any subsequent leadership arrangement was merely a 
temporary expedient until Frederick should arrive in the East.
48
 Christopher 
Tyerman supposed that this took place even earlier, and wrote that when 
Frederick took the cross in 1215 he ‘became the putative commander of the 
crusade.’49  
Although the April letters are the first evidence of correspondence 
between the pope and emperor-elect to mention the crusade, this short spurt of 
diplomacy should not necessarily be taken as definitive evidence that serious 
negotiations for Frederick’s imminent departure had begun: from the extant 
sources we can only reconstruct what might have been discussed.
50
 There are 
several pointers in the letters of 8-9 April which should warn against just such a 
conclusion. That the legate whom Honorius intended to send to Frederick’s court 
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went unnamed in the letter of 8 April suggests that the pope had not decided 
whom to send. Nor does it seem that a legate a latere was actually despatched, 
because there is neither an extant appointment letter nor subsequent 
correspondence mentioning such a legate. It can be inferred from this that 
negotiations were inconsequential at this stage. That this was probably the case is 
supported by the letter to the German princes of 9 April, which is really only a 
generalised exhortation to stand by Frederick, rather than a call for specific action 
regarding his crusade. Frederick was perhaps only dangling the carrot of his 
crusade to soften up the pope regarding his imperial coronation. 
Stürner has argued convincingly that the small number of letters 
exchanged between the two parties in the following months is evidence that 
negotiations between them were not intensive in early 1217.
51
 Friedrich von 
Raumer believed that more correspondence took place in the period 1217-18, but 
that it has now been lost.
52
 This seems improbable given that the curial staff chose 
to register what appears to be the vast majority of its important political 
correspondence with the lay powers on the crusade: some trace of such 
correspondence would surely have survived in the papal and imperial archives. 
When Frederick did agree in a letter of 12 January 1219 to go on crusade, 
Honorius deemed it of such importance that he had it copied into the papal 
register (see chapter two). The lack of letters for 1217-18 should instead be 
interpreted as evidence that neither the pope nor the emperor-elect considered an 
imperial crusade to be a realistic undertaking at this time. While Honorius 
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certainly does seem to have come to an understanding with Frederick that he 
would take over leadership of the Fifth Crusade, the date of this agreement should 
be pushed back to the turn of 1218-19, when one witnesses the initiation of a 
prolonged correspondence that lasted until the pope’s death in 1227. 
Two letters issued on 24 July attest to the papal conception of the Fifth 
Crusade’s leadership in summer 1217. They both concern the proposed meeting of 
the main western crusade contingents on Cyprus, planned for 8 September. 
Honorius despatched one to a number of Italian clergy informing them that 
Andrew II, Leopold VI, duke of Austria (1198-1230), and all the other crusaders 
were going to convene on Cyprus, and urged the clergy to preach the crusade to 
recruit more soldiers.
53
 A slight variation of this letter was addressed to John of 
Brienne, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and the Templars and the Hospitallers in the 
kingdom of Jerusalem.
54
 This letter informed the recipients of the planned 
gathering and invited them to attend or to send messengers so that the crusaders 
might have their counsel.
55
  
In the end, probably on account of coordination problems, the rendezvous 
on Cyprus does not seem to have actually occurred. Nevertheless, the papal letters 
are very instructive on the pope’s thinking regarding the crusade leadership at this 
time. There are a number of important conclusions that can be drawn. Firstly, it is 
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clear that Honorius did not consider Frederick about to depart in the near future, 
or that his leadership of the crusade had even been agreed upon, or else the pope 
would surely have mentioned him in the letters, as became common later in the 
crusade, and invited him to send messengers as well. This brings into question 
Tyerman’s judgement that Frederick was considered the ‘putative commander’ 
from 1215 onwards.
56
 Secondly, because the meeting was planned to occur on 
Cyprus, rather than in John’s kingdom, suggests that either the pope or Andrew 
may have been trying to cut him out of the initial strategic decision-making. 
Thirdly - and connected to the possible exclusion of John from the highest 
echelons of leadership - it is apparent that Honorius was hoping that Andrew 
would play a leading role in the crusade, with Leopold presumably as his second-
in-command, a point which has yet to feature in the historiography. 
 
Andrew II’s Expedition 
No historian has thought fit to credit Andrew with being - at least in the pope’s 
eyes - the initial leader of the Fifth Crusade. As examination of the papal registers 
has shown, however, Honorius seems to have been supporting Andrew as the 
preeminent leader of the Fifth Crusade in 1217; but in the end, the king bungled 
his opportunity. Andrew has not been allocated his proper place in the leadership 
of the crusade by scholars on account of the short-lived nature and limited impact 
of his expedition. After sailing from the West in autumn 1217, Andrew abandoned 
the crusade in January 1218 for reasons which will be examined below. Historians 
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have read backwards from his shameful departure and ignored any earlier 
promise. This reflects the concentration of many historians of the crusades on the 
traditional narrative sources for the Fifth Crusade, which, understandably, have 
little to say about Andrew. The diplomatic evidence, nevertheless, tells a different 
story. 
Andrew’s sullied reputation has never recovered from the damage inflicted 
when he left the crusade in 1218. Runciman judged Andrew’s expedition to have 
‘achieved nothing’.57 Van Cleve agreed, writing that Andrew’s crusade ‘had 
achieved nothing and brought him no honor’.58 James Ross Sweeney called for a 
‘more temperate’ judgement, which Powell subsequently delivered, noting that 
the king’s crusade accomplished more than other historians have credited it 
with.
59
 Still, Powell did not consider him as the papacy’s choice for leader. Z.J. 
Kosztolnyik wrote a damning (and unreliable) account of the crusade, claiming 
that it should not be deemed a crusade because it ‘was not a serious military 
undertaking’, and calling the Hungarian crusaders ‘adventurers’ because they 
supposedly lacked any religious motivation.
60
 In light of its seemingly limited role 
in the history of the Hungarian nation, Gyula Kristó gave a very succinct, if 
dispassionate, overview of the enterprise.
61
 Most recently, Attila Bárány has 
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decried the fact that historians have underestimated and heavily criticised the 
expedition.
62
 
Andrew’s crusade is certainly worthy of proper scholarly attention. Not 
only was the king favoured by the papacy, but the size of the force he assembled 
with Duke Leopold at the port city of Split was considerable.
63
 The Austro-
Hungarian force was substantial and its members were bonded by regional and 
blood ties. Sweeney has demonstrated that Andrew’s crusade was traditional in 
that the core of his army was composed of blood relatives who ruled neighbouring 
territories which shared a common currency (the Friesacher pfennig), and noted 
the importance of forming an army based on family units from the same region.
64
 
Among his army Andrew could count his cousin, Duke Leopold, his brother-in-
law, Duke Otto VII of Andechs-Merania, and Otto’s own brother, Egbert, bishop 
of Bamberg. The Babenberg family, to which Leopold belonged, also had a strong 
family tradition of crusading.
65
 As the only crowned king from the West, Andrew 
possessed credible military force to lead the crusade. 
Andrew’s military and financial preparations ahead of his expedition had 
also been great.
66
 In early 1217 the king despatched the provost Alexander of 
Siebenbürgen and the prior of the Hungarian Hospitallers to Venice to arrange for 
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transport vessels to carry his army to the Holy Land.
67
 The ships were to be 
delivered to the port of Split by the Feast of St James (25 July) and were to await 
there Andrew’s arrival for one month. As an indicator of how serious the king 
was, he was prepared to hand over permanently the contested city of Zara to 
Venice in return for the ships.  
In an ironic twist on the fate of the Fourth Crusade (1202-04), which was 
bankrupted by a massive overestimate of the size of the crusade, Andrew was 
unable to procure enough ships to transport his army, which must have exceeded 
the number provided for in his Venetian agreement of ten large ships together 
with other smaller vessels.
68
 Thomas of Split claims that Andrew’s army was 
composed of more than ten thousand warriors on horseback and innumerable foot 
soldiers.
69
 This is clearly intended to signify that Andrew had assembled a very 
large force - although Van Cleve accepts it unquestioningly, the figure is too large 
to be taken literally.
70
 The History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church 
records that Andrew arrived in one hundred and sixty ships and transport ships, 
with a complement of four thousand knights and ninety thousand infantry.
71
 The 
estimate of ships and knights are plausible figures, although the number of 
infantry is obviously a huge exaggeration. It is clear from all of the sources 
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though that Andrew succeeded in assembling a viable force with which to play a 
leading role in the crusade. The gravitas and influence that this force would have 
brought the king should not be underestimated. 
Kosztolnyik thought that the king had failed to make full and proper 
preparations for his campaign, and was motivated to crusade only on account of 
his claim to the throne of the Latin Empire.
72
 Sometime before Kosztolnyik wrote, 
however, Sweeney had already dismissed this theory as ‘demonstrably 
incorrect’.73 Kosztolnyik thought that when Peter II was chosen instead of 
Andrew, the king merely made the passage to the Holy Land to fulfil his father’s 
vow.
74
 But this is to underestimate Andrew and to strip him of any pious 
motivation at all. It also fails to explain the large donations that Andrew made to 
the Military Orders for the defence of the Holy Land on his journey back home 
from the crusade, which are analysed below. 
There is only a single chronicle that names Andrew as the crusade’s leader 
in its early stages - something which reflects the number and influence of 
narrative sources for the Fifth Crusade composed by authors from countries other 
than Hungary. The Chronicon de gestis Hungarorum (also known as the 
‘Illuminated Chronicle’), a mid-fourteenth-century compilation that drew on 
earlier texts, names Andrew as the crusade’s leader during his brief expedition 
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and, perhaps unsurprisingly, states that he led the army to a glorious victory 
against the Muslims.
75
  
Andrew probably did consider himself as the crusade’s leader, and it is 
important to note, as Guy Perry has, that the first large crusade council took place 
in the Hungarian royal tent.
76
 But Andrew and John of Brienne seem to have been 
at odds, and Andrew kept himself at a distance from John, creating a lack of 
cohesion in the crusade army that culminated in his withdrawal.
77
 According to 
Perry, it is probable that John eclipsed Andrew during these initial stages, when 
he emerged at the top of the leadership pile, which perhaps crushed Andrew’s 
motivation to carry on.
78
 Indeed, Mayer thought that Andrew abandoned the 
crusade ‘in vexation’.79 Nevertheless, Jotischky writes that the Hungarians and 
Germans ‘dominated’ the early phase.80 Certainly the size of Andrew’s contingent 
would have given him great sway in the expedition’s leadership, although it seems 
that Andrew failed to convert this into uncontested command. 
In November 1217 there had been no indication in the information 
available at the curia that Andrew was wearying of the crusade. Towards the end 
of the month Honorius received a despatch from the master of the Knights 
Templar in the Holy Land, William of Chartres, which was probably composed at 
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the end of October.
81
 The report recounted the early activities of the crusaders, the 
state of their provisions, and the plan to attack the Egyptian city of Damietta. 
After receiving this information the pope forwarded the text of the report in a 
letter to the archbishops of Székesfehérvár and Reims on 24 November, which 
celebrated the successful launch of the crusade and urged the recipients to secure 
reinforcements for the crusaders.
82
 That the pope chose to send this early report on 
the crusade’s progress to Hungary reflects Andrew’s prominent role in the crusade 
leadership, although it was not an exclusive sign of papal favour. The Reims copy 
was not listed as an in eundem modum copy in the papal register, and is only 
known through the survival of the original copy. This begs the question: were 
others sent out of which no traces remain?  
The papal letters to the archbishops of Székesfehérvár and Reims 
containing the copy of William Chartres’ original despatch are the only forms in 
which it is preserved. The report is a lucky survival. There must surely have been 
many more reports that informed and prompted the issue of papal letters which 
are no longer extant, especially given that the curia was only selectively 
registering documents. Diplomatic evidence such as this, where information 
arriving at the curia informed papal decision-making and was then passed on to 
third parties (and this is not an isolated example), supports Powell’s perceptive 
statement that ‘the role left for the pope [in the Fifth Crusade] was that of a 
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coordinator and at times a clearinghouse for information, rather than a director of 
operations.’83  
Despite optimism at the curia about the king of Hungary’s role in the 
crusade, Andrew himself obviously did not share it. His departure in January 1218 
justifiably met with criticism from chroniclers. The thirteenth-century Old French 
continuation of William of Tyre, Eracles, noted that there was no honour in his 
withdrawal.
84
 Oliver of Paderborn (head of the cathedral school of Cologne, 1201-
25; bishop of Paderborn, 1225; cardinal-bishop of Sabina, 1225-27) recorded in 
his eyewitness account of the Fifth Crusade, the Historia Damiatina, that Andrew 
ignored the warnings of the patriarch of Jerusalem, and, on leaving the army, was 
excommunicated by him.
85
 Thomas, archdeacon of Split (b.1200-68), is the only 
source to claim that Andrew left early because his enemies attempted to poison 
him.
86
 Thomas further explains Andrew’s motivation in returning home to have 
been the protection of his own life and the security of his kingdom, which he did 
not want to risk when he had already done enough to fulfil his crusade vow.  
Whilst Thomas’s account provides a valuable counterbalance to the other 
narrative sources, some of his excuses are, like the posioned drink he claims 
struck down Andrew, hard to swallow. Andrew probably departed because he was 
unable to exert the total control that he wanted over the expedition. Nevertheless, 
at some point in 1218 after his return to the West, the king addressed a letter to 
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Honorius to make his case for the withdrawal.
87
 Andrew was anxious to explain to 
the pope why he had left early, and argued that it was because he had been 
receiving reports of dissension and unrest in Hungary, claims which correlate with 
elements of Thomas’s account; indeed, the corroboration of the sources on this 
point could offer the real reason for the brevity of the king’s crusade. 
Andrew’s journey home from his short expedition was not entirely 
fruitless, nor did it reveal a lack of interest in crusading and the defence of the 
Holy Land. He visited the Hospitaller castles of Krak des Chevaliers and Margat, 
and arranged marriage alliances through the betrothal of his son, Andrew, to the 
Armenian princess, Isabel, and his eldest son, Béla, to Maria, the daughter of 
Theodore I Laskaris, emperor of Nicaea (1208-22).
88
 Andrew’s journey may have 
had the secondary objective of securing the kingdom of Jerusalem’s northern 
flank by marriages and donations.
89
 This was, however, probably a corollary 
effect. Andrew was most likely making the marriage alliances out of dynastic self-
interest. The donations to the Hospitallers should be seen as a continuation of an 
affinity that the king seems to have felt for the Order, having already employed 
the prior of the Hungarian Hospitallers in the Venetian negotiations for crusade 
transport in early 1217. Perhaps the king also hoped to alleviate any guilt he felt 
for abandoning the crusade. 
After receiving Andrew’s donations, the Hospitallers petitioned the pope 
for papal confirmation of them. The Hospital’s supplications were successful and 
led to the creation of a series of papal documents at the end of June 1218 which 
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reveal the extent of the king’s generosity. A papal document of 25 June confirmed 
the annual donation of five hundred silver marks to the Order, taken out of 
Andrew’s revenues from the salt mines at Szalacs.90 On the same day another 
document confirmed a further annual donation, this time of one hundred silver 
marks to the Hospitaller castle of Margat.
91
 On the next day the chancery issued 
another confirmation of a grant of lands that Andrew had made to the Order.
92
 
Finally, on 27 June, the pope confirmed Andrew’s annual grant of another one 
hundred silver marks to the castle of Krak des Chevaliers.
93
 
These grants are important because they flesh out Andrew’s character in 
more detail and extend our understanding of his crusade beyond the slanderous 
reports of contemporary chroniclers. The depth of the king’s piety and his initial 
commitment to the crusade have never been properly appreciated, and these four 
grants attest to a more complex personality than the current historiography 
attributes to Andrew - he was not merely a cowardly villain, but neither was he a 
model crusade hero in the mould of Leopold of Austria (and even he returned to 
the West without seeing the expedition through to its bitter end). Andrew’s 
withdrawal from the crusade certainly brought shame upon him, but his 
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expedition should no longer be viewed as an insignificant failure. Instead it should 
be considered a missed opportunity, especially for the pope, who as we have seen 
for the first time, held such high hopes for the king of Hungary’s participation in 
the Fifth Crusade. 
 
Conclusions 
Through the careful analysis of the papal registers, Andrew’s underappreciated 
role as the initial leader of the Fifth Crusade has been revealed. Andrew’s 
position, and Honorius’s support of him, alter the interpretation of papal 
diplomacy during the early stages of the Fifth Crusade. Frederick II does not 
emerge as the crusade chief-in-waiting during the years 1216-18. Rather it seems 
that with Andrew’s large fighting force, the desire for imperial involvement was 
not urgent at this stage. After Andrew had turned tail and headed for home 
though, the situation changed, and, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, 
Frederick was called into the breach in direct response to an entreaty from the 
crusaders begging for reinforcements. This chapter has also attempted to shift the 
focus of study of papal diplomacy onto the roles of petitioners, diplomats, and 
messengers at the papal curia. The extent of their influence over Honorius’s 
crusade decision-making will become even more apparent in the next two 
chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
The Administration of the Fifth Crusade, 1218-1221 
 
The Fifth Crusade never had a completely satisfactory leader. A few months after 
Andrew II abandoned the expedition in January 1218 the crusaders urgently 
requested reinforcements. In the West, as part of his response to their petition, the 
diplomacy of Honorius during the years 1218 to 1221 focused on securing the 
potentially crusade-winning leadership of Frederick II. Negotiations with 
Frederick were long and complex. The main sticking point was the imperial 
coronation: Frederick was anxious to be crowned emperor before departing on 
crusade, but the pope was wary of the potential threat to the security of the Papal 
State in so doing. The imagined threat came from making an emperor of the man 
who was already king of the Romans (Germany) and king of Sicily (see Maps 3 
and 5, pp. 87, 108). If these two kingdoms were united under the imperial crown, 
Honorius thought (perhaps wrongly) that the integrity of the Papal State would be 
compromised by being sandwiched between the German kingdom to the north and 
the kingdom of Sicily to the south (see Map 4, p. 107). Honorius’s policy 
therefore was to retain the separation of the two kingdoms.  
In the East the period 1218-21 witnessed the arrival on the Fifth Crusade 
of the papal legate, Pelagius, cardinal-bishop of Albano (1213-30), the success of 
the expedition in capturing the Egyptian city of Damietta in November 1219 
(followed by a long period of inaction), and finally the crusade’s failure during a 
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disastrous march on Cairo in August 1221 (see Map 2, p. 77). Investigating 
further the effect of diplomats and petitioners on crusade diplomacy, this chapter 
considers Honorius’s role in managing the leadership of the crusade, Frederick’s 
commitment to the campaign and his first postponements, John of Brienne’s claim 
to the throne of Armenia, and finally, the negotiations leading up to, and 
following, the imperial coronation.  
 
 
Map 2. Damietta and the Nile Delta (taken from Powell, Anatomy, 139) 
 
Managing the Leadership of the Crusade 
With Andrew departed, the king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne, was left de facto 
as the only viable leader of the Fifth Crusade: there were no western kings 
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interested or ready to take Andrew’s place, and though possessing an important 
role in the crusade’s leadership, the legate Pelagius was charged with keeping the 
army united rather than acting as its undisputed military commander (see chapter 
five). But John does not seem to have possessed the support or the prestige 
necessary to elevate him to a position of total control over the crusade, and he 
does not seem to have been thought of as the leader of the crusade by the papacy.
1
 
Although he was elected by the army as the expedition’s leader in May 1218, this 
really only made him the head of a ‘steering committee’ rather than commander-
in-chief.
2
 John’s election was a result of pragmatism, given that he was a skilled 
military leader, and that since Andrew had gone, John was the only remaining 
crowned king in the army.
3
 Nevertheless, John could not bind the various crusade 
contingents together under his authority.
4
 This wavering and uncertain supremacy 
is evidenced by the fact that before the crusaders arrived, he and his vassals had 
actually been planning to attack Nablus rather than Damietta.
5
 
 Powell observed that studies of the Fifth Crusade have often focused on its 
leadership, asking questions about the character and ability of individuals - an 
avenue of investigation which reflects the narrative sources for the crusade.
6
 
Gregory Fedorenko has noted that Oliver of Paderborn and Jacques de Vitry, 
bishop of Acre, rarely portray John as the crusade’s leader.7 It is possible to tease 
information out of the narrative sources to discover if John really did act as an 
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authoritative leader on the ground, by noting that the chronicle of Ernoul (another 
Old French continuation of William of Tyre) has John taking charge of victualling 
the ships as the crusaders left Acre for Damietta,
8
 or that the Gesta crucigerorum 
Rhenanorum mentioned John (along with Leopold of Austria) in a leading role 
during the assault on the chain tower at Damietta.
9
 Nonetheless, although one can 
scour the narrative sources for evidence that supports or disproves the idea of 
John as leader, however fleetingly, the very fact that such detective work is 
necessary mitigates against him being any kind of commander-in-chief figure on 
the crusade. 
 The nature of command on the Fifth Crusade has been ably analysed by 
Powell, who sketched the crusade council as an ever-changing, flexible body of 
nobles who tended to campaign for only about a year, a body which was depleted 
and replenished in a rhythmical series of departures and arrivals dictated by the 
seasonal passages across the Mediterranean.
10
 Jotischky summarises the 
manpower situation thus: ‘the total number of crusaders between 1217 and 1221 
was high, but most had already arrived before the end of 1218, and the effect of 
staggered contributions to the crusade was to stretch resources during crucial 
moments.’11  
By the thirteenth century, crusading had changed from a mass movement 
(commotio), to a series of passages (passagia), structured around the two 
Mediterranean sailing seasons which took place around Easter and autumn. The 
                                                 
8
 Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard de Trésorier, ed. Louis de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), 415. 
9
 London, British Library, MS Burney 351, fol. 114v; edited in Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum, 
in Quinti, ed. Röhricht, 39. 
10
 Powell, Anatomy, 116-18. 
11
 Jotischky, Crusading, 219. 
80 
 
average passage from the West to the Holy Land took somewhere between four 
and six weeks, and most journeys were made during the two seasonal passages - 
from late March until early April, and from late September until early October - 
so as to avoid the more dangerous sailing conditions experienced in winter. 
Sailing back to the West from the East against the prevailing winds took about 
twice as long.
12
 A firmer guide to the date of passages comes from 1233, when 
Venice imposed a final deadline for passages from the East: 8 May for the Easter 
sailing, and 8 October for the autumn journey.
13
  
Not a single powerful western noble’s campaign in the Holy Land and 
Egypt lasted for the duration of the whole crusade, and the varied and short-lived 
contingents that made up the expedition prevented the establishment of an espirit 
de corps that had been a feature of previous crusades.
14
 
 John does not loom particularly large in the papal registers, and 
Honorius’s attention seems to have been devoted more to other lay powers and 
their petitions. In the summer of 1218 Hervé, count of Nevers, was readying for 
that year’s autumn passage with the other French crusaders, including the count of 
La Marche, who were preparing to sail for Egypt from the port of Genoa. Hervé 
submitted a petition to Honorius requesting that Robert of Courçon, cardinal-
priest of S. Stefano in Celiomonte (1212-19), who had recruited many of the 
French crusaders, be sent to accompany their contingent. On 21 July the pope 
granted Hervé’s request for Robert to accompany the army, but without the 
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legatine powers that he had previously possessed.
15
 Penny Cole wrote that Robert 
was sent ‘at the behest of Pope Honorius’, but the initiative here clearly came 
from outside the curia.
16
 That the pope permitted a lay request for a high-ranking 
cardinal to accompany the crusade army demonstrates the balance of initiative in 
the relationship between the papacy and the lay powers. It seems that the agenda 
of papal crusade diplomacy was, to a large extent, being dictated by the lay 
powers, rather than the pope and his cardinals. Although Honorius did of course 
have the power to refuse Hervé’s petition, in order to achieve his aim of a 
successful crusade he had to grease the wheels of the crusade machine with papal 
favours - one of the only ways in which he could get the lumbering beast moving. 
In August Honorius received another despatch from the crusade. On 15 
June the crusaders had written to the pope informing him that they had sailed from 
the kingdom of Jerusalem and put ashore in Egypt to begin the investment of 
Damietta, and petitioned for reinforcements (‘supplicamus’).17 This report made it 
clear that the crusaders saw the siege of Damietta as a step towards the capture of 
                                                 
15
 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 287r: ‘Receptis litteris tuis et earum intellecto tenore, quod a nobis fuit ex tua 
parte petitum, quantum cum honestate nostra potuimus, curavimus exaudire, in proposito firmo 
gerentes, secundum Deum petitionibus tuis libenter annuere, et exaltationi tue intendere ac honori. 
Sane cum sicut tuis nobis litteris intimasti, tu et nobilis vir comes Marchie ac universi crucesignati 
de regno Francie, Andegavie, Brittannie, Betunie, Aquitanie, et Burgundie promiseritis prestito 
iuramento, vos cum Ianuensibus de civitate de ipsorum versus Egyptum in instantis mensis 
Augustis passagio transfretare, nos zelum fidei vestre in Domino commendates, ad vos ibidem 
iuxta petitionem vestram dilectum filium nostrum Robertum tituli sancti Stephani in Celio Monte 
presbyterum cardinalem absque legationis officio destinamus’; Pressutti 1543.  
16
 Penny J. Cole, The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095-1270 (Cambridge, MA, 
1991), 128. 
17
 The original report is preserved in the papal copy that was distributed to the French contingent 
and registered. Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 9v: ‘Hiis igitur vobis nuntiatis supplicamus sanctitati vestre in 
Domino et per Domino flexis genibus exorantes, quatinus Christiano exercitui magnis periculis 
exposito curetis misericorditer et celeriter subvenire.’; Pressutti 1581; Regesta Regni 
Hierosolymitani (MXCVII-MCCXCI), ed. Reinhold Röhricht (Innsbruck, 1893), no. 911; idem, 
Studien zur Geschichte des fünften Kreuzzuges (Innsbruck, 1891), 39-40. 
82 
 
all of Egypt, followed by the recovery of the Holy Land.
18
 Yet they were not just 
in correspondence with the Roman curia. On 15 June the crusaders had also 
written a very similar letter directly to Frederick himself, which requested that he 
join the campaign.
19
 The letter to Frederick had no immediate effect, yet the 
despatches sent from the East had an important impact on papal decision-making. 
In time they were influential in drawing Frederick into the crusade, and in so 
doing, altered the course of papal-imperial diplomacy for the rest of Honorius’s 
reign, as will be demonstrated below. 
The receipt of this report at the curia led to a two-stage response. The first 
part was to reply directly to the crusaders on 13 August, notifying them that their 
letter had been received and that the pope was acutely aware of their need for 
reinforcements.
20
 Honorius went on that he was continuing to raise support in the 
West and was sending crusaders on to Damietta by way of Genoa, Venice, and the 
other Italian port cities.
21
 The letter ended by urging the crusaders to stand firm 
and unified in carrying out the siege, and reassured them that they had full curial 
support.
22
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vestrum celeriter festinantes, versus civitatem Damitam in nomine Domini saboath dirigant iter 
suum’; Pressutti 1580. 
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 The second part of the pope’s response was to compose another letter, 
issued around the same time, and possibly on the same day, this time addressed to 
the French contingent assembling at Genoa.
23
 This letter actually contains very 
few of the pope’s ‘own’ words, and is really only a brief exhortation flanking a 
copy of the crusaders’ report of 15 June at both ends.24 Honorius exhorted those 
massing at Genoa to hurry to Egypt, because, as the crusaders stated, if they 
received reinforcements, Damietta and the whole of Egypt would be delivered 
into the hands of the Christians. 
 The copying of the despatch into the pope’s own letter to the French 
crusaders is further evidence of Honorius acting as a coordinator of the crusade 
rather than being its director, and demonstrates how a single instance of outside 
initiative could lead to the creation of multiple papal documents. That the 
crusaders’ report was copied into the papal letter to the French contingent 
provides a clear and irrefutable link between the crusaders’ initiative and the issue 
of papal documents. 
 To make decisions regarding the crusade, Honorius and his cardinals were 
reliant on reports arriving from Egypt. Fortunately, the pope was kept abreast by a 
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number of correspondents. In addition to the crusaders’ own missives, which soon 
included the legate Pelagius as an author, Oliver of Paderborn and Jacques de 
Vitry were also sending letters back to the West.
25
 Oliver’s account of the Fifth 
Crusade, the Historia Damiatina, was a later redaction of two letters sent during 
the expedition to Cologne which chronicled the course of the crusade.
26
 It does 
not seem odd to suggest that he may also have been sending reports back to the 
pope given his close relationship with the curia (or that other informants were 
forwarding them to the curia), a point recognised in 1225 with his promotion to 
the College of Cardinals as cardinal-bishop of Sabina.
27
  
In the autumn of 1218 Jacques de Vitry composed two despatches 
intended for the curia. In a letter written after the fall of the chain tower at 
Damietta on 24 August, Jacques recorded the events of the crusade up until that 
point, writing about the assault on Mount Thabor, the withdrawal of Andrew II 
and the king of Cyprus, and the council of war held in Acre before sailing to 
Egypt.
28
 There is reason to believe, however, that the form this letter survives in is 
not the original written by Jacques, but a reconstruction created to replace a lost 
original.
29
 Jacques finished another letter on 22 September that continued where 
‘his’ previous letter had left off, recounting the events of the crusade, emphasising 
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Egypt’s biblical history, and giving an account of the country’s flora and fauna.30 
This letter also mentioned the arrival of the French crusade contingent which 
Honorius had been in contact with (and included the papal legate Pelagius). 
 All of Jacques de Vitry’s crusade letters (he wrote seven over the course of 
the whole campaign) seem to have been reports that required no papal response, 
given that they only sought to inform and that no replies are recorded in the papal 
registers. If we use the Venetian decree of 1233 mentioned above, which imposed 
8 August as the last day for ships to set out on the return journey from the eastern 
Mediterranean, then Jacques’ two autumn letters were probably composed too late 
to be delivered via the ships that brought the French contingent. While it is 
difficult to detect the impact of Jacques’ reports on papal decision-making, it is 
essential to be aware of their existence, along with those of other correspondents, 
as part of the background of information that was available at the curia which 
influenced the pope’s decisions. 
It seems, however, that although Jacques missed the last passage back to 
the West, the crusade leadership did not, because a papal letter of 27 November 
refers to a report received from the crusaders, and specifically names the legate 
Pelagius as being one of the authors (below). The crusaders’ report does not 
survive, but it seems almost certain that on his arrival in Egypt, Pelagius, with the 
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crusade leadership, took the opportunity to write a letter on their dire financial 
situation, and then sent it back to the curia on one of the crusader ships turning 
around and heading for home from the same passage that Pelagius had sailed in 
on. 
On receiving their letter Honorius wrote to Peter of Corbeil, archbishop of 
Sens, all the crusaders in his diocese, and all the archbishops of England and 
France on 27 November.
31
 This papal letter recounted that, having exhausted their 
funds, the crusaders had urgently petitioned (‘instantissime supplicarunt’) the 
curia for men and money to pay for siege machines and galleys, and that the pope 
was hurrying to send aid to the East. Honorius urged the recipients to push the 
crusaders in their dioceses to depart in the March or May passages at the latest.
32
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Map 3. Germany in the thirteenth century (taken from Abulafia, Frederick, p. xvi) 
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Frederick II’s Commitment and Postponements 
The crusader report received in August also appears to have prompted the pope to 
move to engage Frederick as one of the requested reinforcements. Although the 
letter despatched to Frederick is neither preserved in the original nor in the 
registers, it is certain that Honorius sent one, and a rough outline of its contents 
can be estimated. A letter addressed to the pope by Frederick on 12 January 1219 
reveals that he was replying to a recent papal letter on the state of the Holy 
Land.
33
 It is plausible to suggest that the lost papal letter was sent at around the 
same time as the letter to the archbishops of England and France on the same 
theme from 27 November 1218. Judging from Frederick’s reply, the content was 
similar: Honorius must have exhorted the emperor-elect to fulfil his vow and 
reinforce the crusaders. Of course, perhaps unbeknownst to Honorius, Frederick 
had already been primed by the receipt of his own copy of the crusaders’ letter of 
15 June.  
Frederick wrote to the pope that the crusade held a special place in his 
heart and he understood that without support the crusade might soon fail. 
Frederick’s pledge to leave by the Feast of John the Baptist (24 June) correlates 
with the deadline Honorius set in his letter of 27 November, thus Honorius must 
have made a similar request to the emperor-elect in his letter. That Frederick’s 
letter was copied into the papal register (with the pope’s reply of 8 February, see 
below), indicates its importance to Honorius: this was Frederick’s promise to 
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crusade by a fixed deadline and also marked the beginning of serious papal-
imperial negotiations on the subject of his crusade. 
Presumably after receiving the lost papal letter in December 1218 
Frederick announced to the German princes that he planned to crusade in the next 
year and called for a Diet to be held at Magdeburg in March 1219 to settle on a 
regent during his crusade.
34
 This announcement was also mentioned by Frederick 
in his letter to Honorius of 12 January, although in the end this Diet never 
occurred. 
Frederick’s letter of 12 January also requested that Honorius compel 
Henry of Brunswick, the brother of the defeated emperor, Otto IV (1209-18), to 
surrender the imperial emblems to him, and asked the pope to wield the threat of 
excommunication and interdict in order to achieve this. Honorius responded 
favourably to Frederick, replying on 8 February that the prior of Santa Maria 
Nova de Urbe was being sent to fulfil his wish.
35
 The papal pressure on Henry 
worked and he agreed to relinquish the imperial insignia, thus moving Frederick a 
step closer to his crusade.
36
 Set against a background of quid pro quo diplomacy, 
we see here the cogs of papal government turning in response to the requests of a 
lay power, and the pope carrying out Frederick’s will in order to fulfil a papal 
aim. 
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Mayer decided that it was only after the threat from Otto had disappeared 
that Honorius tried to engage Frederick, but wrote that this coincided with 
Andrew’s departure on crusade in autumn 1217.37 Although initially Andrew II 
was Honorius’s favoured leader, when he returned in disgrace the pope must have 
desired another strong western king to assume control of the crusade, which was 
only nominally under the command of John of Brienne. When the crusaders’ 
despatch of autumn 1218 arrived, notwithstanding his relative youth and the on-
going turmoil in the West, the most promising candidate for this role was 
undoubtedly Frederick, who had already taken the cross. When Frederick 
responded with an enthusiastic acceptance of Honorius’s request, he petitioned in 
his letter that the pope wield the threat of excommunication against any crusaders 
who did not depart by 24 June: ‘Pergit petens ut ... nullum crucesignatum retro 
morari patiatur’.38 Serious negotiations and preparations for Frederick’s 
expedition had now begun.  
Preparations for Frederick’s crusade began to ramp up on 11 February 
when Honorius issued another three letters regarding the imperial expedition. The 
first took Frederick, his family, and the kingdom of Sicily under papal 
protection.
39
 Another addressed to the archbishop of Salzburg, the bishop of 
Würzburg, and the bishop of Utrecht, awarded them the power to excommunicate 
any German crusaders who did not depart by 24 June.
40
 The third letter issued on 
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11 February was sent to Frederick and all the crusaders in his territories, declaring 
that, unless they faced a clear and justifiable impediment to their departure, the 
emperor-elect and all other crusaders were to leave by the feast of John the Baptist 
under penalty of excommunication.
41
 
The threat of excommunication for late departure appears a harsh, and 
perhaps imprudent, measure to impose at such short notice, but this action was 
performed at Frederick’s own request.42 It became clear a few months later, 
however, that this was an unrealistic timeframe in which to prepare for the 
crusade. On 18 May, in response to a recent petition from Frederick, Honorius 
issued another letter to the emperor-elect and the crusaders in his territories which 
granted Frederick’s requested postponement until the Feast of St Michael (29 
September).
43
 
This short episode reveals the main role of the pope in crusade 
preparation: a coordinator who was often responsive in his actions. Frederick was 
setting the agenda for his crusade preparations and Honorius ratified it with papal 
approval and by agreeing to deploy one of his only real sources of temporal power 
- ecclesiastical censure - against crusaders who did not perform as Frederick 
wished. The initiative to issue the batch of letters drawing Frederick into fulfilling 
his vow can be traced to the receipt of the crusaders’ report of autumn 1218. 
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Indeed, it was the letter-writing of the crusaders in Egypt which appears to have 
been the decisive factor in Honorius’s approach to Frederick, and the emperor-
elect’s decision finally to weigh in on the Fifth Crusade.  
On 7 September, with the new deadline of 29 September rapidly 
approaching and Frederick being no closer to departing, Honorius wrote a 
response to a recent letter of Pelagius.
44
 The pope’s letter was mostly concerned 
with the matter of sending funds from the collection of the twentieth tax to the 
crusade army, but at the end Honorius included a note stating that Frederick 
would not set out before receiving the imperial crown. The purpose of the letter 
was to relay information to the crusade army, keeping it abreast of Frederick’s 
preparedness; the dispositio clause of the letter (which contained the pope’s 
orders) merely instructed Pelagius to hold the army together (‘as another Joshua’) 
until Frederick’s arrival. 
Although no written request survives, the emperor-elect appears to have 
asked for a second postponement from Honorius, presumably after the letter to 
Pelagius on 7 September. On 1 October Honorius wrote to Frederick notifying 
him that such a letter had been received.
45
 Honorius criticised him for failing to 
leave, having twice demanded postponements and not set out. The pope and his 
cardinals had wanted and expected plausible reasons why Frederick had missed 
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another deadline: ‘expetivimus et expectavimus excusationes probabiles’.46 
Frederick obviously had not provided a satisfactory explanation, but nevertheless 
Honorius acquiesced and set a third deadline for the next Feast of St Benedict (21 
March).
47
 This deadline was publicised throughout Germany in another papal 
letter issued on the same day, which renewed the threat of excommunication 
against those who failed to comply.
48
 
What are we to make of Frederick’s continued failings to leave on 
crusade? Rudolf Hiestand has written that Frederick’s vow was taken out of 
genuine piety, and that the fulfilment of it was of great importance to him, just as 
it was to the pope.
49
 Abulafia has drawn attention to Frederick’s struggle to 
balance the dire necessity of the Holy Land with the never-ending demands on his 
time from Germany, and stated that he could not depart until he no longer faced a 
threat from a Welf revival or civil war in Germany.
50
 The increasing papal 
pressure on Frederick to leave would surely have been known to his opponents as 
well - the emperor-elect could not risk leaving the Empire facing such a threat. 
Hiestand also declared that Honorius knew his credibility, together with that of 
the emperor-elect, was at stake over Frederick’s crusade, and was understandably 
concerned about it, which explains why the pope’s humour turned bitter when, in 
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ironic tones, he asked Frederick how much transportation he had prepared for the 
crusade.
51
 Van Cleve noted a papal-imperial tension, but from earlier in the year, 
writing that from the summer of 1219 onwards there was apparent enmity 
between Frederick and Honorius in their communication.
52
 
Rather than the result of on-going friction from summer 1219, the letter of 
1 October appears to be a product of sheer frustration and disbelief that Frederick 
had missed yet another deadline. It is difficult to understand why Frederick was 
repeatedly requesting such short extensions when he was patently unable to meet 
them, but it suggests that he was serious about leading a crusade in the near 
future, and felt the pressure to do so. The later papal correspondence with 
Frederick is not typified by the elements of bitterness that come as something of a 
surprise in the letter of 1 October. Honorius was probably genuinely optimistic 
that Frederick could fulfil his vow in 1219, and his confidence must have received 
a crushing blow when the emperor-elect failed to carry out his promise in 
September. After this point the pope appeared more understanding and less 
surprised when Frederick deferred his departure time and again.  
Was it too much to expect the emperor-elect to leave on crusade so soon? 
Honorius, after all, had the example of the rapid departure of King Conrad III of 
Germany (1138-52) on the Second Crusade (1147-49). Conrad’s position when he 
took the cross in late December 1146 had been similar to Frederick’s given the 
‘considerable disorder’ in the Empire and that he had not received the imperial 
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crown.
53
 In spite of this, Conrad still managed to depart on crusade in early June 
1147 - less than six months after making his vow - and Emperor Frederick I 
Barbarossa (1155-90) had taken the cross in early June 1188 then left on the Third 
Crusade in May 1189.
54
 Frederick’s imminent participation was therefore not an 
impossibility; it would be a mistake to label the pope naive for believing 
Frederick’s promises, as one scholar has.55 
Papal-imperial relations have been characterised as generally cooperative 
by Powell, and although the pope rebuffed Frederick in October, their relationship 
continued along these lines.
56
 Honorius’s policy consisted of responding 
favourably to Frederick’s requests (something that would be altered by Gregory 
IX). Yet one cannot claim that a detailed and preconceived papal policy of action 
extended beyond the aim of maintaining a cooperative relationship when it was 
Frederick who was defining the direction that their negotiations took. 
After the disappointment of early October 1219, the amount of crusading 
business being presented to the curia slackened off, and few papal crusade letters 
were issued as a result. No doubt the few months of breathing space allowed 
Honorius to devote more time to the cacophony of petitioners seeking privileges 
and justice. Nevertheless, before the walls of Damietta, the crusaders’ siege was 
coming closer to fruition, and on 5 November the city finally fell into their hands. 
On 11 November the leadership wrote to the pope informing him of their success, 
updating him on events up until that point, and (again) begging for reinforcements 
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and funds for the crusade.
57
 The letter also reveals that by this stage the crusaders 
were anxiously expecting Frederick to arrive, and they asked the pope to compel 
him to come, along with others signed with the cross. That Frederick’s 
participation was commonly anticipated is corroborated by Oliver of Paderborn, 
who also records that after the capture of Damietta the crusaders were eagerly 
anticipating Frederick’s arrival.58 It is clear that by late 1219 Frederick was 
widely acknowledged as the commander-in-waiting, something which had 
probably been encouraged by Honorius’s letter of 7 September to Pelagius. 
The next day, a group of nobles including Simon de Joinville, wrote a 
separate letter to Honorius in support of John of Brienne’s claims to the city of 
Damietta, and asked that the city be made over to the kingdom of Jerusalem, using 
the justification that it would make peace among the crusaders.
59
 That a separate 
letter was despatched, presumably in secret, implies that a tension existed in the 
crusade council between John and his supporters on one side, and those waiting 
for Frederick to arrive and assume command on another. John must have felt the 
need to bolster his position in the council because he also wrote his own letter to 
Frederick on 12 November, recently rediscovered by Perry, which related the 
events of the crusade up to that point.
60
 Perry argues convincingly that John was 
taking the initiative to try and establish himself as Frederick’s equal, or at least a 
peer, as well as trying to secure his control over the crusade and Damietta before 
the emperor-elect might arrive.
61
 John obviously felt that his tenuous position was 
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under threat from the pope and Frederick, and made the bold move of tackling the 
papal-imperial axis head on, rather than waiting for his information to be filtered 
through the papal curia to Frederick, an aim in which John seems to have been 
successful.
62
 
The crusaders’ missives did not reach the curia until February 1220 - they 
must have raised the pope’s spirits after the setback in October. On 24 February 
Honorius issued a response to the crusaders’ letter of 11 November (there is no 
known reply to the letter of 12 November in support of John).
63
 Honorius 
congratulated the army on its success and picked out Pelagius for special praise. 
Presumably prompted by the letter supporting John’s claim to Damietta, the papal 
letter of 24 February ended with Honorius’s concern of dissension permeating the 
army (‘quod absit inter vos possit dissensio suboriri’) and ordered that the 
crusaders obey Pelagius in order to prevent this.
64
 
The arrival of the despatches at the curia in February 1220 ended what 
appears to have been a recent drought of news from the crusaders at the curia. 
That Honorius had taken no important decisions regarding the crusade since 1 
October 1219 reveals the extent to which the functioning of the pope’s crusade 
administration was reliant on despatches from Egypt and the Holy Land, as well 
as on the initiative of the lay powers more generally.  
The receipt of the crusader reports also coincided with the run up to 
Frederick’s new deadline of 21 March, although yet again, the outcome was to 
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disappoint the pope. Frederick was angling to secure his imperial coronation and 
the coronation of his son as king of the Romans before he left on crusade.
65
 
Again, this had a precedent in Conrad III’s preparations for the Second Crusade: 
before Conrad’s departure, he had been successful in having his son elected by the 
German princes as his successor as king of the Romans.
66
  
Honorius was suspicious of Frederick’s ambitions regarding the kingdom 
of Sicily and its relation to the Roman-German Empire. The pope wanted to avoid 
the unification of Sicily and the Empire under a single crown at all costs, an 
eventuality which would leave the Papal State surrounded, and potentially at the 
mercy of the emperor. It is worth pointing out though that until his 
excommunication by Gregory IX in 1227, Frederick had no reason to antagonise 
the papacy. Although the patience of Honorius and his cardinals was tested 
throughout his pontificate by Frederick’s repeated delays, his interventions in 
episcopal elections, and his demands for military service from the duchy of 
Spoleto and Viterbo (which were in the Papal State), the pope was not being 
directly threatened by the emperor-elect.
67
 To think that the pope and emperor-
elect were mutually aggressive towards each other at this stage would be to 
misread the evidence in light of the later papal-imperial conflict.   
In a golden bull addressed to the pope on 10 February 1220, Frederick 
reaffirmed his promise of 1216 that when crowned emperor he would pass on the 
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kingdom of Sicily to his son, Henry (VII) and would not rule it himself.
68
 This 
was a reissue of Frederick’s earlier bull addressed to Innocent III on 1 July 1216, 
and which had been copied into Honorius’s own register for safekeeping.69 The 
renewed pledge of 1220 seems to have prompted Honorius to issue a letter to 
Henry on 16 March, taking him and the kingdom of Sicily under papal protection 
as part of the preparation for Frederick’s crusade.70 The emperor-elect despatched 
another letter to the curia on 19 February, declaring that he was readying for 
action in Germany and taking charge of the nobles marked with the cross.
71
 
Despite the lead he had taken in preparing the German crusaders, on account of 
the German princes’ apathy, Frederick needed more time - he sent the abbot of 
Fulda as legate to the curia to engage in negotiations over his imperial 
coronation.
72
 
On 20 March Honorius replied to Frederick’s letter permitting yet another 
postponement, but warned that he did not want to seem to have negligently 
abandoned his duty, and only extended the deadline until 1 May.
73
 The rhetorical 
flourishes of chancery officials were put to good use in this letter, which is 
characterised by sections that sought to inspire Frederick to equip his sword, to 
                                                 
68
 Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, ed. L. Weiland, MGH Const., 2 
(Hannover, 1896), 82; Die Urkunden der deutschen Könige und Kaiser: Die Urkunden Friedrichs 
II., 1218-1220, ed. Walter Koch, Klaus Höflinger, Joachim Spiegel, and Christian Friedl, MGH 
DD F II, 14:3 (Hannover, 2010), 352-53. 
69
 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 35r; Constitutiones, ed. Weiland, 72; Die Urkunden der deutschen Könige und 
Kaiser: Die Urkunden Friedrichs II., 1212-1217, ed. Walter Koch, Klaus Höflinger, Joachim 
Spiegel, and Christian Friedl, MGH DD F II, 14:2 (Hannover, 2007), 394-96. 
70
 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 172r: ‘genitor tuis ad transfretandum magnifice se accingit’; Pressutti 2361. 
71
 Diplomatica, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, 741-44. 
72
 Van Cleve, ‘Crusade of Frederick’, 434.  
73
 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 169v: ‘ad kalendas Maii proximas tui processus terminum prorogamus’; 
Pressutti 2372. 
100 
 
place himself humbly in the hands of God, and to complete the crusade.
74
 The 
pope was using every means possible to try and persuade Frederick to fulfil his 
vow. 
After the abbot of Fulda’s audience with the pope, at which the abbot 
presented Frederick’s coronation case viva voce, Honorius issued a letter on 10 
April 1220 to Frederick which stated that after discussion with his cardinals, the 
most important matters of policy to the curia were the crusade, Church liberties, 
and heresy.
75
 The pope needed to be satisfied on these three issues by Frederick 
before he would crown him. Honorius also granted Frederick’s request for a papal 
legate to be sent in return, and although no legate is named in this letter, this role 
was later carried out by Nicholas da Chiaromonte, cardinal-bishop of Tusculum 
(1219-27), whom was sent later in the year to join the papal chaplain and 
subdeacon Alatrinus (who had been acting as a diplomat and papal informant at 
Frederick’s court since summer 1219).76 
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Frederick’s desire to see his son Henry elected as king of the Romans was 
realised at Frankfurt in April 1220; although it made good sense dynastically 
given the dangers inherent in crusading, it went against the pope’s wishes.77 It had 
also been effected without Honorius’s knowledge.78 Like Conrad III before him, it 
was probably actually part of Frederick’s crusade preparation rather than a threat 
to the papacy, but it was a move which muddied the waters regarding Frederick’s 
promise to Innocent III in 1216 that Henry would owe fealty to the pope alone as 
king of Sicily.
79
 Olaf Rader has called the promise a ‘marvellous lie’ because not 
only did Frederick retain the throne of Sicily, but he now also had Henry crowned 
king of the Romans.
80
 In a placatory letter sent to the pope on 13 July 1220, 
Frederick made the flimsy excuse that the election had been performed in his 
absence in order to settle feuding among the German princes.
81
 Having performed 
a fait accompli behind the pope’s back, Frederick could not be relied upon to fulfil 
his other promise to maintain a legal separation between the kingdom of Sicily 
and the Empire; all Honorius could do was hope that he would. 
 
John of Brienne’s Claim to the Armenian Throne 
Frederick’s participation in the Fifth Crusade was made even more urgent by 
events away from the curia and perhaps contributed to Honorius’s decision to 
crown the emperor-elect. At Easter John of Brienne left the crusade army in 
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Damietta to return to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Oliver of Paderborn records that 
he gave many false excuses for his departure but promised to return quickly.
82
 
Donovan - citing the attacks on the kingdom mentioned by Ernoul and Oliver - 
thought that his primary reason was to defend his kingdom against the threat 
posed by al-Mu’azzam.83 In addition to this, Mayer pointed to his anger at not 
being awarded outright control of Damietta, and the fact that he was running out 
of money.
84
  
John also had a claim to the throne of Armenia through his wife Stephanie, 
and had petitioned for papal confirmation of it, which was duly granted in a 
document issued on 2 February 1220.
85
 It is probable that John left to assert his 
rights in Armenia.
86
 Runciman wrote that the papal document of 2 February 
permitted John to leave the crusade in order to pursue his dynastic concerns, but 
there is no such statement in the letter, it merely confirms that John had a claim, 
not that the pope recommended or allowed him to go.
87
 That Honorius later wrote 
to John ordering him to rejoin the crusade supports this interpretation (see 
below).
88
 
Perry writes that although John may have been attending to his Armenian 
affairs, his main concern must have been his vulnerable kingdom, and notes the 
significance of the Templars’ departure as well, although they did not travel with 
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John but left separately.
89
 Perry states that if John had been truly serious about his 
Armenian ambitions, he would have left Egypt sooner.
90
 The king of Armenia, 
Leo, had died in May 1219.
91
 A substantial amount of time passed before John’s 
claim was confirmed by the papacy but this does not mean a lack of interest in the 
claim on John’s behalf. It took a matter of months, depending on the season, for 
despatches from Egypt to reach the curia (as well as a further delay in carrying the 
news from Armenia to Egypt). In addition, prior to November 1219, the crusade 
army had been focused on capturing Damietta; it may only have been after the 
city’s fall - when John was unsatisfied that it was not added to his kingdom 
without hesitation - that the king began seriously to consider pursuing his claim.  
Historians have not drawn attention to the neat correlation between the 
date of issue of the papal confirmation, 2 February 1220, and John’s departure at 
Easter, a window which tallies with the timeframe for the receipt and despatch of 
letters between the curia and Egypt. Oliver of Paderborn’s note that John’s 
departure coincided with the arrival of that season’s passage allows one to 
speculate that the papal confirmation perhaps arrived on one of these ships, and 
that as soon as John received it, he may have cut a hasty path north to try and set 
about making his claim. Unfortunately the sources do not permit one to do more 
than speculate. That Oliver of Paderborn records the destruction of Caesarea and 
the Templar stronghold of Safita in the two chapters immediately preceding 
John’s departure probably gives us the main impetus (or at least justification) for 
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John’s return to his kingdom.92 Even so, the possibility that he sought to kill two 
birds with one stone - to secure his kingdom and claim the Armenian throne - 
cannot be ruled out. Powell judged that ‘the most that can be concluded is that 
John took advantage of the lull in the fighting after the capture of Damietta to see 
to his own affairs.’93 
John’s pursuance of his claim in Armenia does not mean that he suddenly 
relinquished his interest in Damietta: he had coins minted (deniers), probably in 
the city itself, between 1219 and 1221 which bore the legends +IOhANNES REX 
around John’s facing head, and DAMIETA on the reverse.94 D.M. Metcalf has 
argued against the claim in the historiography that this first issue established John 
as ‘king of Damietta’. Metcalf states that such a notion ‘is numismatic as well as 
constitutional nonsense’ on the basis that ‘Damieta indicates merely the town 
where they were minted, or, by extension, the name of the coin’.95 There was 
another issue of this denier with the legends reversed (a practice which was 
accepted in the early thirteenth century to signify a regency), so DAMIATA 
surrounded the king’s head, and IOhES REX featured on the reverse, and must 
have been struck outside of Damietta, elsewhere in the kingdom of Jerusalem.
96 
 
Metcalf writes that the second issue was probably minted between 1221 
and 1222, and may indeed have sought to signify a claim over the now-lost (but 
perhaps recoverable) city, in the ‘period when John’s position was being 
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challenged by Frederick.’97 The problem with Metcalf’s theory is that the 
agreement that Frederick would marry John’s daughter, which is presumably the 
challenge to which Metcalf is referring, did not come about until 1223, and 
Metcalf states that the notion of the coins being minted as late as 1223 is 
problematic.
98
 In any case, the minting of the coins sent a clear message and 
demonstrates that John had not abandoned his interests in the city: he obviously 
meant to return to the crusade. 
Word of John of Brienne’s departure from the crusade host did not reach 
Honorius until August 1220, and in response he addressed a letter to John on 11 
August.
99
 Honorius did not wish to believe the rumour that John had abandoned 
the crusade to go to Armenia, which he claimed had jeopardised the campaign and 
was an affront to those who had travelled across the sea to come to the aid of John 
and his kingdom. The letter finished by urging the king to return to the expedition 
and the pope threatened him with anathematisation for non-compliance. 
Honorius’s letter throws interesting light on John’s actions, because either the 
information circulating at the curia did indeed make out that John had left the 
crusade to follow his Armenian ambitions, or else the pope drew the logical 
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conclusion from his own confirmation of John’s claim. The evidence therefore 
indicates that John was pursuing his claim at the expense of the Fifth Crusade.  
When John re-joined the crusade army on 7 July 1221, just in time for its 
march on Cairo, Runciman thought that this was to avoid being accused of 
cowardice, whereas Linda Ross logically judged his return to have been prompted 
by the death of his wife Stephanie and their son, with whom his claim to the 
Armenian throne died as well.
100
 It took eleven months from the issue of the papal 
letter for John to return to the crusade. One must allow for the time delay inherent 
in medieval correspondence, but nevertheless, this implies that he was not simply 
motivated to come back by the papacy’s strictest orders as Mayer and Van Cleve 
have propounded, and calls into question the extent of papal authority, especially 
in cases where the lay rulers did not stand to gain papal favours in return for 
obedience.
101
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Map 4. The Papal State in the thirteenth century (taken from Abulafia, Frederick, p. xiii; this 
map originates from Waley, State) 
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Map 5. The kingdom of Sicily in the thirteenth century (taken from Abulafia, Frederick, p. 
xii) 
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Negotiations over the Imperial Coronation 
Back in the West, Frederick’s deadline of 1 May slipped by without his departure. 
The pope issued a letter addressed to Frederick at some point in May, which 
allowed him to leave in the next (autumn) passage under the penalty of 
ecclesiastical censure, and notified him that he was sending the papal chaplain and 
penitentiary, Conrad, scholasticus of Mainz, to preach the crusade and to help him 
depart by the new deadline.
102
 Though Frederick might not have been ready, 
Honorius instructed him not to detain German crusaders who were prepared to 
depart. The decision of Honorius to send Conrad to preach the crusade and exert 
additional pressure on the emperor-elect implies that he was not satisfied with 
Frederick’s attempts to prepare alone. It was an acknowledgement that Frederick 
would need more assistance than merely the despatch of papal letters. 
Frederick subsequently made it known that he could not arrive for 
coronation before the Feast of St Michael (29 September), only then would he 
cross over the sea. Honorius relayed this information to Pelagius in a letter of 24 
July in which he also stated that funds from the twentieth were being transferred 
to the crusade.
103
 The imperial crown then, was the crux of papal-imperial 
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negotiations, and it was inhibiting the crusade leadership in Egypt, which awaited 
Frederick’s arrival. 
The letter to Pelagius goes a long way towards explaining the dynamic at 
work in the negotiations between Honorius and Frederick in 1220. Frederick was 
playing for time in order to achieve his imperial coronation, which was not an 
unreasonable aim to secure before crusading. Honorius was reluctant to crown 
Frederick because of fears for the security of the Papal State, especially given the 
underhanded election of Henry as king of the Romans. Papal government by 
response reflected the balance of power in the papal-imperial relationship, which 
was not swinging in Honorius’s favour. Aside from the despatch of exhortatory 
letters and papal representatives, he was largely confined to watching and waiting 
for the emperor-elect’s next move. 
That the pope would eventually be forced into a corner and give way only 
strengthens this interpretation of papal-imperial diplomacy. Honorius aimed to 
safeguard the integrity of the Papal State: although by the end of 1221 he had 
been successful in securing imperial recognition of papal supremacy over the 
disputed Matildine lands in Italy (a long-running issue in papal-imperial 
diplomacy), his attempts to create an irrevocable separation between the thrones 
of the Roman-German Empire and the kingdom of Sicily were ultimately 
unsuccessful.
104
 Long gone were the days when the papacy could look to the 
kingdom for military protection against the Empire when it was under Norman 
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rule (although the relationship still had not always been easy).
105
 With the 
kingdom under imperial control, the papacy was especially reluctant to allow any 
move by the Empire to engulf the Papal State, yet in this instance we see Honorius 
subjugating one of his key policy goals in order to satisfy Frederick and to see his 
crusade happen.
106
  
Watts has noted the papacy’s flexibility in its dealings with lay powers in 
most matters, except, that is, when it came to papal territorial interests.
107
 This 
episode, however, underscores the reality of Honorius’s relationships with the lay 
powers. It was mostly the lay powers who took the initiative in setting the 
political agenda, to which the pope responded on an ad hoc basis, attempting to 
secure the Church’s interests as best as he could. Even when it came to the Papal 
State, the papacy was not inflexible. A large number of papal decisions bent - or 
in the case of Sicily, would eventually bend - to the will of the lay powers. As 
Weiler has pointed out, although the kingdom of Sicily was nominally a papal 
fief, this ‘mattered little in practice, since papal overlordship, unless backed up by 
military force, remained very much a legal fiction.’108 It is extremely revealing 
that in Honorius’s correspondence on the crusade I have found only one outright 
refusal of a request by a powerful secular ruler: Honorius’s decision to turn down 
Frederick’s request for the count of Tripoli to be absolved from excommunication 
in the winter of 1225-26 (see chapter three). David d’Avray has written that the 
curia ‘seldom refused demands for its services’ because the papacy did not wish 
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to ‘turn away litigants and petitioners’, whose very presence helped to ensure the 
continuing importance of the papal curia.
109
 This applies in a similar sense to the 
lay powers as well. Paradoxically, despite the pope’s inclination to grant lay 
powers’ requests, this system served to reinforce papal authority by establishing 
the pope as the arbiter of Christendom; one can draw parallels with the 
establishment of a private petitionary system in England under King Edward I 
(1272-1307), which served to project royal power throughout the realm.
110
 
One must, however, be aware of the nature of the papal registers as 
evidence and how it can potentially create a warped view of an institution that 
almost always said ‘yes’. Because only successful petitions were dignified with 
the issue of a papal document in response, it means that in the registers one only 
finds the occasions when the pope granted petitions, and even then, on account of 
selective registration, not all of them. For political affairs however, which often 
went hand-in-hand with petitioning, the pope’s curial letters were often registered 
for their own sake. This means that the registers preserve both positive and 
negative responses to requests by lay powers that were framed in political letters 
or delivered through diplomats. It can therefore be asserted with some confidence 
that the lack of refusals is broadly reflective of the pope’s position in the political 
landscape. 
In the run up to his coronation, Frederick had been trying, with mixed 
results, to satisfy Honorius on the Church’s interests.111 In order to secure the 
election of his son Henry as king of the Romans - which threatened to arouse 
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Honorius’s ire, but was necessary before leaving on crusade - Frederick had to 
grant concessions to the German ecclesiastical princes.
112
 On 26 April 1220, just 
prior to Henry’s election, Frederick issued the decree Confederatio cum 
principibus ecclesiasticis, which awarded enhanced privileges to the German 
episcopate.
113
 Abulafia has argued that this was not issued merely to placate 
Honorius, but it did benefit the crusade by creating a stable political situation in 
preparation for Frederick’s absence.114 In addition, although Frederick did not 
leave on crusade in person, he sent a contingent under the command of Count 
Matthew of Apulia, who arrived in Egypt with eight galleys in July.
115
 This was 
not what Honorius really wanted, which was Frederick’s personal participation, 
but it was a start, and was probably designed by Frederick to signal his 
commitment to the crusade.
116
  
In August Honorius dealt with a batch of Frederick’s petitions connected 
to his upcoming coronation and crusade. Two letters were issued on 20 August 
regarding the protection of Frederick’s lands while he would be away. One was 
addressed to the princes of Germany, ordering those signed with the cross to 
depart with the emperor-elect, and those staying behind to keep the peace in his 
lands.
117
 The other was addressed to Egbert, bishop of Bamberg, ordering him not 
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to stir up trouble in Frederick’s absence.118 On the next day the pope issued a 
document to Henry de Neiffen releasing him from his crusade vow as a result of 
Frederick’s requests (‘preces’), because he was entrusted with the care of 
Frederick’s son.119 On 28 August Honorius granted Frederick’s request that his 
wife Constance be crowned empress alongside him.
120
 
Frederick’s requests were strikingly similar to Andrew II’s prior to his 
crusade, and the pope must have had high hopes that after his coronation, 
Frederick would finally cross over the sea just as Andrew had done when his 
petitions had been granted. As Powell has stated, the negotiations leading up to 
the coronation ‘were full of promise’.121 The coronation marked a watershed in 
the papal-imperial negotiations up to this point. By crowning Frederick, Honorius 
would be relinquishing the carrot which he had been attempting to use to secure 
the separation of the kingdom and the Empire. After making Frederick emperor, 
Honorius was left only with the stick of excommunication, and this was a penalty 
which he was extremely reluctant to use.  
Excommunication was the papacy’s ‘ultimate weapon’, and once 
deployed, there was no higher ecclesiastical penalty that could be enforced, unless 
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the pope attempted to depose the ruler in question.
122
 That the Church often relied 
on the secular arm to enforce sentences of excommunication only strengthened 
Frederick’s bargaining position, and there is nothing to suggest that such an 
extreme course of action as deposition or fomenting civil war in Germany was 
either considered a warranted or realistic option under Honorius. Encouraging 
rebellion in Germany or aiding the Lombard League would certainly have been 
options available to Honorius if he had ever wanted to depose Frederick. 
Frederick’s position as emperor was not unassailable, and the German princes 
were powerful political players in their own right.
123
 The emperor-elect’s position 
was vulnerable before his imperial coronation in 1220 (the very reason he could 
not leave on crusade), and the events of Frederick’s early life, and again later in 
the 1240s, demonstrated the threat that papally-encouraged rivals could pose.
124
  
This restraint must be attributed to Honorius’s personality, because 
Gregory IX proved himself to be of a different temperament when, on receiving 
the news of Frederick’s failure to depart on crusade in 1227, he took the step that 
Honorius never had (despite it being within his rights to carry out), and 
excommunicated the emperor, released his subjects from allegiance, and invaded 
the kingdom of Sicily.
125
 In 1229 Gregory offered the German crown to the Welf 
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heir, Otto the Child (1227-52), but was turned down.
126
 This was a political act 
driven by papal initiative, and Gregory’s response completely reversed Honorius’s 
aim of papal-imperial cooperation - proof that the papacy was not always reactive 
in its political affairs. 
Outside the papal curia, pressure was also mounting on Frederick to 
depart. It seems to have been common knowledge among the well informed that 
the crusade army was in a state of limbo whilst awaiting the emperor-elect’s 
arrival. A letter despatched by Peter de Montacute, master of the Knights 
Templar, to the bishop of Elne, given at Acre on 20 September 1220, informed the 
bishop that the crusaders were in desperate need of money and that they had been 
waiting for Frederick for a long time.
127
 Peter believed that Frederick’s 
participation would bring the crusade to an end, and ominously foretold that if he 
did not arrive by summer of the next year (1221), that the Franks’ position in 
Syria and Egypt would be untenable. This then was the backdrop against which 
Frederick’s end-game negotiations for the imperial crown played out: Frederick 
was under mounting pressure to fulfil his vow, and the pope, by association, to 
facilitate it. Such pressure perhaps helps to explain why Honorius, despite his 
fears over Sicily, risked crowning Frederick. 
Only days before the coronation, Honorius hurriedly despatched a letter on 
10 November to Nicholas da Chiaromonte, cardinal-bishop of Tusculum, and the 
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subdeacon and papal chaplain Alatrinus.
128
 Nicholas had been appointed as legate 
to Frederick and travelled to meet him and join Alatrinus before the coronation.
129
 
This letter is instructive in gauging the pope’s mindset at this point and reveals 
that even at this late stage, Honorius still harboured suspicions regarding the 
emperor-elect’s motives. As well as discussing the publication of the agreed laws 
that were to be issued at the coronation, the letter ordered Nicholas and Alatrinus 
to investigate whether Frederick was using his crusade as a pawn in his game to 
unite Sicily with the Empire. Honorius stated that he wanted Frederick to leave in 
the next passage (‘in instanti passagio’), and ordered the recipients to try and 
discover the emperor-elect’s true ambitions regarding Sicily, and to report back to 
the curia.
130
  
Imperial delegates had already arrived in Rome by October to discuss the 
Sicilian question, including Hermann von Salza, the master of the Teutonic Order 
who had already personally fought at Damietta in the Fifth Crusade.
131
 At some 
point in November, Frederick issued a document at his camp on Monte Mario 
overlooking Rome, named the Declaratio regis de regno Siciliae by its editor, 
which promised that the kingdom of Sicily would never be united with the Empire 
in word or deed, and acknowledging that the kingdom was a dependant of the 
Roman Church.
132
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That Honorius needed to issue the letter of 10 November to Nicholas at all 
suggests that the imperial delegation (and the Declaratio if it had been issued by 
then) was not successful at allaying his fears. Despite his apparent misgivings 
though, Honorius went along with Frederick’s wishes; perhaps he clung onto the 
validity of the golden bull Frederick had issued in February. The pope wanted to 
believe Frederick’s promise, indeed he had to if he was ever to secure his most 
urgent aim of imperial leadership of the Fifth Crusade.
133
 
Abulafia has questioned whether Frederick had even decided what Sicily’s 
relationship would be to the Empire at this point, but admits that Frederick had 
promised not to unite the kingdom and the Empire at his coronation, despite 
envisaging a personal union under his authority.
134
 If Frederick was vague about 
his intentions regarding Sicily, and this became apparent in the discussions with 
the imperial envoys at the curia, then it is hardly surprising that Honorius wanted 
the inside track on Frederick’s thoughts regarding this contentious and potentially 
perilous issue. 
Although Honorius’s dealings with Frederick were generally tolerant, the 
letter of 10 November demonstrates that the pope was not easily deceived in his 
relationship with Frederick, as some have claimed.
135
 Honorius clearly knew that 
he could not afford to take Frederick’s promises at face value. Frederick was not 
the only one capable of wily diplomacy, and the despatch of Nicholas to the 
emperor-elect’s court was a clever move in two ways. Not only did Nicholas serve 
as a constant, physical reminder to Frederick of his vow, but he could also be 
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utilised as an intelligence-gatherer at Frederick’s court. Nicholas could hopefully 
deliver independent reports, untainted by the imperial spin present in letters such 
as that of 13 July explaining Henry’s election. The pope’s information network 
was the lifeblood of papal government, and the reports and letters being received 
at the curia were at the core of papal decision-making. Without such agents on the 
side of the Church, it would have been much easier for a skilled diplomat such as 
Frederick to pull the wool over the pope’s eyes.  
Walter Ullmann remarked of Frederick that there were few other western 
rulers who built up such important experience of dealing with the papacy, and that 
by developing a full grasp of the institution’s way of thinking he was well placed 
to exploit this knowledge.
136
 It must be remembered, however, that this familiarity 
benefitted both sides. The pope and his cardinals would have been just as aware of 
Frederick’s way of thinking as he was of theirs, especially by 1220. As Powell has 
commented, Honorius was well versed in using diplomacy to achieve his own 
ends.
137
 
Honorius crowned Emperor Frederick II in Rome at St Peter’s on 22 
November 1220. Although Frederick appeared to be the ‘winner’, the pope gained 
in a number of ways too. Despite enjoying generally good relations with the city 
of Rome, the pope had received imperial support to make his return to Rome in 
the autumn of 1220 for the coronation, after short absences in 1219 and 1220 on 
account of Roman aggression. Another short exile followed in 1222 when the 
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Romans attacked Viterbo, and 1225 saw a further period of leave from Rome, 
from which Honorius returned early in 1226, again with imperial backing.
138
 
Although the pope had lost arguably his biggest bargaining chip for the 
crusade in crowning Frederick, the promulgation of imperial laws at the 
coronation, the Constitutio in basilica beati Petri, benefitted the papacy with 
regards to Church liberties and action against heresy; they represented a not 
inconsiderable, and certainly very tangible, consolation prize.
139
 Powell argued 
that the papal-imperial negotiations were not a one-way street that led only to 
imperial gain, and observed that Honorius actually saw the laws as a major 
achievement of his pontificate.
140
 The pope had the laws copied into his register 
for the curia’s reference, and Stürner has made the significant observation that the 
text of the laws had already been approved during the preliminary negotiations, 
and was largely ‘ein Produkt der Kurie’, lending further support to Powell’s 
interpretation.
141
  
Honorius probably did not even have to twist Frederick’s arm regarding 
the action against heresy because he shared the Church’s view.142 Frederick’s 
coronation promise was not empty, and in March 1224 he issued a new law to 
combat heresy in Lombardy, which ordered that the local bishopric should hunt 
down unrepentant heretics who were to be delivered over to the relevant podestà 
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and burned at the stake.
143
 Through his negotiations with Frederick, Honorius had 
achieved his policy aims of securing Church liberties and imperial action against 
heresy, and had removed supposedly the final impediment to Frederick’s crusade. 
The aim of creating a separation between the kingdom and Empire, however, 
remained elusive, having been abandoned as a hostage to fortune in the pope’s 
adaptation to the political reality. 
The events immediately following the coronation reveal further details 
about the negotiations that took place beforehand. Bombi has linked the arrival of 
the imperial envoy, Hermann von Salza, with the issue of a series of papal 
privileges granted to the Order immediately after the coronation. Since 1198 the 
Teutonic Knights had enjoyed close links with the Hohenstaufen. Many recruits 
were loyal to the emperor, and the Order drew most of its assets from the Empire - 
ultimately they were more loyal to their emperor than the pope who held supreme 
authority over the Order.
144
 Bombi has drawn attention to the fact that the 
Teutonic Order was issued with no fewer than fifty-seven papal documents 
between December 1220 and March 1221, thirty-four of which were issued in 
only six days between 15 and 21 January 1221.
145
 Even before Hermann’s arrival, 
a letter from July 1220 proves that the Order already had a proctor named Otto at 
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Honorius’s curia.146 The privileges granted to the Order in the wake of the 
coronation elevated it to the same position as the Templars and Hospitallers in the 
eyes of the papacy.
147
 The gains made by the Teutonic Order demonstrate the 
great importance of petitioning and maintaining one’s ‘presence’ at the curia, and 
also the rewards that could be obtained from working the system. Furthermore, 
they display the blurring between petitioning and political diplomacy which seems 
to be symptomatic of papal politics. 
Frederick’s chronicler, Richard of San Germano (d.1244), records that 
after his coronation the emperor publically renewed his crusade vow in the 
presence of Hugolino, cardinal-bishop of Ostia.
148
 Honorius moved to capitalise 
on his renewed vow and tried to persuade the emperor to set out as soon as 
possible. The coronation prompted the issue of a flurry of papal documents 
regarding the crusade.  
 After the coronation Honorius wrote to the papal penitentiary and 
chaplain, Conrad, scholasticus of Mainz - who had already been appointed as a 
crusade preacher in Germany - just a few days later on 27 November.
149
 Soon 
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after Honorius had received the petition of Albert of Orlamünde, count of 
Holstein, in 1217, the pope had been prompted by petitions from the Baltic to 
issue an indulgence for crusaders fighting in Livonia.
150
 This new letter of 27 
November 1220 to Conrad cancelled that indulgence in order to prevent 
Frederick’s crusade, planned for August 1221, from haemorrhaging soldiers 
swayed by the geographical proximity of Livonia. This decision reflects more the 
responsive nature of papal government, which constantly adapted itself to 
changing circumstances, than a change in curial opinion.
151
 
On 28 November Honorius wrote again to Conrad, awarding him the 
power to relax the sentences of excommunication levelled against German 
crusaders who had failed to depart on time, so that having been given another 
chance, they might depart in the next passage.
152
 Two days later the curia issued 
another two letters connected to the imperial crusade. Frederick had pledged five 
thousand marks to Duke Louis of Bavaria to pay for the imperial contingent he 
was going to lead in March, and Honorius granted Louis the concession of being 
allowed to delay his departure until the August passage if Frederick reneged on 
his promise.
153
 On the same day Honorius issued another letter on this matter, this 
time to Pelagius, informing him of developments at the curia.
154
 As it stood, 
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Frederick was planning to leave in August, and Louis would lead a vanguard force 
in March. Honorius told his legate that he had promised Louis two thousand 
marks from Pelagius’s funds, but that if he delayed then Pelagius was authorised 
to reallocate the money to support the crusade by another means. 
The two letters of 30 November reveal that the pope was no longer 
surprised by Frederick’s delays but had become more versatile and begun to plan 
around them. By providing contingency options to prevent the Church being 
caught off balance by any imperial recalcitrance, it allowed agents on the ground 
such as Pelagius to respond faster to the changing circumstances of the crusade. 
It was just as well that Honorius did not immediately assume unqualified 
confidence in Frederick, because although the emperor was seriously committed 
to the crusade, his first priority was to secure his domestic situation in Sicily.
155
 
The political situation in the kingdom of Sicily had degenerated after the death of 
Frederick’s mother, Constance of Sicily, in 1198. As Powell states: ‘virtually 
every group and faction represented in the kingdom took advantage of the royal 
minority and, after 1212, the absence of the King in Germany to strengthen its 
position in the existing scheme of things.’156 The systems of tax and trade were in 
need of reform, the barons on the mainland had become over powerful, and 
Muslim rebels were ensconced in the mountains.
157
 That Frederick first turned his 
attention to the kingdom should therefore not be judged as an outright betrayal of 
the pope’s trust. 
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On 15 December the pope wrote to the legate Pelagius, informing him of 
the emperor’s expected departure date and ordering that he rally the crusaders to 
stand firmly together until that time.
158
 Yet only a few weeks later, Honorius sent 
another letter to Pelagius, on 2 January 1221, commenting on the uncertain nature 
of Frederick’s participation and his frequent delays.159 In light of this the pope 
ordered the legate to put out feelers for a potential truce with the Muslims, to see 
if an advantageous deal might be struck, and then to report back. The truce 
Honorius envisioned was probably more of a pause in the campaign to await 
Frederick than to seek terms such as had already been offered by Sultan al-Kamil 
and rejected by the crusaders.
160
 That Honorius had such a rapid change of heart, 
and was mulling over the idea of a pause in the crusade only weeks after the 
coronation and his letter of 15 December to Pelagius, suggests that there must 
have been further developments which dented his confidence in Frederick’s 
imminent departure. It is also evidence of Honorius behaving more proactively in 
his administration of the Fifth Crusade. 
An imperial contingent under Louis of Bavaria was successfully launched, 
and arrived in Egypt in May, supposedly ahead of Frederick’s own arrival.161 But 
by June rumours had reached the pope that it was unlikely that Frederick would be 
ready to depart in August. On 13 June Honorius issued a letter addressed to 
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Frederick, informing him that he was well aware of the reports about his delays in 
preparing ships for the crusade.
162
 The pope urged Frederick to set out, and made 
it clear that he knew the emperor was aware of the effect that his delays were 
having, and the criticism that the pope was attracting as a result.
163
 Honorius’s 
scepticism was perhaps misplaced. John Pryor has argued that the type of ships 
Frederick sent with Louis - galleys designed for war, rather than transport ships - 
signalled a firm commitment not only to participate in person, but also to strike 
the campaign’s coup de grâce before his arrival by fighting up the Nile.164 
Whether the pope was aware of these logistical subtleties is unclear, but a 
papal letter to Pelagius, the Military Orders on the crusade, and the archbishop of 
Bordeaux from 20 June reveals that Honorius was losing confidence.
165
 The letter 
bewailed Frederick’s many delays, and recounted the pope’s own actions to try 
and secure his participation. It notified the recipients that Hugolino was being sent 
as legate to Lombardy and Tuscany to secure aid for the campaign. It certainly 
seems that by the summer of 1221, although not completely despondent, Honorius 
was not expecting Frederick to go on crusade by his August deadline.  
In a move to show his support for the crusade the emperor despatched 
forty more imperial galleys under Count Henry of Malta, which reached Egypt at 
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the end of August, although embarrassingly they arrived just in time to hear of the 
crusade’s failure.166 When Honorius received Frederick’s letter in July informing 
him that he had sent the galleys, Honorius replied on 20 July that while this was 
duly noted, Hugolino had been sent to Italy and that Frederick ought to leave in 
August.
167
 Honorius desired no less than Frederick’s personal departure on 
crusade. Imperial reinforcements under the command of German princes were all 
well and good, but the worrying reports that the curia had been receiving from 
Pelagius, the Military Orders, and Jacques de Vitry, all made it clear that the 
crusade was in danger of breaking up without a universally recognised leader of 
Frederick’s stature. The letters and chronicle sources all agree that the crusaders 
had been waiting for Frederick for around two years, and Honorius aimed to 
supply the army with the crusade-winning leadership that only the emperor could 
provide. Yet now that Frederick had been crowned, the pope had even less 
leverage over him. 
In a letter to Frederick of 21 August, issued only eight days before the 
crusade army would surrender to Sultan al-Kamil, Honorius wrote to Frederick as 
a father to a son (‘ad te itaque tanquam pater ad filium...’) and sounded a note of 
disappointment.
168
 The pope’s informants had reported that Frederick was 
meddling in episcopal elections in Salerno, and Honorius thought fit to remind the 
emperor that the curia had many eyes and ears and was by no means ignorant of 
affairs in the Empire. Honorius ordered him to stop intruding on Church affairs.  
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Unknown to both the pope and the emperor, however, while Honorius was 
scolding Frederick for frittering away time in the West, the crusade had foundered 
in Egypt. It came as an abrupt and crushing blow to Honorius’s curia which had 
no idea that in August the crusade was in the process of being routed. News of the 
crusade’s collapse did not arrive at the curia until November, and what was worse, 
it was delivered in a letter sent by the man whom the pope felt had jeopardised the 
crusade. Despite Honorius’s best and unrelenting support, the Fifth Crusade was 
over. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has put forward an assessment of Honorius’s diplomacy with the lay 
powers that reveals a pope who was persistent, yet tactful in managing 
occasionally difficult relations with the secular rulers. The firmest of orders to 
John of Brienne to return to the crusade army demonstrate that Honorius was not 
afraid to flex his diplomatic muscles when required, although the muted impact 
this appears to have had, and the fact that the pope was cornered by Frederick 
over the kingdom of Sicily, draws into question the amount of temporal power the 
pope really possessed. Honorius was therefore engaged in the art of persuasion: 
without overwhelming temporal power to back up papal orders, he had to balance 
his praise with rationed criticism, hoping all the time that Frederick would finally 
depart.  
At the risk of generalisation, it is probably broadly correct to state that 
Honorius employed a softer approach to solving problems than Innocent III, who 
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had excommunicated King John of England and imposed an interdict to bring the 
king to heel, and who had also assumed an interventionist attitude towards the 
candidature for the imperial throne.
169
 Honorius has been chastised in the past as 
mild and weak, but one must ask what the result of a blunt head-on attack on the 
emperor could possibly have achieved? The attainment of the imperial laws at 
Frederick’s coronation represents one of Honorius’s great diplomatic successes, 
and was extracted from negotiations which appear to have been driven largely by 
Frederick. The importance of incoming petitions, reports, and envoys in the issue 
of papal documents has drawn out the responsive character of papal government, 
and the lull between October 1219 and February 1220, when no significant letters 
on the crusade were issued, testifies to the rarity of proactive policy-making on 
the crusade. This respite in crusade business and the corresponding lack of papal 
action is not an isolated incident, and will be witnessed again, even more 
prominently, in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The Organisation of Frederick II’s Crusade, 1221-
1227 
 
After the Fifth Crusade failed, Honorius and Frederick II refocused their efforts 
on organising a new imperial-led crusade to avenge the loss of Damietta and to 
restore the reputations of those involved. The diplomatic contact revolved around 
a series of papal-imperial colloquia which supply essential markers against which 
to measure the operation of papal government. The flurries of papal letters issued 
immediately after them, followed by a lack of papal action for months at a time in 
between, demonstrate further the importance of outside initiative in papal crusade 
decision-making, and perhaps also point to Honorius’s waning interest in 
supporting Frederick’s long overdue crusade. This chapter is structured around the 
three colloquia which trisect Honorius III’s diplomacy with Frederick and the lay 
powers during the period 1221-27: Veroli in April 1222; Ferentino in March 
1223; and San Germano in July 1225.  
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The Veroli Colloquium 
Frederick’s letter of 25 October 1221 sounded the death knell for the Fifth 
Crusade at the papal curia.
1
 Frederick informed Honorius that the crusade had 
failed, and sought to assuage the pope’s anticipated disappointment by pouring 
out his own grief. The emperor stated that his concern for the Holy Land was such 
that he would not rest, and claimed that he was making urgent preparations for his 
crusade. 
 Honorius replied to Frederick on 19 November.
2
 The letter deplored 
Frederick’s years of delays, yet despite castigating the emperor for his failure to 
go on crusade, the pope channelled his frustration into organising a new crusade. 
Frederick was exhorted to devote all of his strength to Christ’s cause. Once again, 
Nicholas, cardinal-bishop of Tusculum, was being sent to Frederick as legate to 
work towards the imperial crusade.
3
 
 Although the Fifth Crusade had failed, it was perhaps not a complete 
catastrophe for the papacy. Crucially, the peace that the crusade army had made 
with the Egyptian sultan, al-Kamil, was not binding on Frederick if he led a 
crusade in person.
4
 Therefore although the crusade army had been defeated and 
returned home, there was nothing to prevent Frederick from leading his own 
crusade, which, considering the might of the Empire, would potentially be as 
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large, if not larger, than the armies of the Fifth Crusade. United under the 
unquestioned authority of a single leader, it would more closely resemble past 
crusades that had not suffered from the rhythm of seasonal departures which had 
afflicted the Fifth Crusade. The initial target of Frederick’s crusade - whether 
Jerusalem or Damietta - can only be guessed at. When it was proposed in 1223 
that Frederick would marry John of Brienne’s daughter, the focus of his crusade 
firmly shifted to the kingdom of Jerusalem.
5
 Honorius thus still had everything to 
play for. 
 Despite the pope’s sorrow, the failure of the Fifth Crusade did not destroy 
the relationship between Honorius and Frederick, and the previous spirit of 
cooperation was maintained.
6
 The history of the papal-imperial negotiations from 
1221 until Honorius’s death in 1227 is punctuated by three colloquia at which the 
crusade was discussed. These meetings supplied the impetus for the issue of a 
large number of papal letters on the crusade, and batches of letters can be 
discerned that were issued in direct response to particular colloquia and reflect the 
emperor’s input. 
 The despatch of Nicholas to the imperial court was part of the preparations 
for the new round of discussions with Frederick.
7
 On 10 December Honorius 
issued a letter to Nicholas that sheds a small amount of light on Honorius’s 
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meetings with his cardinals.
8
 The pope ordered Nicholas to confer with the 
emperor over the recovery of the Holy Land, and to try to persuade Frederick to 
set a certain date for his departure in the near future. This would then be 
transmitted throughout the Empire. 
 Honorius also hoped to recruit new crusaders to accompany Frederick 
from lands outside of the Empire, and on 19 December he sent a letter to the 
episcopate of Sens, France, England, Scotland, Ireland, Germany, Hungary, 
Tuscany, and Lombardy.
9
 In this letter Honorius lamented the Fifth Crusade’s 
failure but reassured the recipients that he was taking action, and had already sent 
Nicholas to Frederick to arrange a colloquium in which his impending crusade 
would be discussed. These clergy were charged to preach the new crusade. It 
seems that although Honorius wanted Frederick to play the lead role in the new 
expedition, he (and perhaps Frederick himself) did not envisage it being an 
exclusively imperial venture. The pope’s actions were motivated by his desire to 
avoid criticism for the Fifth Crusade, and in his participation in the papal-imperial 
colloquia, one can observe elements of a more proactive papal role alongside the 
responsive behaviour outlined in the previous two chapters. 
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 Before the first colloquium at Veroli, we can identify a very similar set of 
papal-imperial relations to those before the failure of the Fifth Crusade. The pope 
was still urging Frederick to set a fixed date and depart as soon as possible, and 
Frederick was still promising to perform as such. Nevertheless, the upcoming 
papal-imperial colloquium possessed real potential to make progress on 
Frederick’s crusade planning. Rather than merely exhorting Frederick to depart 
and then criticising him for failing in his duty, meeting the emperor face-to-face 
for discussions on the crusade, this time without ulterior motive of angling for the 
imperial crown, held out the prospect of both sides gaining a deeper 
understanding of the other’s motivations and the wider circumstances which 
impacted upon the organisation of the new crusade. 
 The first colloquium at Veroli between 12 and 14 April 1222 seems to 
have been preliminary in nature. Richard of San Germano, a supporter of 
Frederick, recorded that the emperor agreed to a deadline for his crusade, but does 
not state when this actually was beyond his vague statement ‘in certo termino’.10 
Richard could be saving Frederick’s blushes here over yet another missed 
departure, or it could reflect the inconclusive character of this first set of talks. 
The latter seems most likely, because the small batch of papal letters issued in 
response to the colloquium suggest that Frederick renewed his promise to go on 
crusade, but that a deadline had been left in abeyance until the next colloquium.
11
 
Immediately following the colloquium Honorius issued a small number of 
letters that obviously stemmed from the negotiations with the emperor, and 
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tellingly, were all dated at the location of the colloquium, Veroli. On 17 April 
Honorius sent a letter to the Templars in an effort to establish concord between 
them and the Teutonic Order over the assumption of the white mantle by the 
latter, which Honorius had granted in 1220-21.
12
 Two days later the curia 
despatched a letter to the Teutonic Order, confirming Frederick’s donation of two 
hundred ounces of gold to them, and their right to wear white mantles.
13
 Hermann 
von Salza and the Teutonic Order were perhaps emerging from the papal-imperial 
negotiations as the biggest winners yet again, having previously secured a long 
series of papal privileges after Frederick’s coronation. They were now playing a 
significant role as intermediaries in the new negotiations. Indeed, Honorius’s 
support for the Order appears to have been instrumental in their growth. Of 474 
documents issued to the Order between 1216 and 1254, 116 privileges which were 
important for its institutional growth were secured from Honorius.
14
 
On 24 April a letter addressed to the episcopate of Germany took 
Frederick, his family, and his lands under papal protection yet again.
15
 The most 
important letter emanating from the colloquium was that of 25 April, sent to 
Pelagius and John of Brienne.
16
 It informed them that Frederick was still planning 
on crusading, but did not give a fixed deadline. A follow-up colloquium was to be 
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held at Verona on the next Feast of St Martin (11 November 1222), which 
Frederick was to attend in person. Honorius also wanted John and Pelagius to be 
involved because of their experience leading the Fifth Crusade, and invited them 
both to attend, or at least to send messengers if they could not come in person.
17
 In 
addition to John and Pelagius, the patriarch of Jerusalem and Hermann von Salza, 
along with the masters of the Templars and Hospitallers were also invited. 
Although Honorius had possibly connived in excluding John from the leadership 
of the Fifth Crusade, he now sought his counsel. Presumably there was no risk of 
John eclipsing Frederick on his crusade as he had done to Andrew in 1217-18, and 
Honorius appears to have invited him to attend as an adviser rather than a 
potential leader, which probably reflected Frederick’s conception of how the new 
crusade would be organised and led. 
 
The Ferentino Colloquium 
Frederick supplied the transport to bring the delegates from the Holy Land in time 
for the Verona colloquium in November. Oliver of Paderborn writes that in 
September four galleys arrived at Acre to carry John of Brienne, the patriarch of 
Jerusalem, Pelagius, and the master of the Hospitallers back to the West.
18
 The 
master of the Templars remained in the Holy Land to protect the kingdom, but 
sent messengers in his stead to the council. John’s passage to the West under 
Frederick’s banner was emblematic of his relationship to the emperor: whatever 
pretensions to command of the new crusade John may have possessed, it was clear 
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who was in control. As the delegates prepared for the Verona meeting, however, it 
had to be called off because of Honorius’s ill health; it was rearranged for March 
1223 and the venue was changed to Ferentino.
19
 The two main decisions that 
came out of this meeting in 1223 were that Frederick committed to leave on 
crusade by the Feast of John the Baptist (24 June 1225), and it was agreed that 
Frederick would marry John’s daughter, Isabella (also known as Yolande).20  
Several different candidates have been put forward as the originators of 
the marriage proposal. It had traditionally been held that it was Hermann von 
Salza, but Stürner has pointed to Honorius, who hoped it would finally bring 
about the crusade, and Ross has argued that the idea belonged to the patriarch of 
Jerusalem and the Syrian barons, who actively sought the match rather than 
having it foisted upon them.
21
 Ross writes that marrying into the Hohenstaufen 
family was merely a continuation of previous endeavours to bring strong rulers to 
the kingdom of Jerusalem. Ultimately, one can only guess where the idea 
originated, although Honorius’s later actions - his dispensation for the marriage, 
and tacit support of Frederick after John’s deposition - demonstrate that the 
arrangement had his approval whether it was his idea or not. 
After Ferentino Honorius, Frederick, and John  -  the three main players  -  
all went their separate ways. Frederick was supposedly going to prepare for his 
crusade in just over two years’ time, but in the interim he was still involved in 
crushing the Muslims and other rebels in Sicily, Calabria, and Apulia, tasks which 
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occupied him during 1222-23.
22
 John of Brienne began a fundraising tour of the 
West, incorporating France, England, the Rhineland, and Spain (where he married 
Berengaria, the sister of Ferdinand III of Castile, in 1224), in an effort to drum up 
support for his kingdom, and Honorius returned to the regular business of papal 
government, which now included the issue of a large number of important crusade 
letters.
23
 
The colloquia themselves were an arena in which the crusade was 
proactively planned with the emperor. Although the course of the colloquia cannot 
be established, Honorius’s active participation means that he was not playing a 
merely passive role. The extent to which he dictated the course of the 
proceedings, however, is questionable. The decisions made did constitute a 
coherent policy, at least in the short term, although as the evidence below 
suggests, Honorius was often carrying out Frederick’s bidding rather than carving 
out his own policy.  
The periods in-between the colloquia testify to the responsive nature of 
papal decision-making. The batch of letters issued immediately after Ferentino 
provides further evidence of the importance of the lay powers in driving the 
processes of papal government. That Honorius is not recorded to have issued a 
single important crusade letter in the period between the colloquia at Veroli, in 
April 1222, and Ferentino, nearly a year later in March 1223, demonstrates that 
the papacy was not behaving proactively, but predominately reactively, and 
responding to interaction with the lay powers; without the input of the secular 
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rulers, crusade business at the curia almost entirely dried up. No significant 
business concerning Frederick’s crusade was created at the curia until the papacy 
and the lay power met once more at Ferentino. Proactive policy-making did not 
turn the cogs of papal government because the institution did not operate in this 
way. The input and initiative of the lay powers were the main catalysts for the 
curia’s crusade affairs and its related papal document production at the chancery.  
In response to the Ferentino colloquium, on 11 April 1223 Honorius 
launched a pan-European recruitment drive by sending the crusade call Iustus 
Dominus in to Philip Augustus of France, Henry III of England (on 27 April), 
Andrew II of Hungary, King Erik XI of Sweden (1222-29 and 1234-50), and 
innumerable other recipients listed under the general in eundem modum clause.
24
 
This was probably done at the request of Frederick, who appears to have been 
eager to attract other lay rulers to the expedition. Honorius updated the recipients 
on the events at Ferentino, and stated his firm belief that Frederick would depart 
this time, having set 24 June 1225 as his deadline.
25
 This letter was an attempt to 
recruit the recipients to join the expedition themselves, and is noteworthy as the 
first call to crusade that seems genuinely to have addressed Henry III as a viable 
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participant, despite probably having received absolution from his vow by this 
point.
26
 It is also rare in addressing the king of Sweden, with whom Honorius had 
relatively little contact. 
This letter was distributed more widely than the evidence of recipients 
from the registers suggests, and the number of copies sent under the in eundem 
modum clause would surely have been extensive. The copy sent to King Erik XI 
was not noted in the register, nor was the copy sent to the faithful of Flanders and 
Brabant - there must have been many more original copies which are no longer 
extant.
27
 The papal register records the customised wording that was used in some 
of the letters, which personalised them to the recipient in the hope of exerting 
more leverage over them. The copy sent to Henry III, for instance, exhorted him 
to take the crusade and become a new Richard I (1189-99), whose name still 
struck terror into the hearts of the Muslims.
28
  
Simon Lloyd noted that Honorius’s call for Henry to crusade did not come 
until two weeks after the papal declaration of Henry being ‘of legal age in most 
respects’ on 13 April.29 This may explain why Henry’s copy of the 11 April 
crusade call (dated two days before the declaration of Henry being of legal age) 
was not issued to Henry until 27 April, although this might just be a coincidence, 
especially given that crusade calls to Count Thibaut IV of Champagne and 
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Leopold of Austria were also issued on this date.
30
 The letter of 27 April was the 
first serious attempt to engage Henry in the crusade, and the pope unsurprisingly 
stressed his family’s connection to crusading. As Nicholas Vincent has pointed 
out, although only one English king had gone on crusade, that king was Richard I, 
Henry’s uncle.31  In addition, Henry’s great-great-grandfather, Fulk of Anjou, and 
his descendants had held the throne of Jerusalem from 1131 to 1186. Vincent 
states that ‘such ties were not unimportant, and would quite naturally be stressed 
by correspondents ... anxious to recruit Henry’s support.’32 This is how we should 
interpret Honorius’s October 1219 call for Frederick to imitate his own 
grandfather’s example and the April 1223 letter to Henry: they were a means to 
inspire the lay powers to participate, rather than evidence that Honorius was 
renewing Clement III’s crusade policy of securing Anglo, French, and German 
leadership of the Third Crusade, as has been suggested.
33
 
Honorius’s call to crusade in April 1223 was the most important and 
widely distributed crusade call from his entire pontificate. The very length and 
rhetorical flourishes of the letter itself signify its importance - this was not one of 
the standard calls to crusade or support crusading that had been emanating from 
the chancery on a fairly regular basis since Honorius became pope, this was 
something different: a concerted effort on behalf of the papacy in support of 
Frederick’s expedition, targeted at the most powerful western lay rulers. That 
Honorius issued such a letter implies that despite Frederick’s record of 
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disappointing the pope, he truly believed (‘firmiter credimus’) that the emperor’s 
crusade would go ahead.
34
  
For the rest of April and May Honorius was occupied not only with the 
regular rhythm of business created by petitioners at the curia, but now also with 
the continued despatch of crusade letters following the colloquium at Ferentino. 
Certainly by 5 March 1224, Frederick was anxious that peace between England 
and France be maintained so that it would not derail his crusade and wrote to 
Honorius for his assistance.
35
 It seems plausible that he could have made the same 
request in person at Ferentino the year before. On 18 April 1223 the pope sent 
another letter to Philip Augustus, beseeching him to keep the peace with Henry 
III.
36
 That Honorius sent a separate letter to the 11 April crusade call, and also 
despatched Pandulf, bishop of Norwich (d.1226), to Philip, reveals the importance 
that the pope attributed to peace between England and France.
37
 At the end of 
April and beginning of May Honorius also sent letters to many western powers, 
including Henry, Philip Augustus, and the Sicilian barons, requesting that pedagia 
(taxes on travellers) be waived for crusaders making their way through the West.
38
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The issue of these papal letters was prompted by the requests of petitioners 
(‘petitores’) readying for Frederick’s coming crusade, and the pope reassured the 
lay powers that he was asking the same of other rulers throughout the West.
39
 
On 27 April, the same day he wrote to Henry III and Thibaut of 
Champagne, Honorius extended his call to crusade even further, beseeching Duke 
Leopold of Austria, who had acquitted himself well on the Fifth Crusade, to join 
Frederick’s crusade.40 Honorius urged Leopold once again to make this sacrifice, 
because others might follow him in the enterprise. This letter reveals that the pope 
was working on Frederick’s behalf after Ferentino by acting as his intermediary 
with other lay powers to help arrange recruitment for the crusade. Honorius put 
the emperor’s offer to the duke: ten thousand marks if he agreed to take up the 
cross once more.
41
  
A similar proposition was related to the landgrave of Thuringia in a papal 
letter of 26 May, who stood to earn imperial, papal, and divine gratitude, not to 
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mention four thousand silver marks from Frederick.
42
 That such large financial 
grants were deemed necessary to tempt nobles to crusade has been flagged up by 
Weiler as evidence that there was a general reluctance among the nobility to go on 
another crusade.
43
 They simply could not bear the cost and were probably 
apathetic after the recent failure in the Nile Delta - something witnessed after the 
foundering of the Second Crusade as well.
44
 
Weiler’s statement seems to be borne out by the fact that after Honorius’s 
efforts in support of the crusade, there are no more recorded papal letters issued 
on this matter until March 1224. If the western nobility had been enthusiastic 
about the crusade then Honorius’s call would have initiated series of 
correspondence between interested participants. Instead it seems to have fallen on 
deaf ears, which perhaps in part can be attributed to Frederick’s poor record of 
reliability. When the emperor finally did assemble his crusade in 1227, it is telling 
that, with the exception of a group of English and French crusaders who left 
independently, it was largely made up of his own vassals.
45
 
Despite the reluctance among other western lay powers, Frederick’s 
preparations were beginning to gather pace. In summer 1223 the Melkite patriarch 
of Alexandria (who had been one of Innocent III’s key informants) sent a letter to 
the curia explaining how the Fifth Crusade was defeated and the way in which a 
new crusade might best be carried out; Honorius obviously thought it important in 
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the crusade planning and had it copied into his register.
46
 It is also instructive that 
on 26 May Honorius was confident enough to begin organising transport for the 
crusade, when he addressed a letter to Ancona, Genoa, Pisa, and Venice, asking 
them to prepare ships for the expedition.
47
 The Chronica regia Coloniensis 
records that in 1223 the pope sent out preachers to promote the crusade before 
Frederick’s deadline of 24 June 1225.48 This reference could refer to local 
preachers, or perhaps is a misdated reference to Conrad of Urach’s later 1224 
legation as a crusade preacher in Germany.
49
 In either case, the curia was pulling 
its weight in its preparations for the crusade. 
Away from the curia, John was touring the West in his attempt to accrue 
support and funds for his kingdom. After the colloquium at Ferentino, John spent 
the period 1223-24 in France, England, the Rhineland, and Spain, before returning 
to Italy.
50
 John met with success at the French royal court. Conveniently for John 
and his kingdom, Philip Augustus died on 14 July while John was still in France, 
and the king bequeathed large sums for the defence of Christ’s patrimony.51 In his 
will the king of France left three thousand silver marks to John, and two thousand 
each to the Hospital and Temple.
52
 Philip left a further 150,500 marks of silver to 
pay for the cost involved in the general defence of the Holy Land, specifying that 
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three hundred knights should be employed for three years after the truce between 
the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Muslims ended. 
The ‘Barnwell Chronicler’ (writing c.1202-25), from whom Walter of 
Coventry (fl.1293) copied when composing his Memoriale, recorded John 
arriving in England in September, staying for a considerable length of time, and 
supposedly carrying away large amounts of gold and silver from the clergy and 
nobility.
53
 According to the same chronicler, John succeeded in securing provision 
to aid his kingdom in the form of a levy of three marks from each earl, one mark 
from every baron, twelve pence from knights, and a single penny from every 
household.
54
 Still, he seems barely to have benefitted from this levy, and there is 
no evidence that he actually received any of the funds pledged.
55
 
Frederick, still dealing with his domestic problems, successfully petitioned 
for papal dispensation to marry John’s daughter, Isabella, on 5 August, and 
Honorius noted in his letter how closely the matter was tied to the succour of the 
Holy Land (see chapter four).
56
 The pope was nothing if not pragmatic in his 
involvement in the marriage, and kept his focus on the benefit the union would 
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bring to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Honorius supported the planned marriage 
because it bound the emperor to the vulnerable kingdom and appeared to 
guarantee Frederick’s crusade in the near future.57 Once married, Frederick would 
not have been able to extricate himself from the marriage without another papal 
dispensation. Honorius had therefore managed to claw back a potential element of 
control over the emperor, replacing the carrot lost with the imperial crown in 
1220. 
One wonders whether Frederick was actually preparing for his crusade at 
all whilst putting the kingdom of Sicily into order, considering the lack of crusade 
correspondence recorded flowing in and out of the papal curia, although a letter 
dated 5 March 1224 informed the pope that he had ordered the construction of one 
hundred galleys and fifty horse transports (usseria) for his crusade in 1225.
58
 In 
the same month Frederick also issued a new law that charged the bishops of 
Lombardy to root out unrepentant heretics and hand them over to the local 
podestà to be burned.
59
 These were encouraging signs for Honorius. Frederick’s 
moves suggested that the emperor was successfully working towards the new 
timetable, and was fulfilling his coronation promises with regards to the uprooting 
of heresy, but the arrival of the news came at an inauspicious time. In June 1224, 
the new king of France, Louis VIII, had invaded and taken control over most of 
the English crown’s possessions in Poitou.60 The kings of England and France 
were therefore preoccupied with domestic affairs and through their conflict were 
damaging Frederick’s crusade effort by sapping away potential support. Frederick 
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perceived this to be such a problem  -  or sought to use it as a plausible excuse for 
inaction - that in February 1225 he wrote to Honorius requesting that the pope try 
to make peace between Louis and Henry.
61
 Peace in the West was of paramount 
importance to both the pope and the emperor (see chapter five). 
In March 1224 Honorius moved to increase crusade preaching ahead of 
the planned 1225 expedition. He wrote to Jacques de Vitry on 6 March, urging 
him to preach the crusade to the people of the Holy Land in time for Frederick’s 
arrival.
62
 A question mark hangs over Jacques’s effectiveness in preaching or 
organising the crusade given his absences from the See of Acre. After he took part 
in the Fifth Crusade between 1218 and 1221, Jacques visited Italy in 1222-23, 
before returning from the Holy Land for good in 1225 as part of Isabella’s 
entourage.
63
 On 22 April the pope also wrote to the clergy of Germany, stating 
that crusade preachers had been despatched to all the territories where men were 
signed with the cross.
64
 Honorius went on to announce that he was sending 
Conrad, cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina (1219-27), as legate a latere to 
Germany to preach the crusade, and ordered the recipients to receive him 
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honourably.
65
 Although Honorius and Frederick hoped for pan-European 
recruitment, it seems that papal preaching efforts were concentrated, quite 
logically, on Germany. 
Information was also reaching the curia at this time from the kingdom of 
Georgia - a potential ally in the East against the Muslims. Georgia had been 
successful in its conflicts with the Muslim forces in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
during the twelfth century, Jacques de Vitry had held great hopes for Georgian 
assistance in the Fifth Crusade, and there existed open channels of communication 
between the popes and Georgian rulers.
66
 The kingdom therefore seemed to be a 
viable ally in the East. At some point before 12 May 1224, two letters were 
received, one from Queen Rusudan of Georgia (1223-45), explaining that the 
Tartar invasion had prevented the Georgians from assisting the army of the Fifth 
Crusade, but that they were awaiting Frederick’s new crusade.67 The other letter 
was sent by Ivané, constable of Georgia, informing the pope that King George IV 
of Georgia had died, as well as promising a large number of knights for 
Frederick’s expedition.68 Again, like the patriarch of Alexandria’s report, both of 
these eastern letters were copied into the papal registers. Honorius replied to the 
constable on 12 May, notifying him that the emperor’s crusade was imminent and 
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advised him to prepare for it, so that the Georgians might be ready to join the 
expedition.
69
  
After the letter of 12 May 1224 to the constable of Georgia, however, 
there are no more significant crusade letters recorded in the papal registers for an 
entire year. It was not until 12 May 1225 (coincidentally exactly a year later) that 
Honorius is recorded to have written to the new patriarch of Jerusalem, Gerold of 
Lausanne (1225-39), beseeching him to raise support for the crusade in the Holy 
Land.
70
 It is possible that other important letters were sent during this year but not 
registered. However, the registration of documents regarding Frederick’s crusade 
appears to be quite comprehensive, and is supported by the diligent copying of 
eastern reports into the registers - Honorius appears to have desired the thorough 
documentation of this matter. The year-long void of crusade business at the curia 
is very similar to the eleven-month gap in papal documentation discernible 
between the colloquia at Veroli and Ferentino, and the four month gap witnessed 
between October 1219 and February 1220 in the previous chapter. That Frederick 
was not petitioning for further last-minute concessions before his deadline of 24 
June 1225 must have concerned the pope. This was a fear shared by John of 
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Brienne, who discovered on his return to Italy in late 1224 that Frederick was 
indeed not preparing for the crusade.
71
 
That Frederick was going to miss his 1225 deadline must have been 
apparent at the imperial court for some time, but it was left until June, the very 
month of the deadline, before the emperor sent Hermann von Salza and the 
patriarch of Jerusalem, accompanied by John of Brienne, to the papal curia to ask 
for an extension.
72
 Richard of San Germano wrote that when this delegation 
arrived at Rieti, the pope accepted their request favourably, although this imperial 
spin surely glosses over another bitter disappointment for Honorius and his curia, 
a development which must have been met, privately at least, with anger and 
reproach.
73
 
 
The San Germano Colloquium 
A third colloquium was arranged for 25 July 1225 at San Germano, but Honorius 
did not attend in person, and delegated the task instead to Pelagius and Guala as 
legates a latere.
74
 Honorius despatched a letter to Frederick on 18 July shaming 
him for the offence that he had caused to the papacy and the Church by repeatedly 
deferring his crusade.
75
 The letter announced the appointment of Pelagius and 
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Guala who were to be well received.
76
 When the parties met at San Germano, the 
terms reached were conclusive. In the agreement issued on the same day as the 
Colloquium the emperor promised to crusade in person in August 1227, 
maintaining at least one thousand knights for two years, and agreed that he should 
be excommunicated if he did not depart. Experience must have taught Frederick, 
however, that this penalty could quite easily be avoided by renegotiating deadlines 
with, what had proven so far to be (at least under Honorius) a rather agreeable 
papacy. Frederick also agreed to hand over one hundred thousand marks of gold, 
or its equivalent in silver, in five instalments to John, the patriarch of Jerusalem, 
and Hermann von Salza as surety against his departure, which he could claim 
back to fund the crusade once he had left. If Frederick failed to depart a further 
time then the money would be used to support the kingdom of Jerusalem.
77
 By 
investing regularly in his own crusade, Frederick would become more and more 
likely to depart with each instalment he paid, thus increasing his own incentive to 
leave.  
There is a striking dearth of papal letters on Frederick’s crusade after San 
Germano, presumably because the emperor was now shouldering almost all 
responsibility for the crusade, and the pope was perhaps tired of calling the West 
to crusade and attempting to coordinate the departure timings of different 
contingents only to be embarrassed by Frederick’s failures.  
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Powell wrote that the choice of Pelagius as one half of the papal 
delegation at San Germano was a chance for the legate to wipe the disaster of the 
Fifth Crusade from his record, a sign ‘that the pope really meant business’.78 
While there must have been an element of this in his selection, it was probably 
more testament to Honorius’s confidence in Pelagius’s abilities. It seems 
extremely unlikely that the pope would send a legate to such an important 
colloquium merely to make a point, or so as to provide him with an opportunity to 
expiate himself for his supposed failings on the last crusade. Rather Pelagius’s 
previous experience on the Fifth Crusade would have proven invaluable in 
advising the emperor. 
Van Cleve thought the terms of San Germano to be harsh - something of a 
surprise from the apparently ‘milder [than Innocent] Honorius’, and saw the 
impetus for them coming from elsewhere, either Pelagius or the Syrian 
representatives.
79
 In a colloquium such as this it is near impossible to trace the 
gestation of the final terms, but if one takes as a guide the course of papal-
imperial negotiations witnessed during the previous chapter, it may have been 
Frederick himself who was originator of these terms, which, in their striking 
flamboyance, are reminiscent of his previous behaviour. He had, after all, 
requested before that Honorius use the threat of excommunication against himself 
and the German crusaders, and had set his own deadlines, to which the pope had 
acquiesced. Perhaps Frederick felt that he had to make big promises in order to 
appease the pope. 
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Unfortunately one month after San Germano the rumbling papal-imperial 
tension over ecclesiastical appointments briefly flared up. This long-running 
power struggle had shifted according to the waxing and waning of imperial 
strength. Honorius had already warned Frederick in 1223 not to impede canonical 
elections to bishoprics, and in August 1225 the pope took the initiative in 
unilaterally appointing four archbishops, one bishop, and an abbot in the kingdom 
of Sicily.
80
 Nevertheless, this conflict does not seem to have derailed the papal-
imperial relationship. 
More promisingly the likelihood of Frederick’s crusade occurring 
improved dramatically when he married John’s daughter, Isabella, in August 
1225. Frederick and Isabella were married by proxy in Acre, where Isabella was 
crowned, before the emperor brought her to Brindisi and married her in person on 
9 November.
81
 Soon after marrying Isabella, Frederick moved swiftly to deprive 
John of his crown. Frederick assumed the title ‘king of Jerusalem’ (from 
December 1225 until his death in 1250), obtained the homage of the knights who 
had accompanied Isabella to the West, and sent the bishop of Melfi to the Holy 
Land to procure the homage of the Syrian barons.
82
 
Ross suggests that John had never enjoyed an easy relationship with his 
adopted barons in the kingdom of Jerusalem after his arrival in 1210, and that his 
prolonged spell in the West cannot have alleviated this; the barons therefore had 
                                                 
80
 Reg. Vat. 12, fols 60r-61r; Pressutti 4408; Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 87; Pressutti 5655; Loud, ‘Papal’, 
96, 95. 
81
 Stürner, Friedrich, ii, 96. 
82
 Rader, Friedrich, 397-98; Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of 
Jerusalem, 1174-1277 (London, 1973), 160. 
155 
 
few qualms about transferring their allegiance to Frederick.
83
 Bernard Hamilton 
has also noted conflict between John and his barons after the death of his wife 
Maria in 1212.
84
 It is perhaps not surprising then that the barons did homage to 
Frederick immediately and without protest in 1225.
85
 Ross has pointed to the 
continued presence of high-ranking representatives from the kingdom of 
Jerusalem at Frederick’s court from 1225, which aside from Hermann von Salza, 
who was already closely tied to Frederick, included the new patriarch of 
Jerusalem, Gerold of Lausanne, the archbishop of Tyre, Jacques de Vitry, Balian 
of Sidon, and Daniel of Tenremonde.
86
 
Frederick’s putsch should not be seen as the culmination of an escalating 
conflict. Perry has noted that John’s deposition actually marked the end of two 
years’ close cooperation.87 In the wake of seizing John’s crown, Frederick then 
moved to strip his assets as well, going after the money that Philip Augustus had 
bequeathed.
88
 Perry suggested that papal influence could be detected in this move 
by Frederick because Honorius would have wanted the emperor to use the money 
for his crusade, and in any case was about to safeguard John’s financial situation 
with the grant of a papal patrimony.
89
 The grant of a papal patrimony, however, 
did not go through until January 1227, and although Honorius surely would have 
wanted Frederick to be in the best possible position to execute his crusade, it is 
perhaps more likely that the emperor seized John’s money for his own needs, and 
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then Honorius attempted to console John with the papal patrimony. When 
Frederick dispossessed John of his crown, he invited increased pressure to fulfil 
his vow. He opened himself not only to criticism as a failed crusader but also that 
of a king who did not defend his kingdom.
90
 As Powell put it, prior to 1225 
Frederick’s crusade role was as the protector of Christendom, after 1225 it also 
became a dynastic affair.
91
 
Frederick began using the title ‘king of Jerusalem’ by mid December 
1225.
92
 It has been claimed that the pope made a point of not using Frederick’s 
assumed title in its own correspondence. Hiestand wrote that Honorius and 
Gregory IX both avoided using ‘king of Jerusalem’ in their dealings with 
Frederick, which began with Honorius in 1225.
93
 Study of the papal registers in 
fact reveals that Honorius did award Frederick this title in a letter to the Lombard 
League issued on 5 January 1227, which instructed the League on the proper title 
to address Frederick, with whom it had been at war (see below).
94
 That the papal 
letter in which it was issued was also a model letter for a peace agreement 
between the League and Frederick, composed by the papacy, only increases its 
importance. Here was Honorius advising the League on documentary style, and 
recommending that its members correctly address Frederick as ‘king of 
Jerusalem’. 
In the dative address clause for the template, Honorius instructed the 
League to address Frederick thus: ‘Serenissimo et excellentissimo Domino suo, 
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Frederico Dei gratia invictissimo Romanorum imperatori, semper augusto et regi 
Ierusolimitani at Sicilie illustrissimo’.95 As this was a model of a letter which the 
League was to send to Frederick, there is the possibility that Honorius might not 
have been according Frederick the title on principle himself, but did not worry 
about the League using it. If Honorius really did have a blanket ban imposed on 
addressing Frederick as ‘king of Jerusalem’ though, then it is unlikely that he 
would have allowed it in any papal document leaving the chancery, and certainly 
would not have recommended and instructed its use. Instead this is probably 
evidence of pragmatism on Honorius’s part, and a tacit acknowledgement that 
Frederick had completed a thorough fait accompli with his seizure of the throne of 
Jerusalem.  
Although the pope made all the right noises in criticising Frederick’s 
treatment of John, one cannot help but think that, purely regarding the crusade, 
Honorius must actually have been quietly satisfied with the outcome. Frederick 
had married Isabella and was about to lead a large crusade to her kingdom - what 
position could John really hold when the emperor arrived? When Honorius 
awarded John a papal patrimony in 1227, the papacy acquired a military defender. 
The wisdom of that decision was later demonstrated under Gregory IX when John 
led a papal army against Frederick. The deposition of John was ruthless and 
brutal, but necessary for the sake of the Holy Land, something that seems to have 
been recognised even by John’s own barons. 
The kingdom of Jerusalem certainly needed strong leadership - at the turn 
of the year, the Holy Land was riven by internal conflict. In December 1225 
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Honorius had received petitions from the Hospitallers, who had been attacked by 
the forces of Bohemond IV, count of Tripoli (1201-33), during the Fifth Crusade 
(see chapter five). Bohemond was a particularly brutal individual who had ordered 
a Hospitaller knight to be flayed alive, a crime which earned him 
excommunication.
96
 Honorius sent out three letters in reply to the master of the 
Hospital between 16 and 20 December, permitting the Order to use armed force to 
retake their possessions and allowing them to celebrate divine services in the 
count’s interdicted lands.97 Not only was the Holy Land vulnerable to outside 
attack, but the count of Tripoli was threatening to tear it apart from the inside as 
well. 
Nevertheless, at the same time, Honorius also received petitions from 
Frederick, who requested that the count be absolved from his sentence of 
excommunication. In a reply issued on 24 January 1226 Honorius refused, stating 
that he could not accept the emperor’s supplication.98 In a further letter on this 
matter, sent to the archbishops of Nicosia and Caesarea and the abbot of the 
Mount of Olives on 30 January, presumably to circumvent any imperial pressure 
that might be brought to bear, Honorius narrated the abominable crimes of the 
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count, stated that he was to be held under excommunicationis sententia, and 
likewise that all his lands were to held under interdict.
99
 
This episode is not only useful in illuminating the troubled state of the 
Holy Land at this time, but also represents the only case I have found in the papal 
registers of Honorius issuing an outright refusal to a request from Frederick that 
was connected to the Holy Land and his crusade.
100
 The rarity of the event was 
even acknowledged by the pope himself in his letter to Frederick. Honorius stated 
that while he wished always to be amenable to the emperor’s supplications, it was 
simply not possible in this instance: ‘unde licet preces tuas velimus semper, in 
quibus secundum Deum possumus, exaudire’.101 The very fact that Honorius felt 
the need to explain himself is significant for the argument in favour of responsive 
papal crusade government: it suggests that he was doing something out of the 
ordinary in rejecting Frederick’s petition. 
Back in the West Frederick had troubles of his own to deal with. The 
emperor convened the Diet of Cremona at Easter 1226, announcing that the three 
main topics for discussion were his crusade, the problem of heresy, and the 
recognition of imperial rights. Weiler has stated that the primary aim of the Diet 
was to recruit for the crusade.
102
 Choosing the fiercely imperial city of Cremona 
to discuss imperial rights, however, was enough to send the members of the old 
Lombard League into crisis, and the League hastily reformed to meet the 
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perceived threat from the emperor. As Perry has noted, John of Brienne was also 
travelling through Lombardy at this time, and appears to have been purposely 
whipping up opposition against the emperor.
103
 The League frustrated the Diet 
with blockades, but Frederick did not seek conflict. Instead he wanted to return to 
peace in order to concentrate on his crusade and on asserting his new dynastic 
rights in the kingdom of Jerusalem.
104
  
The League was a relic of the twelfth-century conflict between Frederick I 
and the Italian city states, and as Gianluca Raccagni has demonstrated, it does not 
seem to have been active in the early thirteenth century. Aside from the renewal of 
the League’s oath in 1208, there is little other evidence that it was functioning at 
this time.
105
 When the League was swiftly renewed in 1226, it could count Milan, 
Brescia, Bologna, Mantua, Padua, Vicenza, and Treviso among its members, a 
group soon bolstered by the support of Verona, Vercelli, Lodi, Alessandria, 
Novara, and Faenza. Although Milan was still the dominant member of the 1226 
League, it operated in a collegial manner.
106
 The League presented a united front 
against Frederick, and individual cities could not make war or peace without the 
agreement of the other League members.
107
 
On Frederick’s request, Honorius acted as mediator between the Empire 
and the League in an effort to remove this thorny obstacle from the emperor’s 
path to the kingdom of Jerusalem.
108
 In spite of the strife in upper Italy, crusade 
business was still being presented at the curia, and promising news was received 
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from Norway in November, where Duke Skule Bårdsson (d.1240), the half-
brother of King Inge of Norway (1204-17), was preparing to crusade (see chapter 
six).
109
 
In November the crusaders of Cologne and Lübeck also petitioned to be 
taken under papal protection before the crusade, which led to the issue of three 
papal documents granting this request on 13 November.
110
 This was a standard 
request, and an equally standard papal response, yet study of the pope’s choice of 
words regarding the date of the next general passage is potentially illuminating. 
The deadline for Frederick’s crusade was set for August 1227, yet Honorius took 
the crusaders under papal protection for the next, unspecified, general passage: ‘ut 
postquam in proximo generali passagio iter arripuerint transmarinum’.111 There 
are three plausible explanations for the inclusion of this general clause, two of 
which spring from Frederick’s reputation for serially disappointing those who 
depended on him. The first is that it results from a papal desire to cut down on 
unnecessary business being presented at the curia, and the chancery staff therefore 
sought to circumvent the need to reissue the privilege if the imperial crusade fell 
apart. The second is that it could reflect the supplications of the petitioners, who 
may have sought the privilege for the next general passage, whenever it might 
have occurred. The third possibility is that it is simply an unconnected change in 
diplomatic practice at the curia, although this phrase does not appear to have been 
used by Honorius before 1226. If one of the first two possibilities is correct, it 
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reveals a lack of confidence in the emperor keeping his promises, especially now 
that the Lombard League was in rebellion against him. 
For all that Honorius acted as mediator between the emperor and the 
League, it was Frederick who seemed to be taking the initiative in seeking peace 
rather than Honorius, and in a letter to the pope dated 29 August 1226, the 
emperor made clear his wish that Honorius might mediate between him and the 
League.
112
 Honorius used Conrad, cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina, to 
represent him in the mediation, and in December and early January the League 
and Frederick came to terms.
113
 That the terms imposed by Frederick were 
incredibly light was proof of his urgent desire to crusade. The League was 
pardoned for its rebellion, captured property and prisoners were to be returned, 
four hundred knights had to be provided for two years on Frederick’s crusade 
(although in the event they did not abide by this), and the League had to purge its 
cities of heresy (again upholding his pre-coronation promise to Honorius).
114
 The 
emperor was prepared to accept peace on these terms despite the damage it might 
have done to his pride. 
Following the agreement of terms, Honorius issued another batch of 
letters. In one letter of the three that Honorius sent to the Lombard League on 5 
January 1227, the pope regretted the damage that the conflict had done to the 
crusade, and set out the peace arrangements, which included the return of 
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prisoners and the provision of four hundred knights for the crusade.
115
 He ordered 
the League to make a firm peace with Frederick. 
Stürner has written that the papacy used the peace negotiations to secure 
its own aims, and evidence of this can be found in the registers.
116
 The next letter 
from this batch to the League explained that the clause requiring four hundred of 
its knights would be void if Frederick failed to depart on crusade.
117
 This was 
clever arbitration by Honorius, who profited from both sides by reinforcing 
Frederick’s army with a substantial force and acquiring another source of leverage 
over the emperor, because if Frederick did not leave, he would lose this extra 
support. The conflict had been bad news for the crusade, and an unforeseen 
obstacle. Honorius’s response to it provides evidence of how the papacy had to 
adapt to a changing political landscape in its aim to recover the Holy Land.
118
 
Honorius did not need to send Frederick as many letters as the League to 
restore peace because the emperor was offering all the terms. On 5 January 
Honorius merely issued a letter asking the emperor to receive the marquis of 
Montferrat - who had joined the League - back into imperial favour.
119
 Honorius 
had model letters drawn up containing the peace agreement and then despatched 
them to Frederick and the League for them each to copy and seal before sending 
                                                 
115
 Reg. Vat. 13, fols 156v-57r; Pressutti 6142. 
116
 Stürner, Friedrich, ii, 113. 
117
 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 157r: ‘auctoritate presentium declaramus, ut si forte ipse quod absit non 
transierit imperator, transire non teneantur milites supradicti, nisi forsan ipsum imperatorem 
propter necessitatem evidentem et manifestam et a sede apostolica approbatam contingent non 
transire.’; Pressutti 6143. 
118
 Marco Rainini, ‘Guala da Bergamo e la curia romana (1219-1230): Relazioni, incarichi e 
problemi di definizione’, in Maria Pia Alberzoni and Claudia Zey, eds., Legati e delegati papali: 
Profili, ambiti d’azione e tipologie di intervento nei secoli XII-XIII (Milan, 2012), 139. 
119
 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 157v: ‘ut marchionem Montis Ferrati in plenitudinem gratie tue recipias’; 
Pressutti 6147; Abulafia, Frederick, 157. 
164 
 
to the other party. These letter templates were sent out in the batch of documents 
issued on 5 January.  
The model letter that the pope sent to the League bound it to observe the 
peace agreement faithfully, and, in an expedition decided on by Frederick and 
approved by the pope, to provide the knights for the crusade.
120
 The template 
despatched to Frederick bound the emperor to receive the cities of the League 
back into his grace and return to a state of peace.
121
 The clause limiting the 
provision of knights to a passage agreed on by the pope helped to keep the curia 
updated on Frederick’s crusade, which since San Germano, Honorius had not 
been heavily involved in organising: it reveals that Frederick was the one taking 
the initiative in crusade planning. 
In a letter to Frederick dated 8 January, now that peace had been made, the 
pope took him under papal protection once more in preparation for his crusade, 
and informed the emperor that his devotion to God and the Church, and his peace 
efforts were duly recognised.
122
 Frederick’s genuine commitment to the crusade 
has been noted by a number of historians, and it is worth emphasising.
123
 
Nevertheless, in his relationship with Honorius, Frederick was sometimes 
difficult, and Honorius’s attitude towards the emperor is most often characterised 
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as conciliatory and co-operative in the historiography.
124
 While this is certainly 
true for much of Honorius’s reign, letters such as that of 8 January allow us to 
form a more nuanced picture of the pope’s attitude towards the sometimes 
difficult emperor.  
The letter suggests the warm feelings of the papacy towards Frederick at 
this time, whose compliant behaviour in negotiating peace with the League had 
obviously impressed Honorius. This contrasts quite sharply with Honorius’s bitter 
disappointment and frustration at the emperor’s earlier disregard for his crusade 
deadlines. Honorius’s attitude towards the emperor was not fixed and quite 
naturally fluctuated in response to the emperor’s actions. A reading of the papal 
correspondence with the emperor suggests that Honorius treated Frederick as a 
loving father might treat an unruly son. Although the pope certainly saw fit to 
chastise the emperor when he had done wrong, this did not mean that papal 
caritas disappeared entirely.  
After the models of the peace agreement had been sent out from the curia 
and the impediment to the crusade had been lifted, the pope had more time to deal 
with crusade business, although to the League’s discredit, it played for time on 
receipt of the peace agreement and did not seal it until late March (after 
Honorius’s death), claiming feebly that their copy was water-damaged.125 
With the situation resolved, preparations were resumed in earnest. The 
Muslim author Ibn Wasil (d.1298) reports that at some point in 1226, Sultan al-
Kamil, seeking support against his brother al-Mu’azzam, despatched Fakhr ad-
                                                 
124
 Van Cleve, Frederick, 108-09; Powell, ‘Leadership’, 531. 
125
 Abulafia, Frederick, 160-61; Rainini, ‘Guala’, 139. 
166 
 
Din to meet with Frederick as an envoy.
126
 Frederick may have been negotiating 
regarding the city of Jerusalem ahead of his arrival, presumably without the 
pope’s knowledge. On 11 January 1227 the pope wrote to Ugrino, archbishop of 
Cologne, informing him that peace had been made in Italy and that Frederick was 
now planning to leave in the August passage.
127
 Ugrino was ordered to preach the 
crusade for August. On the same day, Honorius despatched a letter to the clergy 
and nobility of Germany and Hungary, the landgrave of Thuringia, and Andrew 
II, to whose letter Honorius attached a short personalised message. Again, the 
letter resumed preparations for the crusade by informing the recipients that 
Frederick had made peace, and urged them to crusade with the emperor in return 
for remission of sins.
128
 The personalised message attached to Andrew’s letter 
asked him as one who had once taken up the cross (‘te qui abolim suscepto crucis 
signaculo’), to take up the burden once more and leave in the August passage, for 
which he would receive papal thanks in the present and glory in the future.
129
 In a 
letter dated 13 January to the archbishops of Germany and Italy, Honorius 
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awarded them the power to excommunicate and place under interdict any 
opponents of Frederick, to be used at their discretion as often as required.
130
  
There was still one problem that Honorius was concerned about: 
Frederick’s treatment of John of Brienne. This episode had soured papal-imperial 
relations but Honorius was not prepared to go all-out against the emperor over 
John’s crown.131 Honorius wanted a crusade and an heir to the throne of Jerusalem 
from Frederick’s marriage to Isabella.132 This made the pope pragmatic: although 
making a show of castigating Frederick’s actions, Honorius seems to have turned 
a blind eye in the interests of the Holy Land, for which, in purely Machiavellian 
terms, Frederick’s deposition of John was unavoidable. 
In a letter of 27 January Honorius wrote to Frederick asking him to 
reconcile himself to John, whom the pope referred to here as ‘king of Jerusalem’, 
despite having accorded this title to Frederick in the model peace agreement sent 
to the Lombard League on 5 January.
133
 Honorius does not seem deserving of the 
mildness which he is usually accused of. If anything, here we see the pope 
employing sharp diplomacy and playing the angles by according the title to John, 
while recommending behind his back that the League use it to address Frederick. 
Honorius was focused on the end goal of the recovery of the Holy Land, but he 
still strove to take care of John, and implored Frederick to make amends with his 
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rival, claiming that the quarrel had caused the devotion of many crusaders to 
become cool. Honorius hoped that if Frederick would make reparations, the 
crusaders’ enthusiasm might grow warm again.134 
Whatever reconciliation Frederick might have made with John, it would 
not have included the return of the throne, despite the pope’s insistence on 
referring to John as the rightful king. Therefore on 27 January, the very same day 
that Honorius named John as king of Jerusalem in his letter to Frederick, he 
awarded John the papal patrimony of Tuscia, and wrote to the patrimony to 
inform them of the appointment.
135
 This is clear evidence that the pope knew 
John’s cause to be futile, and also demonstrates just how far Honorius was willing 
to back John against the emperor. As witnessed in his other mediations, the pope 
gained something from the award, this time in the form of a lay power of some 
distinction on whom the pope could rely to help defend the Papal State.  
The last important letter from Honorius’s pontificate connected to the 
crusade was issued on 10 March 1227. Despatched to the Lombard League, 
Honorius informed it that he was sending the Dominican, Guala of Bergamo, to 
oversee the implementation of the peace agreement that the League had been 
attempting to dodge.
136
 The pope did not live long enough to oversee the 
implementation of this order though; Honorius died at Rome on 18 March 1227, 
having never seen his efforts in support of Frederick’s crusade come to fruition. 
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Chroniclers simply record that the pope passed away and do not give a cause of 
death; presumably, Honorius died of an illness to which he was prone in old age; 
his poor health in November 1222 had already forced the rearrangement of the 
Verona colloquium planned for that month.
137
 
Honorius had done all within his power to assist in preparing for 
Frederick’s crusade, and when the August deadline approached, Frederick had 
actually made full preparations. When Frederick had temporarily to abandon the 
crusade after setting sail because of his own illness, Honorius’s successor, 
Gregory IX, excommunicated him. Frederick’s abortive attempt does not seem to 
have been a cynical one though. Jonathan Riley-Smith has pointed out the 
thoroughness of the emperor’s preparations.138 Similarly, Hiestand remarked that 
the army which Frederick mustered for his crusade, numbering between ten and 
fourteen thousand men, equated to a force about the same size as the whole Third 
Crusade, assembled by a single ruler.
139
 Honorius’s final push in assisting 
Frederick had paid off by helping to create the conditions in which the emperor 
could levy such a large army. Despite winding a disappointing and agonisingly 
slow path towards fulfilment, Frederick’s crusade was ready to leave by the final 
deadline set during Honorius’s reign. The pope’s diplomatic policy must therefore 
be considered a success. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter, and the two that preceded it, have striven to achieve two aims: first, 
to demonstrate that Honorius was not a weak pope and to provide a careful 
analysis of his diplomacy with the lay powers to illustrate how the papacy 
interacted with them on the stage of western politics; second, to sketch out how 
the curia operated, and to argue that the papacy was much more responsive in its 
crusade affairs than has been perceived, and depended on the lay powers’ 
initiative in presenting crusade business at the curia. The papacy, at least under 
Honorius, was not a proactive policy-making machine.  This chapter has revealed 
how the direction of batches of papal crusade decisions despatched after the 
papal-imperial colloquiua were clearly heavily influenced by the emperor’s input. 
There are large gaps in the issue of papal crusade letters between the colloquiua 
which illustrate that Honorius was not proactively executing a policy under his 
own steam. His role as a mediator on Frederick’s behalf, both in coming to peace 
terms with the Lombard League and in attempting to entice other western lay 
powers to join the imperial crusade, indicate the extent to which papal crusade 
policy was influenced by the emperor. 
Between 1216 and 1227, Honorius’s crusade policy was to recover the 
Holy Land whilst protecting the Papal State, and he attempted to achieve these 
goals by cooperating fully with Frederick. Honorius did not, however, proactively 
formulate, implement, modify or develop a coherent preconceived policy. Papal 
crusade policy was instead pursued in a responsive manner: by replying in the 
best way possible to petitions and political missives which changed along with the 
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contemporary political situation. This meant that Honorius’s policy was therefore 
ad hoc and often in flux. 
 It is clear that, at least under Honorius, the papacy did not seek to fulfil the 
role of director of crusading, despite the high priority the pope attributed to it. 
Rather it functioned as its chief supporter, sponsor, and administrator. The pope 
assisted crusading lay powers in preparing for departure, protecting their interests 
whilst they were absent from the West, and organising preaching and funding to 
support the crusade while it was underway. Honorius did not wish or attempt to 
exercise total control over the crusade once it had left the West - that was the task 
of the secular leaders of the crusade. 
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PART II 
INSTITUTIONS OF PAPAL GOVERNMENT 
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Chapter 4 
Honorius III’s Theology in his Arengae 
 
In medieval papal letters the arenga was an important clause in which the pope, 
drawing on biblical quotations and allusions, established his authority to decide on 
the matters to which the letter pertained; the arenga was effectively a miniature 
sermon justifying papal authority. As the first clause after the salutatio in a papal 
letter (if it was used - some letters omitted an arenga), it was intended to have a 
‘sonorous ring’ that provided an impressive opening, leading smoothly into the 
following clauses of the text.
1
 Arengae were ‘long, florid passages’ that were 
‘filled with rich programmatic declarations of papal ideology.’2 Yet they should 
not be dismissed as empty rhetoric. They were more than superfluous rhetorical 
exercises, and should, by contrast, be interpreted as carefully constructed 
theological statements that derived from their contemporary political and 
ecclesiastical context.
3
 The study of arengae is therefore crucial to understanding 
the diplomatic positioning of popes and their conception of the authority inherent 
to their office. 
Aside from a few exceptions, papal arengae have been largely ignored by 
scholars, and a systematic study of the arengae of any high medieval pope is still 
                                                 
1
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2
 Detlev Jasper and Horst Fuhrmann, Papal Letters in the Early Middle Ages (Washington, DC, 
2001), 14. 
3
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Hold, ‘Autoritative Rhetorik: Eine Untersuchung an Arengen in Schreiben des Avignonser 
Papsttums’, Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 40 (2002), 182. 
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wanting. The present chapter goes some way towards addressing this gap in the 
historiography. The landmark work on arengae was published by Heinrich 
Fichtenau in 1957.
4
 Fichtenau surveyed the existing literature on arengae in 
papal, imperial, royal, and episcopal letters at the time, which amounted to almost 
nothing.
5
 Aside from a number of scattered articles on diverse aspects of papal 
arengae, notably for the Avignon popes, little has changed since Fichtenau 
wrote.
6
 Notably, Fonnesberg-Schmidt has recently analysed some of Honorius’s 
favoured biblical quotations in his letters regarding mission and crusading in the 
Baltic, which appear to be distinct from his letters on the Holy Land.
7
 Bernard 
Barbiche has also contributed a short essay on the arengae of medieval popes 
regarding the appointment of legates, and traced common themes and parallels in 
arengae over the centuries - something which is borne out in this chapter.
8
 
Fichtenau’s work, which studied arengae across late antique and early medieval 
western institutions, demonstrated how early medieval papal arengae were used, 
reused, and adapted within the papal curia, and also borrowed from the imperial 
chancery and vice versa. The present chapter builds upon these themes for the 
pontificate of Honorius III. 
This chapter studies a representative sample of Honorius’s arengae from 
his letters concerning the Holy Land crusades: first, the authorship is examined - 
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 Heinrich Fichtenau, Arenga: Spätantike und Mittelalter im Spiegel von Urkundenformeln (Graz-
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5
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how far can we attribute their authorship to Honorius?; second, it analyses the 
content of their themes as an indicator of his theological stance; and third, it 
compares them with the arengae of his predecessors and successors to gauge their 
originality and how they were reused. Engaging with the question of whether a 
papal theological policy was carried over from Innocent III’s pontificate by 
Honorius, it will be argued that while Honorius drew on long-established 
justifications of papal authority in his letter arengae, thus providing evidence of 
continuity in thought and practice at the curia, crucial differences can be identified 
between his arengae and those of Innocent. These differences suggest that 
Honorius (and/or his chancery) was composing new arengae on a mostly ad hoc 
basis, rather than relying on his predecessor’s theological statements - this aspect 
of crusade administration was one in which the could pope take the initiative, as 
Morris phrased it, ‘to publicize his theology of crusading.’9 This approach extends 
Powell’s research into Honorius’s sermon collections, in which he argued that 
while Honorius made great use of Innocent’s sermons, he often revised the texts, 
and altered the meaning, revealing ‘differences between his thought and that of 
his predecessor.’10 In a similar vein it will be argued that in his arengae, Honorius 
propounded a distinct theology to that of Innocent.  
 There are a number of problems inherent in working on arengae as 
sources. Fichtenau pointed out two: how far would these statements and concepts 
have been understood at the time, and how far has one reinterpreted them and 
assimilated them to one’s own nature?11 The problem is thus one of contemporary 
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interpretation. If recipients took the trouble to read the arenga (one cannot prove 
that they were not skipped), the biblical quotations and allusions in arengae 
would have met with a receptive - and active - audience. Beryl Smalley has stated 
that in addition to being ‘the most studied book of the Middle Ages’, the Bible 
permeated contemporary thought; knowledge of the scriptures was not the 
preserve of the elite few.
12
 Readers of biblical texts were conditioned to take an 
active role in interpreting them, rather than merely receiving them passively.
13
 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, papal arengae were designed to deliver a clear 
message that recipients could easily grasp, even if the finer points of scriptural 
allusion were lost on them. 
 Leonard Boyle has questioned how far we should believe the evidence 
from arengae: while they have been used by scholars to reveal how high and 
mighty Innocent III’s conception of his office was, they were general statements, 
rhetorical in nature, designed to lead into the next part of the letter.
14
 The acid test 
according to Boyle is to check arengae against the dispositio clauses of papal 
letters (which carried the letters’ orders) to discern if they rest ‘squarely on the 
rhetorical foundation which the arengae should have established.’15 The sample 
of Honorius’s arengae presented in this chapter correspond closely with the 
orders in the dispositio clauses of their letters, and therefore can be utilised as 
valid sources for the analysis of Honorius’s theology. 
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Arengae should not be construed as monolithic statements of papal 
authority that were rigidly applied to every situation. Brian Tierney has shown 
how despite some bombastic statements in some letters, Innocent III tailored 
letters to the recipient and the situation, and when intervening in secular affairs, 
he always selected the justification ‘that was most likely to be accepted by the 
disputants in a particular case.’16 Evidence then of subtle diplomacy: the pope 
adapted himself to fit changing circumstances, rather than bludgeoning on 
throughout, trumpeting blunt statements of theocratic authority. ‘The real 
difficulty of interpretation’, Tierney notes, ‘arises from the fact that in none of his 
really important interventions in secular affairs did Innocent declare simply and 
lucidly that he was acting by virtue of a supreme temporal authority inherent in 
his office.’17 Instead Innocent always skirted around the issue and justified his 
intervention in a more nuanced manner, claiming that he had no desire to usurp 
the lay powers’ jurisdiction.18 We should therefore not extrapolate a statement of 
authority found in one arenga and use it to characterise a whole pontificate. 
Attempting to isolate the arenga from the following narratio clauses 
(which described the circumstances leading to the issue of the letter, as 
understood at the papal curia) presents a more practical problem of working with 
this material. It can be difficult, on occasion, to distinguish the arenga from the 
narratio because there is sometimes no clear break between clauses, and a 
rhetorical narrative of events is recounted. Papal letters also include biblical 
language throughout. This is testament to the fluidity in the structure of papal 
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letters. Chancery staff did not adhere rigidly to the internal structure of salutatio, 
arenga, narratio, dispositio, sanctio, datum, that the student of papal diplomatic 
might expect. 
In this study I have adopted a stricter definition of the arenga, limiting it 
to the purely rhetorical, and specifically religious, clause that opens the letter. 
Snippets of narrative information still crop up in arengae that are otherwise 
completely theological, but any subsequent rhetorical clauses which contain large 
amounts of narrative information anchored in the contemporary political events, 
have generally been excluded. An example arenga however, Iustus Dominus in, is 
given below which demonstrates the mixing of narrative information with 
rhetorical and biblical language after the purely theological opening of the letter. 
 
Authorship 
How accurate is it to analyse Honorius’s arengae as reliable reflections of his 
theological stance? As Christoph Egger has asked, can we attribute a theological 
stance to the pope alone, when he may have been advised by a specialist?
19
 After 
all, Honorius was surrounded by cardinals educated at Paris - might they have 
been influential in composing the text of arengae? The personal role of popes in 
the composition of letters issued in their names cannot be discerned with complete 
certainty.  
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As Sayers has stated, it is impossible to apportion responsibility for 
drafting important curial letters (as opposed to common letters) to the pope, the 
vice-chancellor, and the notaries.
20
 The vice-chancellor (in the case of Honorius, 
who removed the position of chancellor) and the pope played a significant role in 
the issue of the chancery’s important letters.21 The vice-chancellor, for instance, 
would have been present when the texts of the most important letters were read to 
Honorius for approval prior to issue (littere legende).
22
 Honorius immediately 
removed Innocent’s acting chancellor on his accession, Thomas of Capua 
(d.1239), and replaced him with the notary Willelmus, and then more permanently 
by October 1216, when Rainerius was acting as vice-chancellor.
23
 At least at the 
very top of the chancery, this provided a clean break from Innocent’s 
administration, and perhaps helps to explain the differences in Honorius’s 
arengae from those of Innocent (see below). 
Positive proof that a pope composed the text of a particular letter is 
extremely rare, and it is hopeless to try and discriminate between the views of the 
pope and his curialists, who carried out his orders and often shared a similar 
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intellectual background.
24
 In addition, notaries would not only have taken down 
the minute, but also personally written curial letters on occasion.
25
 
Zutshi has, however, identified an instance where it is certain that 
Honorius dictated the contents of a letter: Gratiarum omnium, issued to the 
Dominicans on 21 January 1217.
26
 According to the Dominican chronicler 
Thomas of Cantimpré (d.1265 x 1270) writing around forty years later, Honorius 
dictated the draft of this letter to a notary, and then, when the engrossed copy was 
read before him, he queried why the word ‘predicantes’ had been changed to 
‘predicatores’. The notary’s explanation was satisfactory to Honorius and the 
alteration was allowed to stand. Thomas’s account is confirmed by the original 
letter preserved in Carcassonne, which shows the word ‘predicantibus’ to have 
been erased, and replaced with ‘predicatoribus’, which is also found in the papal 
register.
27
 
Zutshi has also pointed out alternatives to papal dictation, such as the 
outside chance of the pope writing a draft in his own hand. There are twelve such 
examples written by John XXII, but Zutshi stresses that these were the exception 
rather than the rule.
28
 The techniques of dictation and writing were not mutually 
exclusive in the Middle Ages, as proven by Thomas Aquinas (c.1224-74), who 
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sometimes used autograph drafts to dictate his writings to secretaries.
29
 Even rarer 
than autograph drafts by a pope were autograph engrossed letters, used by some 
Avignon popes, which allowed for secrecy from papal officials and displayed 
special regard for the recipient.
30
 
 Papal sermons and personal treatises can potentially shed valuable light on 
the authorship of letters if conclusive links between them can be established. 
Sermons, after all, provide a more reliable guide to the personal thought of a pope 
than the collegial papal letters.
31
 For instance, Egger has proven textual parallels 
between Innocent III’s letter Cum Marthe circa and his theological treatise De 
missarum mysteriis (aside from the arenga and the pope’s answers to the 
questions of Jean de Bellesmains), which itself copied ideas from Hugh of St 
Victor’s work De sacramentis.32 Likewise, another of Innocent’s letters, Quod 
pietatem colendo, displays textual parallels with De missarum mysteriis and two 
of his sermons.
33
 
Despite the uncertainty regarding the exact level of influence that popes 
had in the composition of letter texts, Zutshi concludes that ‘in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries the pope’s personal part in the production of documents 
continued to be vital.’34 Ultimately, although we cannot definitively attribute the 
wording of theological statements in arengae to the pope himself, the ‘essence’ of 
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the letter can confidently be said to belong to him.
35
 The ideas about the Church 
that one finds in the registers, and especially the arengae, must correspond with 
the ideas of the pope, whether or not he was personally involved in drafting the 
texts in question.
36
 The arengae discussed in this chapter are therefore attributed 
to Honorius, and given in his name, but with the implication that that he may not 
have been their sole author, or even their author at all. 
 Honorius composed a sermon collection at some point before his accession 
in 1216, which he subsequently revised before the end of 1219 or early 1220.
37
 
Powell identified four manuscripts containing the collection or large parts of it.
38
 
Only one text has been printed: the transcription made by Dom Hieronomo 
Bottino from Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele II, 
Sessoriano MS 51, which was published by Horoy in his collection of Honorius’s 
works.
39
 Fortunately this manuscript would appear to contain the best text - 
Sessoriano MS 51 is a fuller recension of the sermons than the other known 
collections. The manuscript once belonged to the cardinal legate Pandulf, who 
knew Honorius personally. Powell posits that this recension was probably 
prepared by the pope himself and presented to Pandulf before his death in 1226.
40
 
 It is possible to make links between the scriptural quotations in Honorius’s 
sermons and his papal letters. A reference to 1 Corinthians 1:31 appears in 
Honorius’s first registered letter to the Holy Land, issued on 25 July 1216, and 
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also appears in three of his sermons.
41
 Romans 11:33 features in the same arenga 
and another five sermons.
42
 Similarly, 1 Peter 2:21 is drawn upon in both a letter 
to the clergy of Germany sent in March 1224 and two sermons.
43
 Links can also 
be drawn between Mark 16:15 found in the same arenga, and another three 
sermons.
44
 Even more examples can be found for Matthew 16:19, one of the most 
traditional claims to papal primacy, which features in an arenga to Frederick II, 
and no less than seven times in five different sermons.
45
 
 It is not surprising that Matthew 16:19 features prominently in Honorius’s 
writings given how commonly it was used by popes to justify papal primacy.
46
 
There are, however, so many cases of scriptural quotations and allusions in the 
sermons that cannot be found in the sample of arengae selected for this chapter 
that it is not possible to deduce from their use alone whether Honorius had a hand 
in a particular letter. A more fruitful search might be conducted if close textual 
analysis was performed on the sermons and arengae, such as Egger used on 
Innocent III’s sermons, but unfortunately that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Themes 
The letter Magnus Dominus, sent on 25 July 1216 to John of Brienne, king of 
Jerusalem, the patriarch of Jerusalem, the people of the Holy Land, and the 
                                                 
41
 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 1r; Pressutti 1; Opera, ed. Horoy, ii, 37, 60, 258. 
42
 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 1r; Pressutti 1; Opera, ed. Horoy, i, 815, 896; ii, 161, 238-39, 352. 
43
 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 183v; Pressutti 4904; Opera, ed. Horoy, i, 665, 846. 
44
 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 183v; Pressutti 4904; Opera, ed. Horoy, i, 781, 829; ii, 132. 
45
 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 84; Pressutti 4460; Opera, ed. Horoy, i, 758, 782; ii, 90, 98-99, 100, 133, 140. 
46
 Karlfried Froehlich, ‘Saint Peter, Papal Primacy, and the Exegetical Tradition, 1150-1300’, in 
Christopher Ryan, ed., The Religious Roles of the Papacy: Ideals and Realities, 1150-1300 
(Toronto, 1989), 3. 
184 
 
masters of the Templars and Hospitallers, represented an important opportunity 
for Honorius.
47
 Magnus Dominus was the first letter recorded to have been issued 
by Honorius as pope, and it is the first letter entered into his register. The arenga 
was also recycled and used in the entire batch of Honorius’s outgoing letters on 
his accession (see below). In the letter, Honorius relayed the news of Innocent 
III’s passing, but reassured the recipients that the crusade was still on its way. 
This was Honorius’s chance to make his mark on the crusade he had inherited, 
and he opened the letter with an arenga rich in biblical references: 
 
Great is the Lord and extremely praiseworthy (Ps. 144:3), famous in 
sanctity, wonderful in majesties and performing marvels (Ex. 15:11), He 
changes circumstances (Dan. 2:21) in the high counsel of His own 
arrangement, to whom another counsellor does not exist, and He calls 
them which are not, as if they are (Rom. 4:17), so that no flesh may glory 
in His sight (1 Cor. 1:29), but, just as it is written, he who glories, may 
glory in the Lord (1 Cor. 1:31). For indeed, He himself brings the 
searchers of secrets to nothing, and makes judges of the earth as vanity (Is. 
40:23), drying up standing pools and turning rivers into islands (Is. 42:15), 
He gathers to Himself seed from the east and the west, and says to the 
north ‘Give’, and to the south ‘Do not hinder’ (Is. 43:5-6), so that good 
fortune might smile on them and they are unable to prevent the sons of the 
north from coming into the grace of the sons, He sets the humble on high, 
and lifts those who mourn to safety (Job 5:11). Since His judgements 
might be unsearchable and His ways inscrutable (Rom. 11:33), if we can 
hold on to one thing for certain, it is that everything He does for us comes 
from just judgement, however unspeakably great and hidden.
48
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Innocent’s death in his mid-fifties on 16 July 1216 would have come as a shock to 
those at the papal curia and those preparing for the Fifth Crusade. This arenga 
presented Honorius as God’s chosen vessel through which to carry out the 
crusade, though His plan in striking down the relatively youthful and vigorous 
Innocent might have been incomprehensible to man. Honorius was effectively 
marking out his authority to continue the crusade’s organisation. The reference to 
Isaiah 43:5-6 connected directly to the content of the letter, which reassured the 
recipients that the crusade was still coming: the crusaders from the north were 
about to enter into the grace of the sons. 
 This arenga also highlights the distinction that must be made between 
biblical references that were consciously used, such as the deliberate quotation 
from 1 Corinthians 1:31 that was preceded with the words ‘just as it is written’, 
and those that seem to have been used in passing, perhaps subconsciously, as 
useful textual building blocks. The present arenga resembles something of a 
medieval ‘cut and paste’ job, with as many biblical allusions included as possible, 
but aside from the 1 Corinthians 1:31 reference, this may not necessarily have 
been the intention. It seems probable that the biblical allusions (as distinct from 
deliberate quotations) were remembered from the liturgy. The pope and his curial 
staff would have attended or read the eight services of the Divine Office every 
day, and particular word combinations must have subconsciously tumbled forth 
from memory when composing arengae.
49
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 The arenga of the letter Gratias agimus, sent to the crusaders of Cologne 
on 27 January 1217, sought to inspire them to leave on the Fifth Crusade by the 
muster deadline of 1 June 1217 fixed by Innocent III at Lateran IV: 
 
We give thanks to our God in the grace of God which was given to you in 
Lord Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 1:4). For after the blast of the trumpet of 
salvation sounded in your ears, reverberating through the mouths of 
preachers and inviting you to the fight of the Christian knighthood, 
continuously inspired by divine grace, and assuming the sign of the life-
giving cross, you resolved to march out from your land, homes and kin, by 
the corporal and mystical example of Abraham at the Lord’s command, so 
that you might walk in that land once glorious and consecrated by the 
blood of Christ, which the Lord will reveal to you, and so that, when with 
the help of God the Canaanites have been driven out, with Judas 
Maccabeus, then you might climb Mount Sion, to cleanse the holy places 
and even to repair them (1 Mac. 4:36), so that, with the filth removed, you 
might be able to adorn the front of the Lord’s temple with crowns of gold 
(1 Mac. 4:57), and, in hymns and by confessions, to praise the Lord 
splendidly.
50
 
 
Stylistically, the arenga was an impressive call to arms, and relied upon imagery 
from the Book of Maccabees. Honorius aligned the crusaders with the pious army 
led by Judas Maccabeus that had overcome the superior forces of the Gentiles to 
retake Mount Sion and cleanse its sanctuary. The parallel with the Holy Land 
crusade and the city of Jerusalem was obvious: just as Judas Maccabeus had 
triumphed, so would the crusaders in their own time. This was an idea shared by 
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at least some of the crusaders themselves. As Nicholas Morton has pointed out, 
Oliver of Paderborn measured the efforts of his fellow crusaders against the 
Maccabees.
51
 
Innocent III does not appear to have used Honorius’s particular allusions 
from Maccabees in his letters, which perhaps demonstrates their individuality.
52
 
Whilst Honorius may have been distinct from Innocent in the recollection of these 
particular passages, nevertheless, the idea of aligning the crusaders with the 
Maccabees was by no means unique to him. Morton has demonstrated how 
popular this biblical imagery was in crusade narratives, and how in reference to 
the Knights Templar, Pope Celestine II (1143-44) was the first pontiff to employ 
the allusion, which was subsequently applied to the military orders by some of his 
successors, including Innocent III and Honorius III.
53
  
Maccabees’ imagery was also commonly deployed in papal encyclicals 
launching crusades. Pope Eugenius III (1145-53) made an allusion to the 
Maccabees in his famous encyclical launching the Second Crusade, Quantum 
praedecessores.
54
 Similarly, Pope Gregory VIII’s (1187) call to the Third 
Crusade, Audita tremendi, and Innocent III’s letter calling for the Fourth Crusade, 
Post miserabile, both employed allusions to Maccabees.
55
 Bernard of Clairvaux 
deployed the Maccabees’ imagery of the faithful few triumphing over the faithless 
multitude - a theme Honorius would return to - in his De laude novae militiae, 
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which promoted the Order of Temple in c.1130 (see below).
56
 Honorius thus fitted 
into a long and distinguished tradition, but differed from Innocent III in his choice 
(whether subconsciously or not) of specific Maccabean allusions. 
 The theme of humility, of the pious few triumphing over the faithless 
multitude, was employed again in Honorius’s arenga to the letter Adversus hostes 
visibiles, despatched to certain clergy in Hungary and Reims on 24 November 
1217, which reported on the early successes of the Fifth Crusade following 
skirmishes with the Muslims in the Holy Land: 
 
Against visible enemies, with invisible weapons, that is with prayers, we 
are taught to fight by ancient examples, which are also renewed in our 
times, we rejoice when the Lord of hosts delivered the multitude of 
infidels in the Spanish war into the hands of the faithful few (1 Mac. 3:18). 
Behold moreover the time all the faithful should rush to arms for this (2 
Mac. 9:2), behold the time when they should sprinkle their heads with 
ashes (2 Kings (2 Sam.) 13:19), behold the time when they should cry out 
to heaven with voices of tears and prayers (4 Kings (2 Kings) 20:5; Is. 
38:5), so that He who does not fight among the many, when signs have 
been renewed and miracles worked (Sir. 36:6), in accordance with His 
omnipotence, may overcome a great multitude in scarcity.
57
 
 
A recent demonstration of the historical link with the biblical past had been 
witnessed in the ‘Spanish war’ with the Christian victory over the Muslims at the 
Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. Smalley noted:  
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How the Old Testament influenced princes through their clerical advisers 
and how it affected ideas on Christian priesthood. The New Testament 
inspired reform movements, both Catholic and heretical. Bible history was 
real history; it taught by example.
58
  
 
Honorius was experiencing reverberations from biblical events, which had been 
‘renewed’ in his own time. Drawing upon Maccabees again (1 Mac. 3:18) - in 
another allusion which the pope shared with Bernard of Clairvaux - he interpreted 
the victory in Spain as prefiguring the success of the Fifth Crusade.
59
 Honorius 
believed that despite being outnumbered, the crusade would succeed. 
 After receiving a report on the Fifth Crusade’s progress from the 
crusaders, who had moved in to begin the siege of the Egyptian port city of 
Damietta and requested reinforcements from the West, Honorius returned to the 
motif of the faithful few in the arenga of his reply to the army, Multis divine 
scripture, issued on 13 August 1218: 
 
We are taught from many examples of divine scripture that God, at whose 
command all things are arranged and whose will nothing can resist (Rom. 
9:19), often delivered a multitude of the mighty into the hands of the frail 
and the few (1 Mac. 3:17-18). After having received your letter and 
messengers and it having been understood how difficult a thing you are, 
by divine aid, carrying boldly, even if all our bones should shake (Job 
4:14) while we were considering your few standing against many, by 
looking back, however, it soon occurred to us that it is written: the 
adversaries of the Lord shall fear Him, and upon them He shall thunder in 
the heavens (1 Kings (1 Sam.) 2:10), and we were filled with confidence 
and encouragement,  He does not abandon those trusting in His mercy 
(Eccl. 47:24), but enlarging them in their troubles (Ps. 4:12), He 
transformed the crooked straight, and the rough ways plain (Is. 40:4) by 
His almighty love, so that human frailty may not dare to glory in itself, but 
when it sees itself prosper there through heavenly assistance, when it 
                                                 
58
 Smalley, Bible, p. ix. 
59
 Sancti Bernardi, ed. Leclercq and Rochais, 221. 
190 
 
appeared to falter through earthly reasons, it might burst out in divine 
praise, and say: thy right hand, Lord, is magnified in strength, and thy 
power has broken the enemy (Ex. 15:6).
60
 
 
The arenga reminded the crusaders of the biblical examples of God delivering 
success ‘into the hands of the frail and the few’. Honorius admitted that although 
he had been concerned by the plight of the crusaders, he trusted in the power and 
mercy of the Lord, and made a deliberate quotation from 1 Kings (1 Samuel) 2:10 
that built upon yet another allusion to the First Book of Maccabees in the arenga. 
This chapter of the First Book of Samuel explains how the Lord would support the 
feeble and break the bows of the mighty, thus destroying His enemies. 
 Honorius’s use of these motifs of the few triumphing over the many 
reflected the situation on the ground in Egypt: it was meant to bolster the crusade 
army while they awaited the requested reinforcements. The pope’s message 
presumably met with a receptive audience given that Oliver of Paderborn was also 
comparing the crusade army to that of Judas Maccabeus. Most of the biblical 
allusions woven into the arengae were probably absorbed by the pope and his 
staff through the liturgy, and the use of particular allusions (as opposed to direct 
quotations from the Vulgate) was probably determined by the current situation of 
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the crusaders in Egypt, the pope’s predilection for certain passages, and also by 
the patterns of his memory. 
 If we accept that many of the biblical allusions were subconsciously 
remembered, rather than proactively sought out from the Vulgate, it raises the 
question of whether it is even possible to analyse the pope’s arengae as evidence 
of his theological stance. The arengae were not artless rush jobs, but meticulously 
constructed theological statements - whether the biblical justification used to 
express this was taken verbatim from the Vulgate or recalled in segments from the 
memory of the liturgy does not affect their validity. Arengae still propagated the 
pope’s conception of the divine order of the world, and his place within it. That 
these recollections seem to have been distinct from those of Innocent is instructive 
in identifying shades of difference between the two popes’ theological ideas. 
 As pointed out by Kenneth Pennington, historians ‘almost unanimously 
concur that his [Innocent III’s] pontificate represented the apogee of the medieval 
papacy.’61 If this really was the case, then Honorius’s pontificate did not represent 
a slump following his predecessor’s reign. In Honorius’s arengae to the lay 
powers regarding the crusade he propounded careful theological arguments that 
relayed a clear message, without being antagonistic. 
 In the arenga of Sinceris fili karissime, despatched to the emperor-elect 
Frederick on 20 March 1220 in reply to a letter of his, Honorius urged him to join 
the Fifth Crusade as soon as possible: 
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Most beloved son, with purity and fervour, the page [Frederick’s letter] 
shone with sincere emotions and laid out the desire of your fervent mind, 
full of devotion, and not lacking in humility; which while it replicates the 
memory of perceived good deeds and offers exchange of favours for 
preparations, the Mother Church has in so excellent and so great a son, 
that she rejoices over these contributions; and she also has to make 
provision so that nothing is overlooked in the abundance of contributions. 
Blessed, blessed is the Lord (Gen. 9:26), by whom kings reign and who 
rules in the kingdom of men (Prov. 8:15), because, just as it is believed 
with firm hope and held with credible presumption, He provides for the 
Church in his son, to whom while milk was presented to him in his tender 
years and whom took solid food in older age (1 Cor. 3:2), with a satisfied 
mouth and by authentic writings he comes to know that the labour of 
solicitude is repaid more sweetly and pleasantly in fruit. Therefore the 
Lord does these things and adds to them, because as He has breathed 
wholesomely upon them, the wholesome might become most wholesome, 
so that by continued devotion in this way he might combine the end with 
the beginning, which because you might be entirely devoted all the time of 
your life to the Church, all to God. O how much we wish that you in sight 
of the Almighty, o how much in the eyes of men, so that in His presence 
your conscience might observe whatever is of integrity, and that your 
notable fame might meet with nothing of notorious description. Moreover, 
he who esteems highly enough, fears enough.
62
 
 
The arenga made a subtle statement of papal authority by the allusion to Proverbs 
8:15. Otherwise the pope avoided antagonising the emperor-elect and instead 
sought to advise Frederick, encouraging him to become a more devoted son of the 
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Church (Innocent III had acted as Frederick’s guardian during his minority).63 It 
has been claimed that Honorius and Frederick were experiencing tense relations at 
this stage, but there is no evidence for such emotions in this arenga.
64
 Indeed, the 
opening of the arenga glowed with papal affection for the ‘most beloved son’ of 
the Church. 
 Even when Frederick had tested the pope’s patience by repeatedly 
delaying his departure on crusade, Honorius concealed his rebukes with charity, 
and adopted the role of a loving father chastising an errant son. In Si aliqua tue 
celsitudini, sent to Frederick on 13 June 1221, Honorius opened the letter thus: 
 
If we have to write anything to your highness, and as far as it seems bitter, 
if we proceed with it out of sincere affection, you ought not to bear it 
badly, but it is fitting that you accept it wholly, because a father who loves 
his son rebukes him, and the Lord loves, blames, and chastises those 
whom he loves (Prov. 3:12; Hebr. 12:6), in whose sacrifice sweetness was 
prevented from being offered, seeing that he detests flattery, and, granted 
that they taste honey-sweet charm, while their ears are soothed, 
nevertheless they are dangerous, because sometimes they are led astray by 
listening to their feelings, and therefore the wounds of another are better 
than the flatterer’s kiss (Prov. 27:6).65 
 
The pope sought to guide Frederick, not to provoke him, and justified his criticism 
of the emperor and his crusade delays by alluding to Proverbs 3:12 and Hebrews 
12:6, combining it with colourful imagery on the dangers of honey-sweet flattery. 
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The reference to Proverbs 27:6 has also been identified by Duggan in an arenga 
of Pope Alexander III; it was clearly an allusion well suited to the papacy’s 
purpose as an international mediator.
66
 
 The pope was not afraid to adopt a more combative stance when the 
occasion called for it however. The arenga of the letter Hereditate superna se, 
addressed to Philip Augustus of France on 18 April 1223, adopted a hectoring 
tone to persuade the king to extend his peace with Henry III of England for the 
sake of the Holy Land crusade: 
 
From the celestial inheritance he made himself undeserving, and from it he 
can fear being excluded, and not without cause be terrified, whom the zeal 
of the Christian faith does not excite, whom the injury to Jesus Christ does 
not move, and whom the pollution of the shrine and the contempt to the 
Redeemer does not hurt, by the heathens coming into His inheritance and 
polluting His Temple, using Jerusalem just as a place to keep fruit (Ps. 
78:1), and the daughter of Sion left behind as though a hut in a cucumber 
field (Is. 1:8). Surely he cannot be the co-heir of Christ, who may have 
neglected to perform according to his own strength in coming to His aid, 
when He was expelled by the blasphemers against His name from the 
[Holy] Land which He chose for revealing the mystery of our redemption, 
or at least does not suffer with the one who is suffering from the bottom of 
His heart? For those who suffer with Him will also reign with Him. Is not 
the vassal of any temporal lord judged to be unworthy of the fief that he 
holds from him as if guilty of treason, if he did not resist with all his 
strength the incursion into his lord’s land by his enemies, and just the same 
did not strive with the best of his ability to drive them out? How much 
those, who profess to be Christians, can fear being proscribed and drawn 
down from the heavens themselves by infernal ropes to the lower hell, 
unto torments (2 Petr. 2:4), if from Christ, when He is complaining that 
His inheritance has been turned to strangers, and His temple to outsiders 
(Lam. 5:2), they withdrew the succour of devotion and compassion and 
did not put the sword upon the thigh, for going from gate to gate (Ex. 
32:27) in vengeance against the blasphemers of His name, who granted 
that He might not need our goods (Ps. 15:2), and by word alone it might be 
possible to fill the enemies with terror, for this, nevertheless, He 
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mercifully asks for our aid, that by the fruits of your devotion it might 
increase, from which He bestows on us the prizes of eternal life.
67
 
 
Honorius pre-emptively shamed Philip and equated any military conflict with 
England with sabotage of the crusade. Honorius implied that anyone who fought 
in the West was responsible for abandoning the daughter of Sion (Jerusalem) like 
a hut in a cucumber field (Is. 1:8). This allusion is specific enough to be 
considered a conscious insertion into the arenga. Honorius hoped to recall to 
Philip’s mind the first chapter of the Book of Isaiah, in which Isaiah railed against 
the sinful nation of rebellious sons that had forsaken the Lord, whose land had 
been overthrown by enemies, in which the daughter of Sion had been discarded, 
like a besieged city - like Acre, Jerusalem, and the rest of the Holy Land in the 
1220s. 
The reference to ‘the heathens coming into His inheritance’ from Psalm 
78:1 echoed Gregory VIII’s Third Crusade encyclical, Audita tremendi, which 
also deployed the allusion, as well as alluding to Maccabees and calling upon the 
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rulers of the West to lay down their arms.
68
 Indeed, as Amnon Linder notes, 
Psalm 78 had ‘acquired a Holy Land specificity’ after the fall of Jerusalem in 
1187.
69
 By writing about ‘the Land which He chose for revealing the mystery of 
our redemption’ Honorius was also citing the prayer Deus qui ad nostre 
redemptionis, which circulated from 1187 and throughout the thirteenth century as 
part of the Holy Land clamor (a series of supplicatory texts on the theme of a 
particular crisis, composed of psalms, versicles, and prayers) of the same name.
70
 
Honorius’s arengae were infused with fragments of texts taken from the wider 
liturgical struggle to recover the Holy Land: parallels in arengae reinforced this 
post-1187 tradition, which Philip Augustus would surely have recognised. Indeed, 
the fall of Jerusalem was thought to have been divine punishment for the sins of 
the whole Christian community.
71
 It was therefore incumbent upon that 
community to rectify the situation through devotion and prayer. This, then, is 
evidence of a certain continuity in papal thought. 
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The pope compounded his assertion of spiritual authority with a 
justification from the temporal realm, employing a feudal metaphor. It was 
required of Philip, as a Christian ruler and a vassal of God, to defend his Lord’s 
land from invaders. The topos of Christ as a feudal lord and the Christian faithful 
as His vassals was popular during the twelfth century, and Innocent III employed 
it in his own crusade calls.
72
  
This more robust arenga to Philip might be explained, perhaps, by the fact 
that conflict between France and England was a clear and present danger to 
Frederick’s fledgling crusade (as would be proven correct by King Louis VIII’s 
invasion of Poitou in 1224) and that Philip was a ruler who, given his advanced 
age and his previous role in the Third Crusade, seemed determined not to become 
involved in crusading again. As a result, Honorius had little to gain from 
mollifying the aged Philip, but everything to lose if he offended the crusader 
Frederick.   
Honorius also rounded on the soldiers of the Fifth Crusade in an arenga 
addressed to the bishop and chapter of Tarantaise on 26 May 1223. The letter 
requested that they receive an unnamed papal representative honourably, and the 
arenga was recycled verbatim in letters sent to the Landgrave of Thuringia and 
the people of Venice, Pisa, and Ancona in the same month, urging them to join 
Frederick’s coming crusade: 
 
The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength in the capture of 
Damietta and had exalted the glory of the Christian name (Ps. 117:16), but 
                                                 
72
 Sylvia Schein, Gateway to the Heavenly City: Crusader Jerusalem and the Catholic West (1099-
1187) (Aldershot, 2005), 45-46. 
198 
 
because Christian devotion from divine favours cooled off, from which it 
ought to have attained a new ardour, and filled with the spirit of elation, 
He was seen to have made flesh his arm (Jer. 17:5), that same right hand 
of the Lord, thus raised up, violently dashed against the land and made it 
drunk with the cup of His wrath (Is. 51:17), transforming grace into anger 
and rejoicing into sadness, with the disgrace through which the city was 
lost [perdita], overcoming the glory through which it was chosen. We 
hope, however, because the heavenly kindness will not repress mercy 
acting in anger, but turning it away from us, it will pour out the same on 
them who did not know Him nor invoke His name (Ps. 78:6), but as a 
reproach to him they rush to us and then say, where is our God? (Ps. 
113:10).
73
 
 
The arenga was heavily critical of the devotion of the Fifth Crusade’s 
participants, which dissipated after the initial success in capturing the city of 
Damietta on 5 November 1219. The defeat of the crusade in August 1221 was 
thus entirely deserved according to the pope. Honorius believed it was God’s 
vengeance on the unworthy crusaders, which fitted into traditional papal 
explanations of disastrous events caused by the sins of man.
74
 It was probably also 
part of an effort to deflect the criticism that Honorius (along with Pelagius and 
Frederick) had attracted.
75
 The pope drew on Psalm 78 again when he lambasted 
those hypocrites ‘who did not know Him nor invoke His name’, but then came 
running to the pope after the crusade’s failure asking where their God had been. 
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There are no extant arengae that adopt such a tone to Frederick himself, despite 
the fact that by dithering in the West for years he was one of those individuals 
most culpable for the Fifth Crusade’s failure. Honorius probably considered it too 
reckless to address him in such a manner. 
 Honorius did reprove Frederick in his letters, bitterly at times, but never 
with such unconcealed aggression that he directed towards the crusaders in the 
arenga to Dextera domini fecerat. This supports Tierney’s argument regarding 
Innocent III’s confusing and seemingly contradictory expressions of authority 
discussed above.
76
 Honorius’s expression of his authority in the arengae of his 
documents was not monolithic. Rather, Honorius and his staff composed arengae 
on an ad hoc basis, customising the theological justifications for papal authority 
according to the recipient. While the pope could unleash the full force of spiritual 
authority on a cleric who was directly responsible to the Church hierarchy, and 
ultimately to the pope himself, Honorius had to be more subtle in his diplomacy 
with the most powerful secular rulers, with whom he needed to maintain positive 
relationships if the Holy Land crusade was to stand a chance of succeeding. 
 Surprisingly, only a handful of Honorius’s crusade letters to Frederick II - 
with whom he engaged in a long-running and important correspondence - actually 
have an arenga at all. One possible explanation is that Honorius reserved the use 
of arengae for the most important letters, in which he needed to justify 
intervention, and conversely (and paradoxically), for common letters, in which 
long established arengae were easily recycled from formularies. Another is that 
the arengae may have been omitted as a time-saving measure. Composing a long 
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arenga, rich in biblical allusion and striking the correct tone, must have taken a 
long time. Some arengae themselves appear to bear witness to this through their 
diminutive length and absence of scriptural quotations. 
 For instance, Honorius employed a short and straightforward arenga in 
Quanto nos angit, sent to Andrew II of Hungary on 11 February 1217, concerning 
his papal protection as a crusader and confirming the succession of his sons 
should he die on the Fifth Crusade: 
 
How greatly the injury to Jesus Christ distresses us, that the land of his 
very Cross is occupied, which He chose for revealing the mysteries of our 
redemption, to the extent that we dispense apostolic protection and favour 
liberally to those who for the liberation of it, moved by the injury of the 
Redeemer, are manfully girding themselves.
77
 
 
Once more, as in Hereditate superna se, Honorius tapped into the liturgical 
struggle to recover the Holy Land by quoting the prayer Deus qui ad nostre 
redemptionis from the Holy Land clamor, which emphasised the importance of 
the Holy Land as that land which the Lord ‘chose for revealing the mysteries of 
our redemption’ (see above). 
Similarly, Honorius employed a short arenga lacking biblical quotations in 
Iusta doloris et anxietatis, despatched to Frederick exactly two years later on 11 
February 1219, warning him and the crusaders in his territories to depart by the 
Feast of John the Baptist under penalty of excommunication: 
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A just occasion of sorrow and anxiety for the Christian people will not be 
wanting, as long as the unbelieving race hostile to Christ’s name holds the 
land in which the only-begotten son of God, our redeemer and Lord Jesus 
Christ, deigned to secure our salvation by His death.
78
 
 
As an arenga it was plain and simple, but it led into long rhetorical sections. The 
reader would have been detained for some time before arriving at the dispositio 
clause. This raises the question of whether recipients paid any attention to the 
arenga? Were they merely skipped over or skim-read by lay powers and their 
staff, who were busily embroiled in affairs of state and simply looking to get to 
the document’s bottom line? Perhaps more attention was paid to them later, when 
Frederick was engaged in conflict with Honorius’s successors and looking for 
ammunition to use in the propaganda campaign. Regardless of whether they were 
actually read by recipients, the arengae still provide us with an important source 
for the study of papal theology and diplomatic as mirrors of papal thought, but 
measuring any impact they might have had is not so clear cut. 
 Another arenga in a letter to Frederick, Quanto mentis affectu, issued on 
21 August 1221, was equally short, yet was also succeeded by long sections of 
papal rhetoric. The letter ordered the emperor to stop meddling in episcopal 
elections, and opened thus: 
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With what great happiness of the heart and concern of the mind we 
awaited, desiring longingly the day of your accession to the throne, when 
you came to the summit of sovereignty - He knows, to whom nothing is 
unknown, and who is aware of secrets.
79
 
 
The pope shamed the emperor, who had let him down, and reminded him that God 
was fully aware that instead of crusading, Frederick was intervening in 
ecclesiastical affairs. Honorius’s hope of securing an imperial crusade had 
obviously diminished since the coronation in 1220. In shaming Frederick, 
Honorius was employing a similar technique to that used with Philip Augustus in 
the letter of 18 April 1223 regarding his conflict with Henry III, although it was 
much less critical in tone. 
 Honorius’s widest call to crusade, Iustus Dominus in, which was sent to 
rulers throughout Christendom in April 1223, furnishes us with a good example to 
demonstrate the mixing of rhetoric and narrative in the section immediately 
following the purely theological arenga: 
 
The Lord, just in all of His ways (Ps. 144:17), who answers to each one 
very worthy recompense in proportion to their merits, keeps the hope of 
the Christian people warm about the business of the Holy Land, sometimes 
with good fortunes, and occasionally He cripples it with misfortunes. O 
how greatly good fortune seemed to smile on Christians! O how much the 
morning of blessed successes was believed to have dawned on the faithful, 
when the army of crusaders was attacking Egypt, after the tower [of 
chains] had been captured, after the river [Nile] had been crossed, after the 
enemies had fled, the army pitched camp in the places of the enemy, and 
hemmed in Damietta, which was considered the mainstay of Egypt, with 
the hardships and difficulties of the siege. The miraculous success was 
enacted, when the Lord, who chose the weak of the world, so that He 
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might bewilder the strong (1 Cor. 1:27), delivered this city, which was 
difficult to take by storm, at the opportune time to the assault of those 
waging His war, when the power of the enemy was much increased, and 
the number of our warriors was weakened not a little. All of Christendom 
had reason from these events to extend hope and confidence for the future, 
but following the successes, the name of the Lord was forgotten (Gen. 
40:23) by the conquerors after their triumph, who, issuing a bill of divorce 
(Jer. 3:8)
80
, they thus entered into a contract with vices, such as detracted 
from the faith where there were infidels to be converted, and there was 
more committing of sins, where their great remission had been hoped 
for.
81
 
 
Arguably the arenga, strictly defined, ends after the first sentence, with the words 
‘debilitavit adversis’. Interspersing biblical language with a narrative of events 
was probably faster and easier than composing long sections which were 
exclusively theological in content. Again the pope cited the crusaders’ sins as the 
reason for the expedition’s failure, and the participants were censured by the pope 
for forgetting the Lord’s name, just as Joseph had been forgotten in the Book of 
Genesis. The narrative elements actually offer an overview of the campaign that 
accurately identify reasons for the crusade’s failure, such as the army’s irregular 
rhythm of seasonal departures and reinforcements, and the inactivity of the 
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crusade army after the capture of Damietta. Tellingly though, Frederick’s role as 
the absentee commander-in-chief was omitted. 
 
Originality 
As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the operation of papal government was 
influenced in a large part by the influx of petitions being presented to the pope, 
and diplomats arriving to engage in diplomacy. Creaking under the sheer weight 
of business during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the papal curia, especially 
the chancery, adapted to operate as efficiently as possible.
82
 Formularies for 
common documents such as confirmations, indults, mandates, and privileges, 
were widely used by chancery staff to speed up document production. How far 
then were the arengae of Honorius’s curial letters bespoke creations? The 
formulary books in use at the chancery, combined with the twelfth-century 
registers of previous popes, provided a treasure trove of example arengae for 
Honorius and his staff to plunder, which could have been adapted or copied 
verbatim.
83
 Yet, strikingly, the arengae in Honorius’s crusade letters appear to be 
original to him. 
 Fichtenau demonstrated that in the Early Middle Ages, papal decretals, 
such as the Decretal of Siricius from the year 385, were recycled time and again in 
the composition of papal documents, because as he stated, the worries and 
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troubles of the papal office remained constant throughout the Middle Ages.
84
 In 
his arengae, Pope Gregory I (590-604) revealed a debt to ancient Rome, and they 
were not only reworked by his successors, but also found their way into the late 
seventh- or eighth-century formulary, the Liber Diurnus, and were later drawn 
upon as models in the high medieval papal chancery.
85
  
A good example of just how prevalent and complicated this reuse of 
arengae could be comes from the eleventh century. In 1049 Pope Leo IX (1049-
54) drew on an arenga of Gregory I (originally composed in 599) when forming 
part of one of his own. The second part of Leo’s arenga was copied from the 
Liber Diurnus, which had been used already by Pope John VIII in 877. Then in 
1074, Gregory VII recycled the first part of Leo’s arenga.86  
Similarly a letter of Pope Alexander II (1061-73) from 1067 copied an 
arenga exactly from a letter of Gregory I from 592, and another of Alexander’s 
letters from 1068 reused - verbatim in parts - another arenga of Gregory’s. 
Fichtenau has established how carefully Alexander amended the text, leaving the 
beginning unaltered, inserting a new section in the middle, and then hanging a 
new sentence on the end.
87
 Gregory’s text was, Fichtenau stated, a sacred piece of 
history that was still perfectly relevant and could be reused freely.
88
 
C.R. Cheney and W.H. Semple have identified an example of Innocent III 
recycling an arenga of Clement III.
89
 As they noted, papal draftsmen would reuse 
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the best passages from past papal letters on relevant topics, even when they were 
years old.
90
 The career of draftsmen could span pontificates: a number of notaries 
can be identified who served variously at the courts of Innocent III, Honorius III, 
and Gregory IX, including one notary who worked under all three popes.
91
 Yet by 
immediately removing Innocent’s chancellor, Thomas of Capua, on his accession, 
Honorius made a small, but potentially important, break with his predecessor’s 
diplomatic practice. There was also borrowing across medieval institutions, and 
Fichtenau has shown how the papacy and the lay powers took technical aspects 
from each other’s documents in the Early Middle Ages, including arengae.92  
Hans Martin Schaller has written that the language of Frederick II’s 
imperial chancery was influenced in a large part by the rhetoric of late antiquity, 
the Christian liturgy, and papal documents.
93
 Some of Frederick’s royal Sicilian 
chancery staff, for instance, had experience of working at the papal curia.
94
 The 
most important example of borrowing from a papal document by the imperial 
chancery was in its formula for naming imperial legates, the arenga of which was 
taken almost word-for-word from the formulary of a papal official, Thomas of 
Capua, who had taken his example from a letter of Honorius III from 1217.
95
 Oft-
used papal incipits were also sampled by the imperial chancery.
96
 Schaller notes 
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though, that despite evidence of some papal-imperial borrowing taking place, it 
does not seem to have been extensive.
97
 
Like the papal chancery, the imperial chancery was also recycling earlier 
material of its own. In the years 1198-1212, more than a fifth of all arengae from 
Frederick’s Sicilian chancery were either copied from Norman formularies or 
heavily influenced by them.
98
 Indeed, Schaller notes that prior to 1212 it is 
difficult to discern papally-influenced language in imperial documents, precisely 
because much of the papacy’s style had also been received from the Norman 
tradition.
99
 After Frederick II’s election as king of the Germans in 1212 and his 
relocation to Germany from Sicily, his chancery staff gained access to the old 
arengae of Frederick I, and the more mature products of Otto IV, and used this 
material in the composition of their own arengae.
100
 It was thus common practice 
both at the papal and imperial courts to make use of their predecessors’ 
documentary output. Indeed, formularies used in composing papal documents - 
from which arengae could easily be copied - were in existence during Honorius’s 
reign, although only one survives from his time (which unfortunately still lacks a 
proper edition), more have surely been lost.
101
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Sayers has examined the forms of arengae used in common letters at 
Honorius’s curia.102 Documents were issued in their hundreds which employed 
these standard arengae for dealing with the flood of petitions being presented at 
the curia. For example, Sacrosancta Romana ecclesia had been known in an early 
version from the reign of Gregory VII, before developing further as a form 
between the 1120s and 1150s.
103
 Cum a nobis was an arenga first documented in 
1184 under Lucius III (1181-85), and possibly reached its final form under 
Celestine III.
104
 Solet annuere sedes dates from sometime between 1138 x 1143, 
and was first used by Innocent II (1130-43), before going through further 
development during the rest of the twelfth century, and becoming common by the 
time of Innocent III.
105
 Iustis petentium desideriis made its first appearance in the 
historical record in a letter fragment of Lucius II from 1144, and varied in form 
until after the mid-twelfth century.
106
 Ea que iudicio was used for the first time by 
Alexander III, and, after being copied into audientia formularies, was then used 
frequently.
107
 The first use of Religiosam vitam eligentibus dates back to the year 
593, during the reign of Gregory I; by the eleventh century it had become 
common.
108
 
There is thus a distinction to be drawn between the composition of 
arengae in common and curial letters. While it was standard operating procedure 
to simply copy the arengae of common letters from exempla, Honorius’s arengae 
in curial letters on the subject of the crusade seem to have been mostly bespoke 
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products. It was probably thought counter-productive to reuse recent arengae in 
curial letters. The intended persuasive effect, such as shaming lay powers into 
behaving as the pope expected, would undoubtedly have been reduced if the 
recipient recognised the arenga as a standard formula. It would only have 
increased the chances of the recipient passing over it to get to the dispositio. 
Incipits, however, were frequently reused in different letters - they were 
obviously considered common intellectual property to be used freely, just like the 
arengae for common letters. Honorius had his crusade letter incipits Iustus 
Dominus in and Gratias agimus in common with his predecessors.
109
 Similarly the 
incipit from Honorius’s first registered letter, Magnus Dominus [et laudabilis 
nimis], provided Gregory IX with the incipit for his letter of 19 May 1229 to 
Pelagius, cardinal-bishop of Albano. Gregory also borrowed Celestis altitudo 
consilii (which Honorius is recorded to have used three times as an incipit 
himself) and used it as the incipit for letters to the sultan of Baghdad and the 
caliph of Baghdad in 1233.
110
  
Aside from the borrowing of incipits, a few examples can be found of 
Honorius recycling his own arengae from curial letters regarding the crusade. In 
the exceptional circumstances following Innocent III’s death and Honorius’s 
accession, the whole arenga from Magnus Dominus (above) was pressed into 
service in the dozens of documents despatched throughout Christendom by 
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Honorius on 25 July 1216.
111
 It was an important arenga for a mass mailing: there 
was neither the time nor necessity to formulate an individual arenga for each 
recipient. 
Honorius or his chancery staff also reused the opening few words from the 
arenga of Deo in cuius which took Frederick under papal protection before his 
crusade, sent on 11 February 1219: 
 
To God, in whose hands are the hearts of kings, and who directs them 
however He pleases (Prov. 21:1), we give thanks that you, humbly 
recognising the great things afforded to you [by God], and dutifully and 
prudently reflecting, thus He made you have fear and love of His name, so 
that taking up your cross, you decided to follow Him and to wield His 
sword of vengeance against blasphemers, so that you might not seem to 
Him to carry without purpose that given to you by Him for the praise of 
the good and the punishment of the evil.
112
 
 
The allusion to Proverbs 21:1 opened the arenga with a reminder of the pope’s 
spiritual authority as the vicar of Christ over the lay power. These initial words 
were reused with some minor adaptation, and featured in four of Honorius’s other 
letters on crusading themes issued during a relatively tight time span, between 5 
September 1218 and 18 May 1219. One letter copies the arenga verbatim.
113
 Two 
letters use only: ‘Deo, in cuius sunt manibus corda regum, gratiarum referimus 
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actiones’.114 Another modifies this to: ‘Deo, in cuius sunt manibus corda regum et 
tue celsitudini multas gratiarum referimus actiones’.115 This opening segment thus 
appears to have been used as an ‘all purpose’ arenga building block in the pope’s 
crusade correspondence during this time; it was probably being copied from a 
draft floating around the chancery during these months, which might explain why 
it was used five times during a short space of time.  
The openings of these arengae are clearly related to the prayer 
Omnipotens sempiterne Deus in cuius manu that circulated as part of a Holy Land 
clamor immediately after the loss of Jerusalem in 1187, and was itself a lightly 
modified version of the prayer Pro Christianissimo imperatore nostro.
116
 The 
prayer Omnipotens sempiterne Deus in cuius manu was also instituted in the Holy 
Land clamor promulgated by the Cistercian General Chapter at around the same 
time (1188/89), and was confirmed throughout the 1190s.
117
 Honorius’s arengae 
drew on this tradition in a small way and fitted into the efforts of the Christian 
community as a whole to recover the Holy Land through the power of prayer as 
well as arms: something to which Honorius referred in the opening words of his 
arenga to clergy in Hungary and Reims on 24 November 1217, Adversus hostes 
visibiles, which promoted prayer as a weapon to be used in support of the Fifth 
Crusade (above). 
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‘Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, in cuius manu sunt omnium potestates et omnia iura regnorum, 
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Le sacramentaire Grégorien: Ses principales formes d’après les plus anciens manuscrits, ed. Jean 
Deshusses, i (Fribourg, 1971), 177-78. 
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 Linder, Liturgy, 26. 
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Letters announcing the arrival of papal legates in a territory, for example, 
were sent out fairly regularly, and while the letters contained some common 
formulas, such as the quotation from Jeremiah 1:10 that informed the recipients of 
the invested powers of legates a latere ‘to root up and to pull down, to destroy and 
to overthrow, to build and to plant’, the arengae were often unique.118 It seems to 
have been common under Honorius and Innocent III to employ a new arenga each 
time when issuing letters which announced the despatch of legates with plenary 
powers.
119
 On at least three occasions though, when notifying the local Church 
hierarchy to receive legates as crusade preachers, Honorius used the same arenga. 
In Cum is qui secundum, despatched to select German clergy in March 1224, 
which announced the arrival of Conrad, cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina, to 
preach the crusade, Honorius justified his appointment thus: 
  
When He, who according to the omnipotence of His majesty can be 
comprehended neither in place nor time, being uncircumscribed and 
infinite, and remaining stable He gives movement to everything 
(Boethius),
120
 He can make His angels’ and ministers’ spirits (Ps. 103:4, 
Heb. 1:7), and when the height of the heavens had turned, assuming 
human flesh for this reason, that His delights are to be with the children of 
men (Prov. 8:31), He chose disciples and sent them throughout the whole 
world, so that they might preach the gospel to all creation (Mk. 16:15), He 
provided us with His example, so that following in His footsteps (1 Petr. 
2:21), when we were assumed into the plenitude of power, but cannot be 
present for a single piece of business ourselves, we divide burdens among 
those whom we summoned to part of the responsibility, we are used like 
                                                 
118
 Jeremiah 1:10 was one of Innocent III’s favoured biblical quotations: Moore, Innocent, 256. 
119
 See for example, Register, ed. Hageneder et al., i, no. 413; ii, no. 193; vii, no. 77, no. 209; viii, 
no. 56, no. 57, no. 103; x, no. 137. 
120
 Here Honorius quoted and lightly adapted book III, metre 9 of Boethius’s De consolatione 
philosophiae. See Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae opuscula theologica, ed. Claudio 
Moreschini (Munich, 2000), 79: ‘stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri’. 
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Jethro for consultation (Ex. 18:21-26), entrusting to each one according to 
his strengths, those things which are pressing at different times.
121
 
 
Honorius had already used this exact arenga in a letter issued on 14 March 1221 
announcing the arrival of the legate Hugolino, cardinal-bishop of Ostia, to preach 
the crusade in northern Italy.
122
 The pope recycled it verbatim one more time 
when he wrote to the clergy of Livonia and Prussia on 31 December 1224, 
announcing that William, bishop of Modena, was being sent as legate to preach in 
the region.
123
 The form of the arenga appears to have been developed from an 
earlier letter of Honorius, Cum is qui et, which was despatched to the archbishops 
of Cosenza and Brindisi on 8 July 1217, arranging preaching and an ecclesiastical 
presence at the Fifth Crusade’s appointed departure ports of Messina and 
Brindisi.
124
  
It is clear that the wording and content was developed between Cum is qui 
et and Cum is qui secundum. Most notable is Honorius’s use of Boethius’s sixth-
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 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 183v: ‘Cum is qui secundum sue omnipotentiam maiestatis nec loco potest 
nec tempore comprehendi, utpote incircumscriptibilis et inmensus, et stabilis manens dat cuncta 
moveri, faciat spiritus suos angelos et ministros, et celorum altitudine inclinata, carnem assumens 
humanum pro eo, quod delicie sue sunt esse cum filiis hominum, discipulos quos elegerat in 
mundum destinaverit universum, ut omni predicarent evangelium creature, suo nos instruxit 
exemplo, ut eius sequentes vestigia, cum assumpti simus in plenitudinem potestatis, nec per nos 
ipsos possimus singulis negotiis imminere, inter eos, quos in partem sollicitudinis evocavimus, 
onera quasi Gethro usi consilio dividamus, unicuique secundum virtutem propriam que variis 
temporibus imminent committendo.’; Pressutti 4904.  
122
 Pressutti 3178. 
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 Pressutti 5242. See also, Fonnesberg-Schmidt, ‘Honorius’, 111. 
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 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 120r: ‘Cum is qui et si secundum humanitatis naturam loco et tempore potuit 
quia voluit comprehendi, secundum tamen divinitatis omnipotentiam erat sicut et est ubique, 
utpote incircumscriptibilis et inmensus, pro suo beneplacito cuncta disponens discipulos quos 
elegerat in mundum destinaverit universum, omni creature evangelium predicare ac nunc et 
semper in sua regnans ineffabili maiestate, faciat spiritus suos angelos et ministros, nos qui licet 
immeriti eiusdem in terris sumus vicarii constituti, ad eius exemplar ea que non possumus exequi 
per nos ipsos hiis qui sunt in partem nostre sollicitudinis evocati et tamquam menbra capiti nobis 
obedire tenentur, committimus exequenda ut non videatur fieri sine nobis quod nobis mandantibus 
adimpletur.’; Pressutti 654. 
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century text De consolatione philosophiae and the reference to Jethro in the later 
form of the arenga. Because the developments took place during Honorius’s 
pontificate, they can thus confidently be attributed to him. It is suggestive of self-
confidence in his own theological stance, distinct from his predecessor, and also 
of a vibrant intellectual culture at his curia.
125
  
By aligning himself with the words of the Old Testament figure of Jethro, 
Honorius revealed an insight into how he viewed his own role as pontiff. In the 
Book of Exodus Jethro advised his kinsman Moses that he could not, and should 
not, judge every small disagreement among his people because it was too much 
strain for one man alone to bear (Ex. 18: 13-18). Instead Jethro counselled Moses 
that he should share his burden as leader by delegating the less important affairs to 
trusted representatives, and only consider the most important cases in person (Ex. 
18:21-22). It was important for the pope to justify why he had invested legates 
with plenary powers in the arenga because of the performative aspect of papal 
documents, especially in mandates announcing the arrival of legates, which would 
probably have been read aloud in partibus.
126
 
The arenga from Cum is qui secundum elegantly combined biblical 
allusions justifying the papal preaching mission (Mk. 16:15), with the institution’s 
plenitude of power, and the sharing of part of this responsibility with legates (Ex. 
18:21-26). The deft use of this theological justification and sagacious phrasing 
probably explains why it was recycled. Pope Innocent IV (1243-54) reused part of 
the second half of this arenga in two crusade letters, although interestingly, not in 
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 Cf. the wording of Innocent III’s arenga in the appointment letter of Peter of Capua examined 
in Barbiche, ‘Diplomatie’, 150. 
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 I am grateful to Dr Barbara Bombi for suggesting this to me. 
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the arenga clauses. The first letter was issued on 23 February 1248 to all the 
nobles on the crusade of King Louis IX of France (1226-70) requesting that they 
receive the papal legate, the cardinal-bishop of Tusculum, and the second was 
issued to the legate himself on 21 July 1248, and both used the same segment 
from Honorius’s arenga.127 
The arenga may have been original to Honorius. I have found no evidence 
that the entire arenga from Cum is qui secundum (or Cum is qui et) was used by 
any other pope, either before or after Honorius. In the study of arengae, however, 
one must be cautious not to misattribute the invention of an arenga to a particular 
pope. Earlier precedents may have been lost altogether or reworked and given new 
incipits, and thus they might be missed by the researcher relying on the incipit to 
identify arengae. While one must be alert to the possibility that Cum is qui 
secundum, or sections of it, may have been culled from earlier letters, nevertheless 
it remains possible that this elegant arenga was in fact an original product of 
Honorius’s curia. Even if it was not, then the clear development that this arenga 
underwent during Honorius’s pontificate is testament to the intellectual vitality of 
his curia - he obviously did not feel constrained merely to follow his predecessor, 
but confidently created and modified his own arengae. Such developments 
originating from within the curia are examples of the pope behaving proactively in 
his administration of the Holy Land crusades. 
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 Reg. Vat. 21, fol. 509v: ‘qui in universum mundum ad predicandum evangelium omni creature 
discipulos quos elegerat destinavit, inter illos quos in partem sollicitudinis evocavimus onera quasi 
Jethro usi consilio partientes, unicuique secundum propriam virtutem que variis temporibus 
imminet committendo.’; Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. Élie Berger, 3 vols (Paris, 1884-97), i, 
(no. 3661) 552-53. The letter to the legate was not copied into the Registra Vaticana series of 
registers: Registres, ed. Berger, ii, (no. 4662) 108.  
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 The case for Honorius as the creator of original and important arengae is 
strengthened by another example from his reign. On 5 August 1223, Honorius 
issued Quia celestia simul to Frederick, granting him dispensation to marry the 
king of Jerusalem’s daughter, Isabella, who was within the prohibited four 
degrees of consanguinity: 
 
Because heavenly along with terrestrial knowledge is guided by the 
Almighty, for this reason, He bestowed the keys of the kingdom of heaven 
to the blessed Peter as His vicar and his successors after him, and entrusted 
the loosing and binding of popes (Matt. 16:19), so that the highest pontiff, 
with no regard for the application of human invention, but rather driven on 
by divine inspiration, establishing beneficial laws, He might unite all men 
by bonds of necessity to observe the same laws, even if at least sometimes, 
when urgent necessity compels or evident usefulness to the people 
persuades, in respect of some of them He might prudently release some of 
the people from the plenitude of power, so that nonetheless the rest might 
be closely bound by him; yet without receiving the undue interventions of 
people, since it is not to be considered for a [single] person, when for a 
particular case, place, and time, for the sake of the common good not 
private but public, by the greatest consideration of divine service, anything 
may be conceded to some without injury to the law.
128
 
 
Relying on the traditional basis for papal primacy in Matthew 16:19, Honorius 
justified his power to relax certain laws in special circumstances without injury to 
the law, but stressed that this power was not to be used for the benefit of a single 
person, but for the Christian community as a whole. By allowing Frederick to 
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 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 84: ‘Quia celestia simul et terrena omnipotenti prudentia moderatur, ad hoc 
beato Petro tamquam vicario suo et successoribus eius post ipsum conferens claves regni celestis, 
ligandi et solvendi tradidit pontificium, ut summus pontifex non humane adinventionis studio, sed 
divine potius inspirationis instinctu leges statuens salutares, quodam necessitatis vinculo liget 
homines ad observantiam earundem, quod utique nonnumquam, cum urgens necessitas exigit vel 
evidens utilitas maxime publica persuadet, sic laxat provide circa quosdam de sue plenitudine 
potestatis, ut ceteri nichilominus astricti teneantur eodem, nulla tamen interveniente acceptione 
indebita personarum, cum non sit reputandum deferri persone, cum pro causa, loco et tempore non 
privati sed publici commodi gratia, et maxime consideratione divini servitii, quicquam alicui sine 
iuris iniuria indulgetur.’; Pressutti 4460. 
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marry the daughter of John of Brienne, the dispensation directly benefitted the 
crusade by binding the powerful emperor to the vulnerable kingdom of Jerusalem. 
Honorius was relaxing Canon 50 of Lateran IV which had reduced the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity from seven to four.
129
 Honorius appears to have 
borrowed a phrase from the canon that he was relaxing: ‘cum urgens necessitas 
vel evidens utilitas id exposcit’.130   
D’Avray has noted that papal dispensations such as this were rare until the 
reign of Innocent III.
131
 As far as can be ascertained, the first occurrence of this 
arenga seems to be under Honorius, before it was copied widely by his 
successors. Alexander III is recorded to have issued a letter to the archbishop of 
Trondheim between 1164 x 1181 that allowed him to offer marriage dispensations 
to those living on a remote island twelve-days’ journey from Norway, so that they 
could marry within the fifth, sixth, and seventh degrees.
132
 Alexander’s letter 
lacks an arenga entirely, and launches immediately with the narratio clause. 
Another decretal of Alexander III’s, Super eo quod, originally despatched 
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 At Lateran IV Innocent III made significant changes to marriage laws, making it harder for lay 
powers to acquire annulments as well as reducing the prohibited degrees of consanguinuity: D.L. 
d’Avray, Medieval Marriage: Symbolism and Society (Oxford, 2005), 104. For an overview of 
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 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Volume I, Nicaea I to Lateran V, ed. and trans. Norman P. 
Tanner (London, 1990), 257.  
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 David d’Avray, ‘Lay Kinship Solidarity and Papal Law’, in Pauline Stafford, Janet L. Nelson 
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Pragmatism during Innocent III’s Pontificate’, Journal of Medieval History, 24 (1998), 259-71. 
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 Decretales ineditae saeculi XII, ed. Walther Holtzmann, Stanley Chodorow and Charles 
Duggan, Monumenta Iuris Canonici Series B, 4 (Vatican City, 1982), (no. 86) 149-51. 
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between 1168 x 1170 in response to the bishop of Split’s questions, was structured 
into three sections.
133
 The third section, on the topic of consanguinity and 
marriage, bears no textual resemblance to Honorius’s arenga. 
Innocent III’s marriage dispensation letters similarly furnish us with no 
antecedent for Honorius’s Quia celestia simul. All apart from one of Innocent’s 
arengae for letters on marriage dispensation bear no textual resemblance at all.
134
 
The one exception is Innocent’s arenga from his dispensation granted to the 
crusader Count Hervé of Nevers and his wife Mathilda on 20 December 1213, 
Ascitis aliis in, which displays elements of similarity.
135
 
Whilst Honorius appears to have taken a small amount of inspiration from 
Innocent’s arenga, the ideas were so heavily reworked and developed that the 
authorship of Quia celestia simul must be attributed to Honorius. Ascitis aliis in 
and Quia celestia simul are totally different chancery products. It was Honorius 
who developed the bare bones of Innocent’s simple arenga into the majesty of 
Quia celestia simul. Indeed, Honorius had actually used the arenga Ascitis aliis in 
himself on 26 May 1219 after making a number of small alterations, some of 
which prefigured elements of Quia celestia simul, such as ‘cum imminens 
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 Edited in Charles Duggan, ‘Decretal Letters to Hungary’, in idem, Decretals and the Creation 
of ‘New Law’ in the Twelfth Century: Judges, Judgements, Equity and Law (Aldershot, 1998), V: 
(no. 10) 23-24. 
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 Register, ed. Hageneder et al., ix, (no. 61) 110-11, (no. 68) 133-34, (no. 75) 143-44; x, (no. 
118) 203-04, (no. 136) 228-29; Patrologiae, ed. Migne, ccxvi (Paris, 1855), 715, 1268-69; 
Regestum, ed. Kempf, (no. 23) 66-67, (no. 169) 375, (no. 181) 390-92. 
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 Patrologiae, ed. Migne, ccxvi, 943-44: ‘Ascitis aliis in partem sollicitudinis, summus pontifex 
assumptus est in plenitudinem potestatis, qui cum moderator sit canonum, iuri non facit iniuriam si 
dispensat; presertim cum dispensatio sic iuris vincula laxet in aliquo quod in aliis non dissolvit, et 
sic beneficium gratie specialis inducat quod vigorem constitutionis non perimit generalis.’ 
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necessitas et evidens utilitas id exposcit’, which, as noted above, is also found in 
Canon 50 of Lateran IV.
136
 
That Honorius reused Innocent’s Ascitis aliis in is strong evidence that the 
text of Quia celestia simul was not created until 1223 - if it had been then 
Honorius would surely have used it in 1219. This is perhaps the closest thing to 
conclusive proof that one can find to demonstrate the invention of an arenga by a 
particular pope. The evidence is therefore strong enough to claim confidently that 
it was Honorius (or his staff) who invented the arenga for Quia celestia simul: it 
was he who set the basis of the text that was used, with only slight modifications, 
for over one hundred years by his successors. 
 Gregory IX recycled Honorius’s arenga nearly verbatim on 29 October 
1230, making only the smallest modifications: Honorius’s first word of the incipit, 
Quia, was switched to Qui; adinventionis became simply inventionis; inspirationis 
was replaced with aspirationis; and ad observentiam was made plural - ad 
observentias.
137
 When Gregory reused the arenga again on 26 June 1237, 
however, he made substantial changes.
138
 Nevertheless, Gregory’s amendments to 
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 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 99v: ‘Ascitis aliis in partem sollicitudinis summus pontifex assumptus est in 
plenitudinem potestatis, qui cum moderator sit canonum iuri non facit iniuriam si dispensat cum 
imminens necessitas et evidens utilitas id exposcit, presertim cum dispensatio sic iuris vincula 
laxet in aliquo quod in aliis non dissolvit, et sic beneficium gratie specialis inducat, quod vigorem 
constitutionis non perimit generalis.’; Pressutti 2084. 
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 Reg. Vat. 15, fol. 42r. The letter is edited by Lucien Auvray, although crucially, and 
frustratingly, as with other papal letters in the editions in the Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de 
Rome series, the arenga is truncated to the incipit only: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. Lucien 
Auvray, 4 vols (Paris, 1896-1955), i, (no. 517) 339. 
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 Reg. Vat. 18, fol. 303r: ‘Qui celestia simul et terrena omnipotenti providentia moderatur, ad 
hoc beato Petro suo vicario et successoribus eius post ipsum collatis clavibus regni celestis ligandi 
atque solvendi contulit potestatem, ut summus pontifex non humane inventionis studio, sed divine 
potius inspirationis instinctu subtili examine pensare debeat singula que ad tribunal deferuntur 
ipsius, et quantum iudicium permittit humanum res etiam perscrutari latentes, ne vel dampnet 
innoxios, vel nocentes absolvat neve dicat bonum malum, aut malum bonum medentium tenens 
formam qui manus prudenter moderantur officium, ne dum pars corrupta, vel cauterio uritur, vel 
aliter resecatur, cum ea trahatur vel ledatur etiam pars sincera.’ 
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Honorius’s arenga were short-lived, perhaps because the altered wording was 
considered less effective compared to the elegant text of Honorius. It was in a 
form much closer to the latter’s 1223 usage of Quia celestia simul that the arenga 
was reused by Gregory’s successors.  
Perhaps most important for the survival and subsequent entrenchment in 
papal diplomatic of Honorius’s arenga was its use by Innocent IV. Innocent IV 
ignored Gregory IX’s 1237 modification of the arenga, and recycled it in its 1230 
form - which was much closer to its 1223 issue - in a letter to the landgrave of 
Thuringia, despatched on 12 April 1244. Innocent made only minor changes, 
omitting Honorius’s words ‘omnipotenti prudentia’ and rearranging his ‘ligandi et 
solvendi tradidit pontificium’.139 The rest of the arenga was copied verbatim, 
apart from the swap of Honorius’s inspirationis for aspirationis, as Gregory had 
done, and Innocent returned to using Honorius’s singular ad observentiam.  
Not only was it reused in this letter, but the arenga was even copied into 
the formulary of Marinus of Eboli, Innocent IV’s vice-chancellor between 1244 
and 1251, under the heading: ‘Incipit liber quartus cuius forme propter earum 
dissimilitudinem que de matrimoniis tractant omnes simul sine aliqua rubricarum 
distinctione ponunutur’.140 That Marinus took his example from Honorius’s letter 
- presumably the first instance of it that Marinus could trace, and most probably 
the arenga’s first ever use - lends weight to the argument that this arenga was an 
original creation of Honorius’s curia, and is testament to its quality and the 
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 Reg. Vat. 21, fol. 95r: ‘Qui celestia simul et terrena moderatur, ad hoc beato Petro tanquam 
vicario suo et successoribus eius post ipsum conferens claves regni celestis, ligandi pontificium 
tradidit et solvendi’; Epistolae, ed. Rodenberg, ii, 41. 
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 Arles, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS 60, fol. 245r; Die Formularsammlung des Marinus von 
Eboli, ed. Fritz Schillmann (Rome, 1929), 290. 
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superlative nature of its style. That the recipient of the arenga had originally been 
Frederick II and the matter contained within the letter itself (his marriage to secure 
the future of the kingdom of Jerusalem) were undoubtedly extremely important to 
Honorius, are also factors which support the assumption that he created the 
arenga. 
 Innocent IV also appears to have reworked the arenga from Quia celestia 
simul into Dum summus pontifex, first witnessed in his reign for a marriage 
dispensation issued on 8 December 1244.
141
 By December 1245 Dum summus 
pontifex had been further revised into a shorter arenga entitled Cum summus 
pontifex for marriage dispensations, cutting many parts from the text to shorten 
it.
142
 These cropped sections were later reintegrated into the arengae for Cum 
summus pontifex letters issued by Innocent IV and his successors, which 
fluctuated in details and length, but maintained many core elements from Quia 
celestia simul.
143
 It was still being used in a lightly modified form as Summus 
pontifex as late as 28 December 1345 by Clement VI.
144
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 Reg. Vat. 21, fol. 121r: ‘Dum summus pontifex collatis sibi in persona beati Petri ab eo qui 
eterna providentia celestia simul et terrena disponit, clavibus regni celestis ligandi obtineat 
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The ‘popularity’ of the arenga text from Honorius III’s Quia celestia 
simul is astounding. Its prolonged use with only slight modifications over more 
than a century represents a previously unnoticed and extremely significant 
development in papal diplomatic under Honorius.
145
 Honorius’s curia appears to 
have been a vibrant intellectual forum for the development of papal diplomatic, an 
interpretation which is reinforced by Cheney’s point that dispensations for bastard 
clergy which excluded the episcopate were also developed during Honorius’s 
pontificate.
146
 
Cum is qui secundum and Quia celestia simul reveal Honorius 
propounding a discrete, original theology to that expressed by his predecessors, 
and one worth copying - imitation is, as the saying goes, the sincerest form of 
flattery. Nevertheless, although Honorius’s arengae have a distinctive flavour to 
those of Innocent III, like all popes he was building upon and reworking 
traditional claims to papal authority (such as Matthew 16:19) which had featured 
in the arengae of his predecessors. 
 For instance, in Sinceris fili karissime to Frederick II (above), Honorius 
had drawn upon Proverbs 8:15: ‘per quem [the Lord] reges regnant et in regno 
hominum dominantur’. This was a typical theological justification for the popes’ 
spiritual authority over lay powers. Innocent III had used it in his documents to 
rulers such as Frederick (‘per quem reges regnant et principantur’; ‘per quem 
reges regnant et principes principatur’) and King John of England (‘per quem 
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 Bernard Barbiche has identified more limited copying of phrases or themes over a long period 
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etiam reges regnant et principes principantur’).147 Even so, subtle differences in 
theological justification between popes can be discerned by how they used these 
traditional biblical allusions.  
An instructive example comes from comparing Honorius’s Si aliqua tue 
celsitudini to Frederick (above) with the arenga from Innocent III’s letter Cum 
divina testante to King John of England, sent on 20 February 1203. Innocent 
reproved John for his offences against the Church, and like Honorius in Si aliqua 
tue celsitudini, his purpose was to shame John into compliance. Like Honorius, 
Innocent also drew upon Proverbs 3:12 and Hebrews 12:6 to justify his criticism 
of the king: 
 
Holy scripture testifies that a father rebukes and chastens the son whom he 
loves: and so if your Majesty, whom we love with sincere affection in the 
Lord, is rebuked in our apostolic letter, and even upbraided, for the sins 
which you are known to have committed against the head and members, 
that is, against us and the Roman Church, the clergy and the churches, it 
should be pleasant and welcome to you to realise that our rebuke springs 
from love and not from anger - especially as, in administering this rebuke, 
we obey the decree of the Apostle who, in his instructions for bishops, 
says to Timothy, ‘Be instant in season, out of season, reprove, plead, 
upbraid with all long-suffering and doctrine.’148 
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John’s crimes against the Church up to 1203 were not dissimilar to Frederick’s 
own interferences in ecclesiastical affairs. Innocent had been involved in disputes 
with John over his aggressive posturing towards the Church, especially - like 
Frederick - regarding benefices and Church property.
149
 Keeping the danger of 
generalising firmly in mind, the similarity of theme of the arengae, and the fine 
shades of dissimilitude in justification are striking, which makes them valid 
examples for comparison.  Broadly, the arengae are similar, but Innocent’s seems 
blunter and less nuanced than Honorius’s. In these arengae Honorius seems to 
have expressed a less aggressive theological conception of his role than Innocent 
III, but it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from a single pair of letters. The 
roles of popes and their political concerns did not change greatly during the 
Middle Ages. As a result, any variations in arenga theology between popes would 
only have been subtle. 
 The shades of difference in Honorius and Innocent’s arengae complement 
the findings of Powell, who compared the two popes’ sermons on the Pastor 
bonus, noting that ‘the structural development of Honorius’s sermon parallels that 
of his predecessor, but with striking differences in emphasis and interpretation of 
themes.’150 Their differences were further demonstrated during Honorius’s 
pontificate. Readings from Innocent’s sermons had been compiled into a breviary 
by a papal chaplain who held them in ‘a somewhat inflated regard’, inserting them 
alongside the traditional readings from Saints Augustine, Leo, and Gregory - 
Honorius was perhaps making a statement of opinion on Innocent’s sermons when 
he had these readings removed from his own revision of the breviary; Moore sums 
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up that Honorius ‘was not so impressed’.151 Powell has also drawn attention to 
Honorius’s outspoken concern in compiling his own sermon collection to explain 
the authorities that he relied on - making his work distinct from the collections of 
his predecessors (whilst relying on the traditional authorities).
152
 Arguably this 
impulse to ‘go his own way’ is also found in the arengae examined above.  
After all, it has long been recognised by historians that Innocent’s 
theological works were not stunningly original. Pennington wrote that Innocent’s 
theological tracts ‘are of pedestrian quality ... [and] very similar to contemporary 
theological tracts which were produced in Paris.’153 Innocent received his formal 
theological education ‘in the late 1170s in the School of Pastoral Theology within 
the nascent University of Paris.’154 It was not inevitable that Honorius - a man of 
humble origins - would simply follow in the footsteps of his Paris-educated 
predecessor in his theology. Indeed, that Honorius was not educated in Paris, 
together with his immediate removal of Innocent’s chancellor on accession, might 
explain the different nuances in his arengae. 
 
Conclusions 
Honorius III’s arengae from his crusade letters demonstrate elements both of 
continuity and innovation from Innocent III’s pontificate. Whilst traditional topoi 
and theological justifications feature in Honorius’s arengae, one also finds a 
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distinct theology expressed using different scriptural allusions to his predecessor. 
Honorius emerges as an important influence on the creation and development of 
arengae. His fingerprints (or those of his staff) can be found on significant 
additions to arengae such as Cum is qui secundum, and also on Quia celestia 
simul, which the evidence suggests is one of his original creations, hitherto 
unappreciated in the history of papal diplomatic. Had Honorius simply revised 
Innocent’s arengae from the old curial letters of his predecessors, it could 
arguably be considered as a conscious effort to continue the theological 
justifications of predecessors. Yet by taking the initiative in developing bespoke 
crusade arengae, he propounded a theology which was similar, but crucially 
distinct, to that of Innocent III. Honorius’s theology found in his arengae was 
therefore not a mere continuation of Innocent’s theological stance, but something 
more complex and original, and is also an area of crusade administration in which 
the pope took a proactive role. 
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Chapter 5 
The Deployment of Legates 
 
Papal legates played a role of the uppermost importance in the organisation of the 
Holy Land crusade under Honorius III. As representatives of the pope, legates 
acted as intermediaries between the Roman curia and the royal courts of the West, 
the local Church hierarchy, and the crusaders. Honorius deployed legates to fulfil 
a number of roles: to continue his negotiations with lay powers, such as Frederick 
II; to make peace between the kingdoms of England and France, and among the 
Italian communes; to reform the Church and eradicate heresy in southern France; 
to shore up the recently acquired Latin Empire of Constantinople; to preach the 
crusade and collect the crusade tax; and finally, to represent him on the Fifth 
Crusade itself. Understanding the roles of these ‘middle men’ is crucial to 
comprehending papal diplomacy and Church government more broadly, yet the 
roles of legates, their mandates, duties, and powers, has often been glossed over 
and generalised, something which is especially apparent in the historiography on 
Pelagius, Honorius’s crusade legate. 
This chapter seeks to fill an historiographical gap by providing a thematic 
analysis of Honorius’s legates, and also to reconcile two distinct historiographies, 
that on legates and that on the Fifth Crusade. The aim is to arrive at a nuanced 
understanding of the role of legates in promoting and conducting crusading. It 
first addresses the appointment of legates and their powers. This is followed by 
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studies of legates’ roles as peacemakers in northern Italy and England whose 
purpose was to benefit the Holy Land crusade, and of Pelagius’s role in the course 
of the Fifth Crusade. This chapter locates the work of these legates in the context 
of the overall effort made by Honorius to organise and support crusading to the 
Holy Land, and demonstrates further aspects of responsive papal government in 
action. 
The existing scholarly work on Honorius’s legates is far from 
comprehensive, and a detailed study of his deployment of legates to prepare for 
the crusade has yet to be attempted.
1
 Powell conducted a short survey of the topic, 
but his research tails off with the end of the Fifth Crusade in 1221 and does not 
explore the later years of Honorius’s pontificate.2 Others, such as Kate Norgate, 
Sayers, David Carpenter, and Fred Cazel Jr, have discussed the legates’ work for 
peace in England during Honorius’s reign, but do not always place it against a 
background of Honorius’s wider diplomatic affairs.3 
Some of Honorius’s individual legates have received attention, such as 
Falko Neininger’s study of Conrad of Urach, and Vincent’s edition of the ‘acta’ of 
the legate Guala Bicchieri, which features a detailed introduction.
4
 Other relevant 
studies by Helene Tillmann, Christine Thouzellier, Anton Pokorny, and Heinrich 
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Zimmermann are useful in sketching out the details of legates’ movements and 
actions during their commissions.
5
  
 One of Honorius’s legates in particular, Pelagius, cardinal-bishop of 
Albano, has attracted considerable attention and criticism in the historiography. 
Because Pelagius was the papal representative on the crusade in possession of 
plenary powers, historians have circled around the carcass of his reputation for the 
easy pickings on offer. It is often claimed that he had an arrogant personality and 
an alleged blotch on his record from an earlier legation to the Latin Empire of 
Constantinople (1213-15) under Innocent III. 
In 1936 René Grousset displayed no hesitation in attributing the failure of 
the entire Fifth Crusade to Pelagius - it seemed clear to him that it was the fault of 
the legate alone.
6
 Grousset thought that in Pelagius’s opposition to John of 
Brienne over the decision-making of the crusade leadership, he proved himself 
uncompromising, full of pride and driven by fanaticism.
7
 Grousset quoted the 
diatribe against Pelagius’s earlier actions in the Latin Empire by the later Greek 
historian George Akropolites (1217-82) without question, and thus thought that in 
opposing John, Pelagius was simply reprising the haughty attitude that he had 
already adopted towards the Greeks.
8
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Runciman’s opinion of Pelagius in 1954 was that he was ‘a man of great 
industry and administrative experience, but singularly lacking in tact.’9 Whilst not 
attributing the crusade’s failure to the legate alone, Runciman thought that 
‘Pelagius was a haughty, tactless and unpopular man whose faults as a general 
were revealed by the last disastrous offensive’.10 Van Cleve likewise propounded 
a damning verdict on Pelagius’s personality in 1969, criticising him as ‘imperious, 
proud, headstrong, and dogmatic’.11 In 1988 Mayer maintained a similarly critical 
judgement of Pelagius, whom he considered ‘a man of driving energy but 
hopelessly shortsighted, autocratic, self-satisified, and uncommonly pigheaded.’12 
Like Grousset, Mayer stated that the Fifth Crusade failed ‘dismally owing to the 
legate’s pigheadedness.’13 
A number of historians have nevertheless put forward more favourable 
views of Pelagius. In 1950 Donovan wrote that the Fifth Crusade did not fail 
because of the legate, even though the available evidence points to him as the 
culprit for the final defeat.
14
 Demetrio Mansilla shifted the blame away from the 
legate in 1953, and concluded that the failure of the crusade was not the fault of 
Pelagius, but the apathy and selfishness of the military leaders.
15
 Powell published 
the most sympathetic and nuanced assessment of Pelagius’s role in 1986, stating 
that the legate was not to blame for the entire crusade’s failure, but conceding that 
‘Pelagius and Duke Louis of Bavaria share the responsibility for the decision that 
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impelled the army to its fate.’16 In the wake of Powell’s work, historians have 
generally avoided making the sweeping, one-sided judgements on Pelagius’s 
personality that had previously dominated the historiography, but nevertheless, 
remnants of Pelagius’s reputation for arrogance linger on.  
Stürner noted that Pelagius’s tenacity as much as his arrogance had been 
demonstrated by the legation to the Latin Empire, and in 1992 wrote that the 
legate worked passionately to spur the crusade on, but without noticing, or caring, 
that his actions created enemies and jeopardised the whole undertaking.
17
 
Stürner’s view echoed that of Werner Maleczek, who had written of Pelagius’s 
two-sided personality in 1984, which brought enthusiasm and success to the 
crusade, but also created tensions in the crusader camp.
18
 In 2008 Norman 
Housley stated that it would be wrong to attribute the blame for the crusade’s 
military defeat to Pelagius alone, when he was advised and had the counsel of 
others.
19
 The historiographical debate thus swirls around Pelagius’s personality, 
the mandate awarded him by Honorius, and his role in the military leadership of 
the crusade - these issues will be examined in this chapter and placed into the 
context of other contemporary legations.  
 
Appointment and Powers 
The pope’s choice of legate was an important matter. A legate a latere was 
invested with the same powers as the pope in his territory of legation (known as 
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his provincia by thirteenth-century canon lawyers), and therefore it was crucial 
that a legate could be relied on to act not only as a determined representative of 
the pope, but also as one who could deal with contentious matters sensitively.
20
 
Carpenter’s assessment of one of Honorius’s legates in England, Pandulf, bishop 
of Norwich, as confident and determined, but also tactful, summarises the ideal 
traits for a papal legate, although it was a fine balancing act to achieve.
21
 
 Legates a latere were most often chosen from the College of Cardinals, a 
circle of top-ranking churchmen who acted as the pope’s ‘closest advisers and 
collaborators’ (on the different classifications of legates, see below).22 As an 
institution, the College tended to outlive reigning popes: a large carryover of 
cardinals can be witnessed from the reign of Celestine III to that of Innocent III, 
and then in turn to that of Honorius.
23
 Whilst it has been claimed that Honorius 
flooded the College with kinsmen on his accession, removing Innocent’s 
appointments in the process, in fact, as I have argued elsewhere, he only made six 
appointments, and most of his cardinals were actually appointed by Innocent.
24
  
The relatively static membership of the College ensured that the pope had a select 
group experienced churchmen, up-to-speed on current diplomatic affairs, from 
which to appoint legates a latere.  
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The pope could also employ high-ranking clergy from outside the College 
to act as ambassadors; for instance Innocent III used the Cistercian Gerald, abbot 
of Casamari, to negotiate between England and France in 1203-04.
25
 As Bolton 
writes: ‘such sensitive diplomatic negotiations required trusted men, well-
informed and authoritative who could also appear neutral and impartial. That 
Innocent should have turned to the Cistercians of the Patrimony ... should not 
surprise us.’26 That two of Honorius’s six appointments to the College were 
Cistercians reveals a similarly high regard for the Order.
27
 It is important to 
remember that the pope’s choice of diplomats and legates could extend beyond 
the College, which Honorius demonstrated with his selection of Pandulf, bishop 
of Norwich, as legate to England (see below). 
 Studying the earlier careers of the legates despatched by Honorius reveals 
no fixed pattern to elucidate why one legate was chosen over another for a 
particular task. While some cardinals appear to have been selected because of 
their previous experience, others were plucked from relative obscurity for high 
profile legations. It is interesting to note for instance, that Guala, cardinal-priest of 
S. Martino, had a history of mediating between Italian communes before he was 
sent as a peacemaker to England in 1216, which may explain his selection as 
Bolton suggests.
28
 In July 1207, Innocent III had employed him as legate to settle 
disputes between Florence and Siena, and on 4 September 1210 he brokered a 
peace between Todi and Amelia on one side, and Orvieto on the other. During his 
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legation to France in 1208-09, one of Guala’s responsibilities was to preach the 
Holy Land crusade.
29
 Innocent III sent him to England, possibly at King John’s 
request, to deal with the baronial revolt, to preach the Holy Land crusade, to make 
peace between England and France, and to collect funds for the crusade.
30
 Guala 
arrived on 20 May 1216. Following Innocent’s death, rather than recalling the 
legate for replacement, Honorius immediately confirmed Guala’s legation.31 
 On Guala’s resignation from office as legate to England in 1218, Pandulf 
was chosen as his replacement. Pandulf hailed from Monte Cassino in southern 
Italy. Nothing is known about his career before 1211 when he worked in England 
as a nuncio, except that he was a subdeacon under Innocent III.
32
 Pandulf’s role as 
nuncio continued (encompassing several trips to and from the curia) until 1215, 
and included the duties of collecting Peter’s Pence, acting as a judge delegate, and 
as Innocent’s representative, receiving King John’s homage for the kingdom in 
1213.
33
 In 1215 he was elected to the see of Norwich (but not consecrated until 
1222), and by January 1217 was appointed chamberlain by Honorius.
34
 Pandulf 
gained important diplomatic experience, acting on John’s behalf in negotiations in 
Wales and France in 1213, and at Runnymede in 1215.
35
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 There was a precedent for Honorius’s selection of Hugolino, cardinal-
bishop of Ostia, as legate for important political affairs. When Honorius appointed 
Hugolino as a peacemaker in northern Italy on 31 January 1217, he perhaps called 
to mind Hugolino’s legation of 1207-09, when Innocent III had used him to 
mediate between the two candidates vying for the imperial throne, Philip of 
Swabia and Otto of Brunswick.
36
 Therefore a tenuous parallel can be drawn 
between the careers of Guala and Hugolino, who had experience of peacemaking 
before their deployment by Honorius.  
The pope also chose legates for important missions who seem to have had 
little or no background in political affairs. We possess little information to help us 
understand the appointment of Bertrand, cardinal-priest of SS. Giovanni e Paolo 
(1217- after 1221), as legate to the south of France, making it difficult to speculate 
about why he was chosen for the Languedoc legation. He had been created 
cardinal-deacon of S. Giorgio in Velabro, most likely on 19 May 1212, by 
Innocent III. Bertrand had worked as an auditor at the curia under Innocent, and 
occasionally subscribed papal privileges. On 7 January 1217 Honorius promoted 
Bertrand to become cardinal-priest of SS. Giovanni e Paolo, just before 
appointing him as legate to Languedoc on 19 January.
37
 
Conrad of Urach, cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina, was appointed to 
replace Bertrand as legate to Languedoc. Prior to his appointment, Conrad had 
been abbot of Citeaux. Arriving in Rome to negotiate privileges for the Cistercian 
Order, he was consecrated as cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina by Honorius on 
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6 January 1219.
38
 Conrad was appointed as legate to Languedoc probably in 
December 1219, and left the curia in early 1220, carrying out this office until 
1223, when he successfully requested that he be recalled to the curia.
39
 Honorius 
subsequently employed Conrad again as legate to Germany between 1224 and 
1226 to preach Frederick II’s crusade.40 It seems likely that Conrad was selected 
for the German legation because he was related to Frederick in four or five 
degrees through his mother.
41
 
Roman, cardinal-deacon of S. Angelo (1216-31), had no legatine 
experience before being despatched to southern France to replace Conrad. Again 
we know little of the origins and upbringing of Roman, although Maleczek 
suggests that he might have belonged to the Bonaventura family. He was created 
cardinal-deacon of S. Angelo by Innocent III in his last appointment, and 
undersigned his first papal privilege on 11 April 1216. Before his appointment as 
legate, he had acted as an auditor at the curia from 1216, and held the position of 
rector of Campagna and Marittima, an administrative division of the Papal State, 
between 1220 and 1222. The highlights of his career at the curia were his 
appointments as legate to Languedoc, first by Honorius from 1225-27, and then 
after Honorius’s death by Gregory IX from 1228-30.42 This reappointment must 
have stemmed from a favourable opinion of his first legation. 
                                                 
38
 Neininger, Konrad, 157. 
39
 Maleczek, Kardinalskolleg, 171; Pokorny, Wirksamkeit, 6-7; Zimmermann, Legation, 76-77; 
Kay, Bourges, 17. Kay demonstrates how Conrad’s return to the curia had a direct influence on 
papal decision-making in response to his counsel: Kay, Bourges, 17-18. 
40
 Neininger, Konrad, 64; Pokorny, Wirksamkeit, 18; Zimmermann, Legation, 82-83. 
41
 Neininger, Konrad, 75; Smith, ‘College’. 
42
 Maleczek, Kardinalskolleg, 189. 
237 
 
The legate despatched by Honorius to the Latin Empire, John Colonna, 
cardinal priest of S. Prassede (1217-45), began his career in the papal chapel, and 
in May 1206 was created cardinal-deacon of SS. Cosmo e Damiano by Innocent 
III, undersigning his first papal privilege on 8 June 1206. John’s sphere of activity 
was not at the curia, and he rarely operated as an auditor. Rather he worked in 
diplomacy, the administration of the patrimony of St Peter and its military 
defence. He was probably promoted on 18 February 1217 to be cardinal-priest of 
S. Prassede by Honorius, and undersigned a privilege on 4 March 1217. Soon 
after his promotion, John was made rector of Campagna by Honorius, but then 
was shortly appointed as legate to the Latin Empire, perhaps in view of his 
experience, on 21 April 1217.
43
 John’s legation lasted until 1222.44 
The most controversial legate appointed by Honorius was Pelagius. We 
are fortunate to possess relatively full documentation regarding his appointment, 
and the close study of this material provides an important case study for the 
process of appointing legates more broadly. Pelagius was a Spaniard, and given 
his connections, in all likelihood came from León.
45
 Innocent III had elevated 
Pelagius to the College of Cardinals in 1206/07 when he was made cardinal-
deacon of S. Lucia in Septasolio. Pelagius acted as an auditor hearing litigation at 
the curia, and was promoted to become cardinal-priest of S. Cecilia in 1211, and 
then again to cardinal-bishop of Albano in 1213. In the same year, Innocent III 
gave Pelagius the Latin Empire legation.
46
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 There is a sense in the historiography that Pelagius overstepped his 
authority on the Fifth Crusade, and went off the rails by exceeding his mandate. 
Van Cleve wrote that:  
 
Imperious, proud, headstrong, and dogmatic, over-conscious, perhaps, of 
the lofty position to which he had been elevated by the pope, and literal in 
his interpretation of his mandate, Pelagius did not hesitate to interfere in 
the making of military decisions instead of deferring to the judgment of 
experienced commanders.
47
 
 
Similarly, Mayer thought it a shame that Robert of Courçon, cardinal-priest of S. 
Stefano in Celiomonte, who was accompanying the crusade, died, because 
Pelagius needed someone ‘to hold him in check.’48 Nonetheless, the most 
important source for assessing whether Pelagius exceeded his authority, the 
pope’s letter of appointment to Pelagius, has not been published or analysed in 
print by scholars.
49
 For a start, there is uncertainty regarding the timing of 
Pelagius’s appointment as legate to the East. Donovan put forward a date of July 
1217.
50
 This was then followed by Honorius’s grant to Pelagius of full authority 
for the Fifth Crusade on 12 June 1218.
51
 Mansilla and Powell, on the other hand, 
have claimed June 1218 as the date of Pelagius’s appointment.52  
So which is correct? At the end of July 1217 Honorius issued a flurry of 
documents concerning Pelagius. On 24 July, Honorius granted Pelagius - as 
cardinal-bishop of Albano, rather than as legate - his requests to have his 
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possessions in Albano confirmed according to the example of Innocent III, 
holdings which included its hot baths, the hill called Sol et Luna, the episcopal 
palace, and all the appurtenances that went with the position.
53
 On the same day 
Honorius wrote a letter to a number of Italian clergy which notified them of the 
planned meeting of crusade contingents on Cyprus.
54
 This letter explicitly referred 
to Pelagius as apostolice sedis legatus. The next day, Honorius issued a letter to 
Pelagius as legate, entrusting to him the safeguarding of Raymond-Rupen, prince 
of Antioch, who had been taken under papal protection.
55
 Another letter on the 
same topic was also issued to Pelagius on 27 July.
56
  
After July Honorius issued a number of letters regarding Pelagius’s 
legation. On 31 August the pope responded to the dean and chapter of Antioch, 
who had chosen Pelagius as their new patriarch, deftly deflecting their decision on 
account of Pelagius’s desire to continue serving the Roman curia.57 That Pelagius 
was in such demand, and that he was chosen for such an important position in 
addition to his appointment as legate for the crusade, suggest that contemporaries 
held him in high regard (at least before the crusade). On 8 May 1218 Honorius 
issued another letter to Pelagius on the duties of his forthcoming legation and 
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ordered him to settle the conflict between the archbishop of Tyre and the 
Venetians.
58
  
It is clear then that Pelagius was designated as legate a latere for the Fifth 
Crusade in July 1217. He was not, however, issued with his written appointment 
mandate, which set out his authority as legate a latere, until July 1218, when the 
he was about to depart on crusade. In fact, Honorius despatched a letter to all the 
clergy in outremer and the crusade army on 18 May 1218 setting out Pelagius’s 
powers before he had even issued Pelagius with his personal written mandate.
59
 
This was presumably issued first so that the letter would arrive before the legate. 
In the letter of 18 May, Honorius employed the standard formula praising 
Pelagius as a man of ‘prudence, honesty, and knowledge’, and stated that his 
mission was to maintain harmony among the crusaders.
60
 Honorius was not 
appointing Pelagius as a military leader of the crusade, but as its spiritual leader. 
The recipients were ordered to receive Pelagius honourably and to observe his 
orders strictly. It was standard practice to quote Jeremiah 1:10 in legates’ 
appointment mandates, awarding them vague and wide-ranging powers ‘to root up 
and to pull down, to destroy and to overthrow, to build and to plant’.61 Honorius 
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also granted Pelagius special powers usually reserved to the pope so that nothing 
might impede him, although these went unexplained.
62
 
Legates were granted a general mandate by nature of their appointment, 
which could be supplemented with ‘papal reserved powers’ at the time, or later in 
response to necessity (such as Guala’s requests, below).63 The grant of special 
powers extended the general mandate to include specific privileges, which 
Innocent III considered to include the absolution of excommunicates who had 
committed violence against members of the clergy, the transfer of bishops, and the 
division or unification of bishoprics.
64
 The scope of these reserved powers was 
not set in stone, however, and thirteenth-century decretalists differed on the 
number and extent of these powers.
65
 A manageable example is supplied by 
Johannes Teutonicus (d.1245/46), who compiled a list of sixteen reserved powers 
in his gloss to the canon law collection Compilatio tertia.
66
 By contrast, 
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Hostiensis (d.1271) identified no fewer than sixty-three papal reserved powers.
67
 
These differences are testament to Vincent’s statement that ‘there was no such 
thing as a typical legation ... the office of legate was subject to great flexibility, 
governed as much by individual circumstances as by any general set of rules.’68 
The special powers granted to Pelagius were by no means unique to him; indeed, 
Honorius had also granted them to other legates, such as John Colonna.
69
 Pelagius 
thus had the full backing of the pope and was not to be hindered in any way when 
executing his office as legate. 
Finally, on 12 June 1218, Honorius issued his written appointment 
mandate to Pelagius. The terms of the appointment matched the previous month’s 
letter to those in outremer. Honorius awarded his full powers as legate a latere for 
his mission in ultramarinum provinciam, as well as his special reserved 
privileges, and the pope counselled him to use these powers prudently and with 
discretion.
70
 It is clear that Pelagius was charged by the pope to act as his true 
plenipotentiary, with almost no limits on his actions. This makes it difficult to 
reconcile Van Cleve and Mayer’s claims about Pelagius’s abuse of his power with 
the appointment letter itself, which set no written limits on his powers, although 
disgruntled parties reserved the right to appeal to the pope about a legate’s 
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decisions.
71
 Before Pelagius’s departure Honorius continued to add to his duties in 
a number of letters issued to him throughout the rest of July; his mission was not 
merely a crusade legation. On 12 July the pope sent a letter to his legate, and 
copies to the masters of the Hospitallers and Templars, ordering them to defend 
the kingdom of Cyprus and the sons of the recently deceased King Hugh (1205-
18).
72
  Honorius was concerned that turbulence in the kingdom would prove 
damaging to the Fifth Crusade. The next day Honorius also issued Pelagius a 
letter charging him to settle an episcopal dispute in Nicosia.
73
 
By the mid-thirteenth century three different classifications of legate 
existed, which contemporary canon lawyers defined thus: the most powerful was 
the legatus a latere, a plenipotentiary dispatched on high profile missions with 
full powers to act on the pope’s behalf; the legatus missus or nuncius apostolicus 
was entrusted with fewer powers, and performed the more limited functions of a 
messenger rather than a negotiator; and finally, the legatus natus was an honorific 
post awarded to a particular archbishopric that lacked the powers enjoyed by 
legates despatched from the curia.
74
 In addition to the office of legate, popes also 
employed judges-delegate in response to the increase in legal cases being 
presented at the curia.
75
 These categories were not fixed by Honorius’s 
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pontificate, but they provide a useful guide to the representatives - mostly legates 
a latere - that he employed to handle crusade affairs.
76
 Although there were 
clearly different levels of power awarded to legates a latere, such as the grant of 
papal reserved powers, there appears to have been a degree of flexibility in what 
limits were placed on the legates’ powers. Thirteenth-century canon lawyers 
skirted around any restrictions on legates’ powers by awarding extensive authority 
to all legates a latere, regardless of whether they only possessed a general 
mandate or had been endowed with extraordinary powers.
77
 
 
Peacemaking and the Crusade 
Honorius employed legates in the West in a number of roles to support the Holy 
Land crusade. In addition to acting as tax collectors (see chapter six), legates 
functioned as preachers and recruiters. Honorius relied upon legates, along with 
the local Church hierarchy and charismatic individual preachers such as Oliver of 
Paderborn, as the main channels through which to disseminate crusade 
‘propaganda’.78 It is the role of peacemaker, however, in itself closely tied to 
recruitment, which emerges most prominently from Honorius’s registers. This 
section examines legates as peacemakers in northern Italy and England - the most 
important flashpoints of conflict during Honorius’s pontificate.  
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The warring communes of northern Italy naturally came to the attention of 
the pope due to their geographical proximity, and their great - but wasted - 
potential to assist in the recovery of the Holy Land, especially the wealthy port 
cities of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice, which had traditionally been relied on to 
transport crusade armies by sea and to assist in naval warfare in the Holy Land.
79
 
Hugolino was appointed to two legations in northern Italy, between 1217 and 
1219, and again in 1221.
80
 Hugolino’s 1221 legation to the communes is 
extremely important for the study of papal government because he kept a register 
which sheds light on the minutiae of his actions that went unrecorded in 
Honorius’s own registers.81 Hugolino’s register allows us to extend our 
knowledge of his role a stage further, from the level of the papacy’s interaction 
with its legate, to that of the legate’s interaction with his province. The existence 
of Hugolino’s register allowed Thouzellier to reconstruct the legate’s very full 
itinerary for 1221.
82
 Hugolino’s efforts to pacify the fractured political states of 
northern Italy were vast, and he rarely stayed put in the same location, visiting a 
different commune to conduct negotiations almost every few days.
83
  
 Hugolino’s legation and his register provide crucial evidence to support 
the argument for responsive papal government that underpins this thesis. His 
register proves that papal peace efforts in the West were not just a papal initiative 
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that derived from a one-way level of interest of the pope attempting to impose 
peace on the unruly secular powers, with little effort made in return. In northern 
Italy at least, more of a two-way system can be discerned whereby the communes 
actively co-operated with the papal legate. Hugolino’s efforts were welcomed by 
many podestà who were suffering as a result of warfare with their rivals or owing 
to civil strife within their own cities.  
A letter sent to Hugolino from Redolfus, the podestà of Cremona, in April 
1221, painted a bleak picture of local warfare, and sought Hugolino’s assistance in 
sowing the seeds of peace (‘pacis semina seminare’) between Piacenza and the 
other Lombards.
84
 Hugolino’s register also records a letter dated 20 April 1221 
from the podestà of Piacenza, Berlengerius Mastagius, in which he vowed to 
abide by the mandates of Hugolino for peace between the knights and the people 
of Piacenza, and promised to obey all of Hugolino’s orders.85 Honorius’s legate 
was certainly in demand. Other evidence that the communes actively co-operated 
with the legate is provided by letters in Hugolino’s register which show that not 
only did he travel out to meet with the podestà of various cities, but that the 
communes actually despatched ambassadors who travelled to meet with him. A 
letter of 28 July 1221 from the commune of Piacenza thanked Hugolino for all his 
exertions to bring peace and security to the city, and revealed that they sent to him 
Arnaldo Stricto and Rufino de Porta as representatives of the milites of Piacenza, 
and Gandulfo de Fontana and Alberto Sicamilice as ambassadors for the populi.
86
 
                                                 
84
 Registri, ed. Levi, 15-16. 
85
 Ibid., 16-17. 
86
 Ibid., 52-53. 
247 
 
During both legations, Hugolino’s peacemaking and recruitment met with 
good results. He enjoyed early success at Lucca in 1217, where the commune 
agreed to send a contingent of soldiers on the Fifth Crusade, supported financially 
by a tax of a fortieth raised by the commune.
87
 This successful pattern of 
peacemaking followed by procurement of a contingent of crusaders whose costs 
were paid by the commune became typical of Hugolino’s legation. His register for 
the year 1221 contains many letters sent to him from north Italian communes 
confirming just such agreements. To take one example, on 13 May 1221, in 
response to Hugolino’s request, Laurentius de Ricardo and Carbo Superaqua, 
messengers and ambassadors for the commune of Lodi, promised to send four 
fully-equipped knights to the Holy Land in the next passage for the duration of 
one year.
88
  
Hugolino’s tour of northern Italy encompassed all aspects of the papacy’s 
organisation of the crusade, being involved in preaching and tax collecting as 
well. Hugolino had been entrusted with the collection of the tax of a twentieth 
levied on Church income at the Lateran IV to help fund the Fifth Crusade, 
something which the pope made mention of in a letter of 20 June 1221 sent to 
Pelagius.
89
 Honorius played a crucial role in the organisation of the crusade by 
passing on information throughout Christendom and keeping legates informed of 
their counterparts’ activities. Making peace in northern Italy also had a knock-on 
effect for Honorius’s other concerns relating to the Fifth Crusade. Abulafia has 
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pointed out that the pacification of northern Italy smoothed Frederick II’s 
coronation journey through territories that were fiercely opposed to him and had 
supported the rival candidate Otto IV during the struggle for the imperial throne.
90
 
The problem presented by warring communes raised its head once again in 1226 
when the Lombard rebellion delayed Frederick’s long-promised crusade.91 
The civil war in England also threatened the Fifth Crusade by preventing 
English crusade contingents from departing and it endangered any future 
prospects of Henry III fulfilling his vow. Honorius employed two legates in 
England whose successes as peacemakers rivalled those of Hugolino. Since 1215 
England had suffered from a civil war between the king and the rebel barons, a 
conflict sparked in the reign of King John and carried over into the reign of his 
young successor, Henry III, who took to the English throne aged only nine. The 
protection of this young and vulnerable papal ward became an instant priority for 
Honorius, who had also supported his father before him against the rebels. The 
barons’ rebellion drew the French royal house of Capet into the war when Prince 
Louis of France invaded England at the barons’ behest in May 1216.92 This did 
little to alleviate Anglo-French tensions that centred on the rump of the Angevin 
Empire remaining on the continent - another source of hostility that the pope 
attempted to regulate.  
During the barons’ rebellion in England the papacy tried to appear neutral, 
although examination of Honorius’s correspondence reveals that he naturally 
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favoured the royalists, as Innocent had done. Nevertheless, it was crucial for 
Guala and Pandulf’s roles as mediators to give the impression of neutrality. This 
was especially important because some of the rebel barons were also signed with 
the cross, and Honorius hoped to persuade them to fulfil their vows alongside 
royalist crusaders, something which would both help to stabilise the kingdom by 
exporting their violence abroad and also bolster the crusade in one fell swoop. It 
was in this light that Honorius wrote to Pandulf on 30 May 1220, praising him for 
his discreet and prudent execution of his office, and reassuring him that by 
continuing to act in such a way he would overcome the malice of his enemies.
93
  
Non-papal sources corroborate the importance of executing the legatine 
office with neutrality and tact. The patent rolls of Henry III for 1220 record 
Pandulf’s important role as a mediator between the king and his barons.94 In the 
contemporary royalist political song The Taking of Lincoln, Guala found extreme 
praise as the ‘star of right’ and the ‘mirror of reason’, although this was perhaps 
unsurprising given that he found himself on the winning side.
95
 Whether the 
barons felt the same about the papal legates is a different matter. 
                                                 
93
 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 186v: ‘Quanto de persona tua gerimus fiduciam pleniorem scribendo tibi super 
diversis articulis iuxta quod ex parte tua frequenter a nobis a clericis tuis et nuntiis postulatur, tanto 
magis est tibi circumspectio necessaria ut in te videamur cum omnia prudenter feceris quievisse, 
nec aliquis cum multi tibi sint emuli, undique factis tuis ponentes insidias contra nos de te habeat 
materiam obloquendi. Specialiter autem volumus, et per apostolica tibi scripta mandamus quatinus 
super castris regiis et facto crucesignatorum et baronum Anglie cum ea prudentia et maturitate 
procedas, ut discretio tua tuorum superet malitiam emulorum, nec de te nobis improperari 
contingat, nec eisdem baronibus suscitandi aliquam turbatione in regno tempore tuo materia 
ministretur, ex qua quantumque levis existeret grave posset karissimo in Christo filio nostro regi 
Anglorum illustri et eidem regno periculum provenire.’; Pressutti 2464. 
94
 Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office, 2 vols (London, 
1901-03), i, 266. 
95
 The Political Songs of England from the Reign of John to that of Edward II, ed. and trans. 
Thomas Wright (London, 1839), 23; Charters, ed. Vincent, p. xlv. 
250 
 
Guala played a pivotal role in bringing peace to England and used his full 
complement of ecclesiastical powers to change the course of the war. When 
Prince Louis left his troops in England in 1217 to gather support in France, Guala 
used the opportunity to turn many of the rebellious nobles to the king’s cause.96 
Evidence from the ‘Barnwell Chronicle’ shows that Guala served as a ‘rallying 
point’ for those who supported Henry: after wielding his powers of 
excommunication and interdict the English clergy flocked to support the legate.
97
 
Throughout the months of war with Louis’s invading force, Guala used his 
powers as legate to support the king’s cause and even signed Henry’s supporters 
with the cross and offered them remission of sins in return for their service.
98
 
Honorius was acutely aware of the importance of making the kingdom of 
England secure, and thus temporarily subjugated the needs of the Holy Land to 
those of the English king. On 17 January 1217, presumably in response to English 
requests, Honorius wrote to Guala allowing him to suspend the crusade vows of 
knights who were needed in England by Henry until the kingdom was in a more 
stable state.
99
 This letter was followed by another on 27 March 1219, this time 
sent to Pandulf, in which Honorius released English knights from their vows at the 
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petition of the king because of their great utility to him. Pandulf was ordered to 
find a suitable alternative way for them to redeem their vows.
100
  
These two letters demonstrate Honorius’s ability to respond to the 
immediate needs of a country under threat from rebellion and invasion, whilst at 
the same time trying to support the Fifth Crusade. Through the pacification of 
England, English knights were able to depart on the Fifth Crusade where they 
played a noteworthy role. As Powell has noted, that the English contribution to 
the Fifth Crusade contained contingents led both by royalists and rebel barons was 
testament to the ability of the legates in England. Indeed, the force led by the 
staunch royalist Earl Ranulf of Chester could even count the prominent rebel 
Robert Fitz-Walter among its members.
101
 Peace between England and France 
would also allow the future Louis VIII to turn his attention towards the 
Albigensian Crusade. 
 After the victory of royalist forces at the battle of Lincoln on 20 May 1217 
and the naval battle of Sandwich on 24 August, Louis had made peace with the 
king and his supporters near Kingston on 12 September, a treaty which was 
ratified by a larger assembly at Lambeth on 20 September.
102
 It is clear that Guala 
played a vital role in the peace negotiations with Louis. Once the prince had 
renounced his claim to the English throne, Guala released Louis from the sentence 
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of excommunication.
103
 Honorius upheld his legate’s decision in a letter addressed 
to Louis on 13 January 1218 that confirmed the peace made by Guala.
104
 
 Following Louis’s absolution, Guala had to tend to the wounds of a 
country torn asunder by civil war if there was to be any hope of English 
participation in the Fifth Crusade, reconciling noblemen who had previously 
fought one another, and uniting them under the young king. Guala had excluded 
the clergy from the terms of the Treaty of Kingston, and he meted out different 
levels of punishment to ecclesiastical and lay rebels.
105
 Guala treated the latter 
with leniency, and pardoned offenders, but he punished disloyal churchmen 
severely, and deprived some from office.
106
 The variation in punishment owed 
partially to the greater power that the legate could wield over the clergy, but 
primarily reflected the more heinous nature of their crime. They had not only 
rebelled against their anointed king, but had also disobeyed the clear and direct 
wishes of the pope and his legate. 
Although Guala did not involve himself in the routine administration of 
the kingdom after the war, he did have a hand in important government 
decisions.
107
 Guala had built up a strong relationship with the appointed regent, 
William the Marshal (c.1147-1219), during the war, and continued to 
communicate with him on matters of state right up to the end of his legation, as 
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evidenced by a letter of 2 September 1218 discussing Louis’s detention of 
hostages in violation of the truce and advising William on how he should 
respond.
108
   
 When Guala resigned his legation in September 1218, Pandulf was quickly 
appointed as the legate to England by Honorius on 12 September.
109
 Pandulf’s 
legation is not so well documented as Guala’s, although it is clear that he played a 
premier position in the government of England after the death of William the 
Marshal, when he formed part of a triumvirate with the justiciar, Hubert de Burgh, 
and the bishop of Winchester.
110
 As Guala’s successor, Pandulf was required to 
make a different type of peace to that made by Guala in the immediate aftermath 
of the war, and on beginning his legation he reversed some of his predecessor’s 
more stringent punishments on the clergy, releasing thirteen clerics from prison 
and restoring others to office.
111
 The dissimilarity between Guala and Pandulf’s 
actions are evidence of the free rein that was given to legates a latere to make 
their own decisions. Whilst in communication with the pope during their 
missions, legates were allowed remarkable independence. They did not simply 
execute papal orders, but in England at least, played integral roles in royal 
decision-making as largely autonomous agents. 
 Guala and Pandulf both conducted legations that were extremely difficult 
but also successful, something that was recognised by Matthew Paris in the 1250s, 
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who applauded Pandulf’s execution of his office.112 High praise indeed from a 
chronicler who according to Carpenter was ‘not in general a friend of papal 
legates’.113 The positive write-up that Guala and Pandulf received from English 
commentators was a relatively rare occurrence for legates (see below). Vincent 
has pointed out, however, that Guala did attract some criticism for despoiling 
English clergy of their churches, supposedly without cause, and awarding them to 
his household.
114
 Overall though, the roles performed by Guala and Pandulf do 
not appear to have been thought of as unwanted papal interference, but vital 
mediation that was positively welcomed. 
When Pandulf resigned his legation on 26 July 1221, Honorius did not 
rush to replace him. The foundations of a stable kingdom had been laid by 
summer 1221.
115
 With peace established, on 27 April 1223, and with Henry 
having reached the age of fifteen (and having made the transition in Roman law 
from pueritia to adolescentia at fourteen), Honorius felt able to exhort him to 
participate in the imperial crusade (see chapter three).
116
 The pacification of 
England created a benefit for the Fifth Crusade in the form of enabling English 
nobles to leave the country, and held out the prospect of future involvement in 
crusading; that said, Honorius did not expect the young Henry to crusade whilst 
still in his minority. 
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Pelagius on the Fifth Crusade 
Having established above that Pelagius’s legatine mandate was essentially 
limitless, one must move on to analyse the execution of his office on the Fifth 
Crusade, and the reactions of Honorius and other contemporaries to his actions. It 
is not the intention here to refight the course of the Fifth Crusade, and clashes of 
its principal actors, in print yet again.
117
 There is now a general consensus in the 
historiography that Pelagius did not take total control over the direction of the 
Fifth Crusade as soon as he arrived in Egypt in the autumn passage of 1218, but 
rather gradually assumed more influence as the crusade wore on, on account of his 
stable presence in a constantly changing leadership council, his access to the papal 
crusade tax (see chapter six), Frederick II’s absence, John of Brienne’s disputed 
role as leader, and Honorius’s full support.118 Pelagius and John of Brienne do 
seem to have clashed with each other, but they also collaborated successfully 
during the early stages of the crusade.
119
  
As Powell has noted, although Pelagius and John found themselves on 
opposing sides over Sultan al-Kamil’s truce offer in autumn 1219, it was not until 
after the capture of Damietta in November that they publicly fell out over control 
of the city. Pelagius followed Honorius’s orders that gave him power over the 
division of conquered territories and acted to protect the interests of Frederick II, 
while John demanded that the city be joined to the kingdom of Jerusalem. This 
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dispute was settled when Pelagius compromised and awarded John control of 
Damietta until Frederick’s arrival.120 
Regardless of commonplace statements in much of the historiography that 
Pelagius was an arrogant and proud individual - whether or not this is given as the 
main reason for the crusade’s failure - the legate’s personality cannot be discerned 
objectively within the sources. Scholars have attributed too much importance to 
the narrative sources composed after the crusade’s failure which display the clear 
agenda to find a scapegoat in the legate. Not enough weight has been given to the 
evidence committed to parchment before August 1221.  
The Chronique d’Ernoul, composed in the West in the late 1220s, has 
often been quoted on the ominous arrival of Pelagius in Egypt.
121
 Ernoul wrote 
that when the cardinals Robert of Courçon and Pelagius arrived, it was a great 
misfortune for the crusade that the former died and the latter survived.
122
 Alberic 
of Trois Fontaines, writing between 1227 and 1241, judged Pelagius to have 
pushed for the final disastrous advance into the Egyptian interior in summer 1221 
against the advice of John, and criticised him for gambling on capturing more 
cities when he should have been concentrating on holding Damietta.
123
 Burchard 
of Biberach (d. after 1231) recorded that it was Pelagius’s arrogance that led to 
failure.
124
 It is possible to find some favourable mentions of Pelagius in chronicle 
sources, such as Tolosanus of Faenza (d.1226), who refers to him as legatus 
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dignissimus, and Lucas of Tui (d.1250), a fellow countryman of the Spaniard, who 
calls him ‘noble and prudent’ and portrays him as the appointed leader who was 
successful in capturing Damietta and its countless treasures.
125
 This evidence, 
composed in the West after the failure of the Fifth Crusade, should not be 
dismissed out hand, but it must be treated with caution given the distance of the 
authors from events. 
While scholars have been quick to accept the later western sources, the 
favourable reports of Pelagius’s actions on the Fifth Crusade given in eyewitness 
accounts - admittedly by curialists - have been correspondingly underappreciated. 
Oliver of Paderborn wrote that when Damietta fell to the crusade, Pelagius was 
skilfully and vigilantly performing his role as legate.
126
 As Pelagius’s secretary on 
the crusade, it was certainly in Oliver’s best interest to link the legate’s role with 
the fall of Damietta.
127
 Nevertheless, Pelagius’s pivotal role in the capture of 
Damietta is corroborated by Jacques de Vitry’s letters back to the West.  
In March 1220, Jacques wrote a letter to the pope that informed him of 
Pelagius’s involvement in the siege. Proving himself ‘wary, prudent, vigilant, and 
careful’ in spurring on the army to action, Pelagius led a group of soldiers who 
burned down the gate of Damietta’s outer wall and then the gate of the inner 
wall.
128
 According to Jacques, glory was thus delivered to the Roman Church and 
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its legate.
129
 In another letter which Jacques had composed in two stages, on 14 
and 22 September 1218, he also wrote to Honorius that the army had been pleased 
to receive Pelagius, whose arrival they had been eagerly awaiting.
130
 Pelagius’s 
arrival was thus perhaps not as ominous as Ernoul made out. 
A weakness in the historiography on the Fifth Crusade is that the treatment 
of Pelagius by chroniclers has not been compared to that concerning other papal 
legates. It has largely escaped historians of the crusades that Pelagius was far from 
unique in attracting fierce criticism - in fact it was somewhat par for the course for 
a papal legate. Legates proved irresistible targets for chroniclers who loathed the 
representatives of papal authority sent to root up local ecclesiastical abuses, 
collect taxes, and settle disputes - there was after all, always likely to be at least 
one dissatisfied party in every dispute that was brought before a papal legate.
131
 
Even Robert of Courçon, beloved of Ernoul and the French crusade contingent, 
had executed one of the most controversial legations of the early thirteenth 
century in France a few years before.
132
 
Honorius’s letters provide no evidence that Pelagius was discharging his 
office in a way that was anything but satisfactory to the pope. Maleczek has 
pointed out that Honorius never had a bad word to say about Pelagius.
133
 The 
pope’s letters demonstrate that despite being in close contact with the crusade 
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army, and especially Pelagius, Honorius was content to let the legate make his 
own decisions, like the pope’s other representatives. Although the most important 
sources written during the crusade all present the views of curialists, if used 
critically, a more accurate depiction of Pelagius’s role on the Fifth Crusade can be 
reconstructed. 
Honorius was obviously confident in the abilities of Pelagius, and him 
alone, to act as his representative. Despite the comment of Ernoul lamenting 
Robert of Courçon’s death - and Mayer’s repetition of it - the pope would never 
have allowed Robert to eclipse Pelagius if he had survived. It had not even been 
the pope’s idea to send Robert with the army. In a letter of 28 July 1218 to the 
French crusade contingent assembling at Genoa, Honorius granted their petition 
for Robert, who had recruited many of them, to accompany the army, but put it 
beyond doubt that Pelagius was the undisputed legate over the entire crusade, 
whom they were ordered to obey.
134
 The pope did not want partisanship to 
weaken the army. Honorius must have feared that if he did not spell out the 
distinct roles of Robert and Pelagius, his approval of the petition would have been 
taken as tacit approval for the French contingent to treat Robert as their own 
exclusive papal representative. In the end, Robert’s untimely death soon after he 
arrived in Egypt rendered the question a moot point, and, given the French 
                                                 
134
 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 1r: ‘Ad hec siquidem vobis assidue suggerenda misimus vobis ad petitionem 
tuam fili comes Nivernensi dilectum filium nostrum Robertum tituli sancti Stephani in Celio 
Monte presbyterum cardinalem, ut sicut vir potens in opere ac sermone, proponat vobis secundum 
datam sibi a Deo prudentiam verbum Dei, cui legationis officium idcirco dare nequivimus, quia 
dudum ante quam ad nos pervenisset dicta petitio, de consilio fratrum nostrorum venerabili fratri 
nostro Albanensi episcopo plenam legationem super totum crucesignatorum exercitum dederamus. 
Vos igitur predicationis verbum devote ac humiliter recipientes a cardinali predicto, cui predicandi 
gratiam contulit bonorum omnium distributor in hiis que spectant ad legationis officium recurratis 
cum opus fuerit ad episcopum antedictum, cui tamquam unico in partibus illis apostolice sedis 
legato, tam a vobis, quia a crucesignatis aliis, volumus et precipimus humiliter obediri.’; Pressutti 
1558. 
260 
 
contingent’s loyalty to Robert, probably circumvented the development of any 
further divisions in the already fragmented leadership. 
It is clear that to Honorius, Pelagius’s role never changed from being that 
of a peacemaker in the army, charged with keeping it as united as possible so as to 
perform as an effective fighting force. His letters to the legate never questioned 
his judgement, and on only one occasion did the pope send orders to Pelagius that 
sought to direct the course of the crusade through his representative. On 2 January 
1221, with Frederick II still delaying in the West, Honorius instructed Pelagius to 
investigate if a potential truce could be struck with the Muslims that would be to 
the advantage of the Holy Land, and to then report back.
135
 Pelagius dutifully 
wrote back with the terms of the truce, and in Honorius’s reply of 20 June 1221, 
the pope stated that they were both in agreement that the terms were 
unsatisfactory and that the army should await Frederick’s arrival.136 Aside from 
this occasion, Honorius trusted in Pelagius to direct his own actions according to 
his written mandate of June 1218. 
Honorius was not imposing a policy for the crusade’s direction from the 
curia - Pelagius was largely a free agent. If anything, more influence can be 
detected in the other direction. Pelagius’s letters back to the curia caused the pope 
to take action on his behalf. For instance, on 28 July 1220, having received a letter 
from Pelagius that requested more support against al-Kamil, Honorius wrote to 
the papal chaplain and penitentiary, Conrad, scholasticus of Mainz, ordering him 
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to preach the crusade incessantly, and to organise preaching throughout Germany, 
so as to provide Pelagius with the reinforcements he had requested.
137
 
Most of the pope’s letters to Pelagius were designed to bolster his faith 
and enthusiasm in the enterprise so as to keep the crusade host together until 
Frederick’s arrival. When word of the capture of Damietta in November 1219 
reached Honorius, he replied in a letter issued to the army on 24 February 1220. 
This letter congratulated the crusaders on their triumph and urged them to 
continue following Pelagius whose leadership Honorius aligned with the biblical 
Joshua.
138
 Honorius went on to award Pelagius temporal and spiritual powers so 
as to prevent dissension and urged the crusaders to remain united in their 
undertaking.
139
 This award of temporal power was not a grant of full military 
control over the crusade as has been traditionally argued.
140
 Powell convincingly 
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demonstrated that the grant referred to the division of spoils and conquered 
territories.
141
 
The exact nature of Pelagius’s command - whether he was a spiritual or 
military leader - on the crusade has proven a battleground for historians. 
Runciman thought that Pelagius proved himself a blundering general.
142
 
According to Van Cleve however, Pelagius was forced to make military decisions 
in order to keep the army united.
143
 Mayer criticised Pelagius for playing an active 
part in the crusade’s military affairs, despite the contraventions of canon law.144 
Powell has stated that Pelagius was never intended to be the crusade’s military 
leader, and that his role was to attend to the spiritual needs of the army.
145
  
Pelagius seems to have played his most important role as the army’s 
spiritual leader. After the crusader camp was devastated by a storm in November 
1218 for instance, Pelagius ordered three days of fasting, prayers and processions 
before Damietta.
146
 Soon afterwards the other leaders sought the legate’s help and 
intercession with God. Powell stresses that the other leaders approached him as 
the expedition’s spiritual, rather than military, figurehead, and that it was not an 
attempt by the legate to seize military control.
147
 According to Powell, when 
Pelagius assumed a more prominent role during the winter of 1218-19, he 
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‘continued to work within the framework of the collective leadership that 
prevailed in the army.’148 
In the opinion of Oliver of Paderborn, after the capture of Damietta the 
army fell into sinful idleness.
149
 Pelagius repeatedly pushed for action to try and 
keep the army unified and to prevent the host disintegrating through inactivity. 
This seemingly hawkish behaviour was perfectly in line with his orders from 
Honorius - Pelagius was merely fulfilling his original mandate. It has also been 
pointed out by Powell that the legate’s calls to attack were probably made in 
cooperation with the other leaders beforehand, and that he was acting on their 
behalf.
150
 Pelagius was not, and could not be, the crusade’s sole leader. Indeed, 
Oliver of Paderborn candidly records that many of the crusaders, to their shame, 
refused to follow the legate’s exhortations. After the capture of Damietta, Pelagius 
assembled the other leaders and urged them to attack the sultan’s camp, but was 
ignored because the knights were against his proposal.
151
 Pelagius then pitched his 
tents away from the main camp in an attempt to inspire others in favour of action 
to join him. This was also a failure, even among mercenaries in his pay.
152
 The 
legate therefore did not have unchallenged command over the crusade; in fact he 
appears somewhat impotent at this point. 
Pelagius’s actions throughout 1220 reflected the wishes of the pope, who 
wrote to his legate to keep him updated on Frederick II’s faltering progress 
towards departing and instructed him to strive to keep the army together. On 24 
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July 1220, Honorius wrote to Pelagius to enumerate all the money sent to him 
from the crusade tax, and urged the legate not to give up on his duties, since 
Frederick was expected to arrive soon. He reassured Pelagius that he would 
succeed in achieving the ‘desired prize’.153 Once Frederick had been crowned on 
22 November 1220, Honorius wrote to his legate again on 15 December to inform 
him of the coronation and Frederick’s plan to crusade in person in August 1221. 
The pope ordered Pelagius to take courage in the Lord and in his service, and to 
reinforce the hearts of the crusaders, who would, God willing, receive the longed 
for succour.
154
 
While Pelagius’s role as peacemaker and spiritual leader was most 
important, he was involved to some extent in the military affairs of the crusade, as 
evidenced by Jacques de Vitry’s letter above. The legate also funded assaults with 
money sent to him from the crusade tax, such as that proposed by the Pisans, 
Genoese, and Venetians in 1219.
155
 During another assault in 1219, Pelagius and 
the patriarch of Jerusalem (who was carrying the Cross) urged retreating crusaders 
unsuccessfully to stand and fight.
156
 Pelagius was clearly often close to the action. 
There is an important distinction to make, however, between the crusade’s 
military direction and actually picking up a sword to join in. Timothy Reuter has 
demonstrated that accusations of bishops being more familiar in wielding the 
temporal sword than the spiritual one had been common since the twelfth 
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century.
157
 Reuter cites Caesarius of Heisterbach who noted in the 1220s how 
experienced German bishops were in personally waging war.
158
 Although frowned 
upon, the direction of soldiers by the episcopate was not unheard of. Reuter 
wonders, nevertheless, how much of this was unique to Germany, where German 
bishops did more to support their lay rulers militarily than their French and 
English counterparts.
159
 What matters for our purpose here though is to note that 
while to modern observers there seems little difference between commanding 
soldiers and actually spilling blood with them, ‘this distinction was undoubtedly 
felt in the twelfth century.’160 Therefore, provided he was not actually doing the 
fighting himself, Pelagius probably saw no tension between his roles as cardinal-
bishop and crusade leader. 
In addition to his crusade duties, during 1218-21 Pelagius was also 
carrying out the other aspects of his legation in ultramarinum provinciam. The 
prince of Antioch, Raymond-Rupen, had been urgently petitioning Honorius for 
protection and assistance in taking the throne of Armenia. Raymond-Rupen 
certainly needed protection from his own uncle, Bohemond, count of Tripoli, who 
had expelled Raymond-Rupen from Antioch, and for which Pelagius 
excommunicated him for the first time.
161
 Honorius had previously confirmed the 
claim of John of Brienne through his wife and son, but when they both died, the 
pope recognised Raymond-Rupen’s.162 The pope acquiesced to Raymond-Rupen’s 
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petitions, and in response sent orders on to his legate. On 16 December 1220, after 
receiving Raymond-Rupen’s messengers and letters, Honorius entrusted the 
business of his coronation to Pelagius.
163
 When the Antiochene situation escalated 
and Raymond-Rupen was imprisoned by the regent of Armenia, Constantine of 
Lampron, the pope wrote to Pelagius on 9 July 1221 to explain the gravity of the 
situation, and in a rhetorical flourish that he must have regretted a few months 
later, cautioned Pelagius to deal with Bohemond carefully, since the loss of 
Antioch would be worse than the loss of many Damiettas.
164
 After Bohemond 
seized possessions of the Hospitaller Order and had two of their knights brutally 
murdered, Pelagius excommunicated him for a second time (which Frederick II 
later appealed unsuccessfully to have overturned - see chapter three).
165
 
Pelagius had also been tidying up affairs in the kingdom of Cyprus whilst 
on crusade. On 17 December 1221 Honorius issued a letter to Alice, queen of 
Cyprus (d.1246), which confirmed the agreement regarding the conflict between 
the Latin and Greek clergy on the island, made between her and the Cypriot 
nobility on one side, and Eustorge, archbishop of Nicosia, and his suffragan 
                                                 
163
 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 52r: ‘unde cum idem nobilis nobis per suos nuntios et litteras supplicarit 
instanter, ut quia regno Armenie ad ipsum de iure spectante coronari debet in regem, sibi per te 
inunctionis munus faceremus impendi, nos de tam arduo negotio et tam a nobis remoto plenam 
habere certitudinem nequeuntes, et attendentes quod huius rei circumstantias potes plenius 
indagare, tam super hiis que ad inunctionem et coronationem eius pertinent, quam super principatu 
Antiochie ac dicto regno Armenie et aliis que causam eius respiciunt tibi committimus plenarie 
vices nostras.’; Pressutti 2876. 
164
 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 151r: ‘Quare fraternitati tue monemus per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes 
quatinus cum eo moderamine super facto nobilis viri comitis Tripolitani procedas, ut nichil sinistri 
de eadem civitate Christianitati contingat, in cuius ammissione sicut dicitur plus dampni et 
ignominie sustineret populus Christianus quam si plures perderet Damiatas. Super facto quoque 
ipsius comitis ideo est maxime subsistendum quia de nobili viro Rupino quod captus fuerit minime 
dubitatur, et nunc publice fertur eundem carnis debitum exsolvisse.’; Pressutti 3495; Hamilton, 
Latin, 225. 
165
 Runciman, Crusades, 172; Donovan, Pelagius, 100 and n. 100. 
267 
 
bishops on the other.
166
 The letter mentioned Pelagius’s role in putting his own 
confirmation to the agreement whilst on crusade, which had taken place at 
Damietta on 16 May 1221.  
After the failure of the Fifth Crusade in August 1221, Pelagius remained in 
the East as legate. Raymond-Rupen was killed in 1221, but the affair rumbled on 
into the next year.
167
 On 23 March 1222, Honorius wrote to his legate again, 
explaining that Raymond-Rupen’s mother had sought papal protection. Pelagius 
was entrusted with defending her and Raymond-Rupen’s daughters and 
territory.
168
 Pelagius finally left the East when he was invited by Honorius on 25 
April 1222 to attend the papal-imperial colloquium at Verona scheduled for 11 
November 1222.
169
 Pelagius was picked up in one of the four galleys that 
Frederick sent to Acre to collect Pelagius and John of Brienne in September 1222, 
but stopped at Cyprus on the passage to the West.
170
  As Donovan noted, despite 
the failure of the Fifth Crusade, Pelagius’s authority was still respected in his 
more normal duties as legate.
171
 Proof perhaps that Pelagius was not a failure as a 
legate, something bolstered by the fact that Honorius did not end his legation after 
the crusade. After Pelagius’s return to the West, Honorius employed him in his 
old role of auditor at the curia for the rest of his reign.
172
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Conclusions 
Honorius’s deployment of legates was an integral part of the pope’s efforts to 
support the Holy Land crusade, and was, for the most part, successful. The award 
of plenary powers permitted them to pursue their own approach to their appointed 
mission, and though in close contact with the curia, they seem to have acted with 
a great degree of autonomy. This raises the question of how Honorius’s despatch 
of legates fits into the model of responsive papal government. They were often 
despatched in response to events in the localities of Christendom, such as the civil 
war in England, although obviously their appointment was done at the pope’s 
behest. The decisions that the pope made were issued in response to reports sent 
back by his legates, which appear to have had a powerful influence on the issue of 
papal letters, such as Honorius’s actions to support Pelagius’s requests for 
reinforcements on the crusade.
173
 The pope’s decisions varied according to the 
changing situations in the provinciae of his representatives, and aside from the 
policy to make peace in the West and recruit more crusaders, it is clear that 
Honorius was not implementing a preconceived programme of action through his 
legates; something which draws into question I.S. Robinson’s statement that they 
were the ‘foremost executors of papal policy.’174 
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Chapter 6 
The Tax of a Twentieth 
 
The 1215 tax on ecclesiastical income has much in common with modern 
taxation: despite being dogged by loopholes and fraud and resented by those who 
had to pay, it proved broadly effective in generating large amounts of money. A 
systematic study of Innocent III’s three-year tax of a twentieth upon ecclesiastical 
income to support the Fifth Crusade has yet to be attempted by scholars, 
especially concerning the mechanics of its operation. The present chapter 
endeavours to fill this historiographical gap, and also to extend further the 
investigation of the responsive nature of papal government, and to question 
statements by historians that Honorius III’s tax collection followed a linear 
progression from devolved local collection to centralisation - an innovation that 
set the precedent for his predecessors.
1
  
The imposition of the twentieth and its collection arguably represent one 
of the few examples of policy-making formulated at the curia, but one that was 
still administered in a largely responsive fashion. There was no clear-cut case of 
advancing financial centralisation under Honorius. Rather centralised collection 
methods were employed alongside devolved local tax collection and distribution 
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that was driven by petitioning. This chapter first addresses the announcement of 
the tax in 1215, then local and centralised collection and transfer, the issue of 
diversion, followed by exemption, fraud and theft; the final section examines 
spending of the tax on the Fifth Crusade, and how it was collected after 1221. 
This chapter seeks to establish how Honorius supported the Fifth Crusade 
financially through his administration of the 1215 twentieth tax, based on the 
systematic analysis of evidence from the papal registers. In 1969 Helmut Roscher 
noted that the registers of Honorius contained all the information necessary for a 
detailed study of the collection of the twentieth, but that it was outside the scope 
of his own work.
2
 The historiography on the twentieth, and papal finance in 
general, is sparse. Adolf Gottlob’s 1892 monograph on thirteenth-century papal 
crusade taxation is still extremely valuable, as are the publications on papal 
finance by William Lunt from the early twentieth century, works which have yet 
to be superseded even if some of their conclusions have been slightly tweaked.
3
 
Nevertheless, these studies are general in their outlook, and while containing 
much extremely useful information regarding the 1215 twentieth, they are far 
from comprehensive. Powell’s short chapter on the financing of the Fifth Crusade 
in his monograph provides a useful starting point which this chapter builds upon.
4
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The Institution of the Twentieth in 1215 
In November 1215 Pope Innocent III presided over Lateran IV to discuss a raft of 
legislation concerning reform of the Church, the threat of heresy, and the Fifth 
Crusade. The final constitution appended to the decrees of the Council, Ad 
liberandam, officially launched the Fifth Crusade, and set out Innocent’s plan for 
getting the expedition off the ground. Among other things it offered participants 
the indulgence of remission of sins, assigned a departure deadline, identified the 
ports to be used, and prohibited trade with Muslims. Innocent also made provision 
for financing the crusade in two ways. Firstly, he confirmed the offer made in the 
encyclical letter of 1213, Quia maior, which extended the indulgence to include 
those who could not campaign in person but funded the participation of another in 
their stead.
5
 Secondly, Innocent attempted to support the crusade by levying a tax 
of a twentieth - or five percent - on ecclesiastical income for three years, and he 
also promised a tenth of the income of the pope and cardinals: 
 
We therefore decree, with the general approval of the council, that all 
clerics, both those under authority and prelates, shall give a twentieth of 
their ecclesiastical revenues for three years to the aid of the Holy Land, by 
means of the persons appointed by the apostolic see for this purpose; the 
only exceptions being certain religious who are rightly to be exempted 
from this taxation and likewise those persons who have taken or will take 
the cross and so will go in person. We and our brothers, cardinals of the 
holy Roman Church, shall pay a full tenth. Let all know, moreover, that 
they are obliged to observe this faithfully under pain of excommunication, 
so that those who knowingly deceive in this matter shall incur the sentence 
of excommunication.
6
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Apart from attempting to collect money to fund the crusade, the Council also 
legislated to assist crusaders financially by exempting them from paying taxes and 
interest on debts, which has been claimed as the measure that was of most 
practical use to those preparing to crusade.
7
 In the twelfth century most crusades 
had been funded privately, primarily through the sale of assets, often to monastic 
houses.
8
 Despite the provision of a tax towards the costs of the Fifth Crusade, the 
crusaders were still expected to fund most of their own campaign, and Powell has 
remarked that there is no evidence for an early thirteenth-century downturn in the 
traditional methods of funding crusades that had proliferated during the twelfth 
century.
9
 
 The 1215 twentieth was not the first general tax levied to aid the Holy 
Land. The first known levy was made by King Louis VII of France (1137-80) in 
1166 on his subjects, which was quickly imitated by King Henry II of England 
(1154-89). Similar levies followed in 1183 and 1185. The first levy to support a 
specific crusade, as opposed to the Holy Land in general, was the 1188 Saladin 
Tithe which was imposed on all non-crusaders in England and France with few 
exceptions.
10
 Powell has pointed out that the 1166 and 1188 taxes were levied on 
laity and clergy alike, and Cazel has claimed that it was Clement III who imposed 
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the first crusade tax on the clergy, but that it has been overlooked by historians 
because it was rolled into the collection of the Saladin Tithe.
11
  
 Innocent III thus had a precedent for the tax of a fortieth that he levied on 
the clergy in 1199 to support the Fourth Crusade. The effectiveness of the 1199 
fortieth was hampered by Innocent’s decision to leave the method of collection up 
to each province, which was unlikely to be conducive to the efficient collection 
and transfer of funds from reluctant tax payers.
12
 
 Of all the crusades, the Fourth Crusade was the one which was most 
affected by a lack of money, and it was the financial shortfall of the French 
crusaders in trying to meet the terms of the 1201 Treaty of Venice that led 
eventually to the conquest and sack of Constantinople, because the crusaders 
could not afford to continue on to the Holy Land.
13
 Although the failure of the 
crusaders to meet the calamitous terms of the treaty was not connected to the 
papacy’s collection of the fortieth - the crusaders who assembled at Venice were 
neither awaiting nor expecting a papal subsidy - the financial disaster of the 
Fourth Crusade proved a bitter lesson for the papacy.
14
 
 The 1215 twentieth differed from the 1199 fortieth in that it was not 
imposed on the pope’s authority alone, but crucially, as Roscher and Powell have 
noted, was granted with the full authority of the Lateran Council.
15
 Gottlob has 
written that by passing Ad liberandam at Lateran IV, the clergy was effectively 
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recognising its duty to pay tax.
16
 This was a step forward for the pope: the 
acknowledgement by the wider clergy of the necessity of paying the twentieth 
meant that the pope could hold them more effectively to their promise, and many 
of Honorius’s letters on the collection of the twentieth were prefaced by reminders 
that the tax had been agreed to in generali concilio. 
 There was another offer made to sweeten the deal. Those who paid the 
twentieth or made donations to the crusade received the remission of a portion of 
their enjoined penance.
17
 The laity were invited to give free will donations of any 
size they chose, and the Regesto delle Pergamene records the will of a certain 
Roger, who in 1218 arranged to leave three ounces of gold for the aid of the Holy 
Land, his property to his mother, and another one-and-a-half ounces of gold for 
his funeral.
18
 The Annals of Dunstable record in 1217 that the priory paid the full 
three years’ worth of the twentieth in that year, a statement which precedes a 
relatively full account of the Fifth Crusade.
19
 Presumably the priory felt that they 
had a vested interest in the crusade now that they had paid a share to fund it, and 
followed their investment closely in the Annals until the end of the crusade. This 
is what Innocent had wanted when planning the crusade: it was to involve the 
entire Christian community by broadening the base of support - and spiritual 
rewards - to include those who helped finance it and prayed for its success.
20
 
 After winning the support of those who would be instrumental in 
collecting and paying the twentieth at Lateran IV, according to Lunt, Innocent 
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appears to have moved fairly swiftly to appoint local collectors and order the local 
clergy to pay the twentieth by a specific date.
21
 However, the loss of Innocent’s 
register from the end of his pontificate means that this order is taken from a rubric 
of his lost letters and cannot be proven to have been sent throughout the West. 
Although the rubric notes that it was sent to ‘diversis archiepiscopis et eorum 
suffraganeis’ - exactly how many this was cannot be proven.22 Even so, any order 
that Innocent made was superseded by Honorius’s first collection mandates issued 
in November 1216 and February 1217 (see below). 
 Before Lateran IV, Innocent had begun preliminary moves to collect 
money for the crusade in 1213. There is evidence that he appointed crusade 
procurators (mostly bishops, archbishops, abbots, and a large number of 
academics) who were to preach the crusade and collect any money given in aid of 
it, depositing the funds in religious houses and sending annual reports of the 
amounts collected to the curia. Unfortunately none of these reports survive, but 
Powell has drawn attention to a letter sent by Abbot Gervase of Prémontré to 
Archbishop Simon of Tyre in autumn 1217 that proves the existence of the 
procurators.
23
 
 Although Innocent was instrumental in laying the foundations of the 
twentieth tax, the main responsibility for collecting and administering the tax (and 
ironing out any problems) was bequeathed to Honorius when Innocent died in 
1216. Roscher has pointed out that Honorius was well prepared for such a task, 
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given his decade of service as camerarius (chamberlain) between 1188 and 
1198.
24
 The papacy’s financial administration apparatus had been centralised in 
the camera, under the direction of the camerarius, during the second half of the 
twelfth century.
25
 Cencius (Honorius) had managed the camera’s reorganisation 
whilst he was in charge at the end of the twelfth century, and Leonard Boyle has 
remarked that it was under Cencius that the camera ‘became fully a department in 
its own right ...  with its own clerks, notaries, and scriptors.’.26 He would therefore 
have possessed a keen understanding of how papal finance worked and what 
could reasonably be achieved in terms of crusade taxation. If any man had the 
right experience and pedigree to make the collection of the twentieth work, it was 
Honorius. Unfortunately there are no records for the operation of the camera 
during the Fifth Crusade because it did not begin keeping records of receipts until 
the reign of Pope Alexander IV (1254-61), and none of these receipts survive 
before 1270-80; even then records are patchy until after 1316.
27
 
 The papacy’s relatively small regular income derived from its landed 
estates (the Patrimony of St Peter), payments owed by the churches of 
Christendom as laid out in the Liber censuum (completed by Cencius himself in 
1192), money collected from papal vassals, and ‘Peter’s Pence’ - an aptly named 
small levy only collected from England and some Baltic kingdoms. The sum of 
this income was not great, but nevertheless it represented a vital element of the 
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curia’s budget.28 Given Honorius’s previous experience as camerarius, he would 
have been all too aware that the curia’s income had not been enough to support its 
twelfth-century expansion, let alone a crusade.
29
 
 
Local Collection and Transfer 
The twentieth agreed to by the Church hierarchy at Lateran IV in 1215 was not 
levied (excluding Innocent III’s early foray mentioned above) until Honorius sent 
out orders to begin collection, the first of which was issued by the papal chancery 
on 21 November 1216.
30
 This letter marked the beginning of collection for the 
twentieth, but was not sent throughout Christendom. The register copy is 
addressed to the archbishop of Palermo, and the scribe recording the in eundem 
modum copies despatched noted some fifty other recipients, but then stopped, 
leaving a blank space in the folio. There are some notable absences from the in 
eundem modum list, including England, Lombardy, and France. It is possible that 
they were despatched copies which were meant to be recorded in this blank space, 
but it is much more likely that, given the presence (or imminent presence) of 
papal legates in all of these regions, Honorius intended the legates to oversee the 
collection of the twentieth and thus did not need to forward on the same written 
instructions.
31
 Unfortunately there are no surviving instructions from Honorius to 
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his legates, but it is probable that they were similar to those in his letter of 21 
November, but with the legate as the chief collector, possibly with or without the 
same apparatus outlined below. 
 The letter of 21 November is therefore crucial in establishing how 
Honorius planned the collection of the twentieth to be carried out in provinces 
without a legate present. The letter opened with a reminder to the recipients that 
the Church hierarchy had agreed to the imposition of the twentieth tax in generali 
concilio and threatened excommunication against those who were discovered to 
have defrauded the tax.
32
 The masters of the Hospitallers and Templars and the 
cantor and treasurer of each province were named as collectors, with the power to 
select two suitable clerics and a Templar and Hospitaller to make up a four-man 
collection team.
33
 Each province was ordered to calculate a twentieth of its 
ecclesiastical income by the Feast of All Saints (1 November 1217), and then to 
pay this amount honestly by the following kalends of May (1 May 1218). The 
Premonstratensians and Cistercians were exempted from paying the twentieth 
from the beginning, which probably reflected curial favour, especially in the case 
of the Cistercians.
34
 
 The letter of 21 November 1216 was then followed by another issued on 
28 February 1217 to all the churches of the West - this time including the 
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provinces with legates present - establishing the method by which the twentieth 
would be distributed.
35
 Honorius wrote that he had heard many different pieces of 
advice on the best way to disperse the twentieth, and had decided to distribute it 
among crusaders from the regions in which it was collected to circumvent 
accusations of misuse.
36
 The local bishop and collectors were to select four or five 
trustworthy crusaders of good repute (either clergy or laity) from their diocese, 
including the bishop himself if he was signed with the cross, who were to 
transport their local twentieth to the crusade army in the East.
37
 After arrival in the 
crusader camp these four or five escorts were to pay out the twentieth to crusaders 
from their area with the approval of the papal legate and the masters of the 
Hospital and Temple, before acquiring testimonial letters from them to ensure that 
the distribution of the twentieth had been carried out properly.
38
 Honorius’s letter 
ended with another mandate to collect the twentieth. 
By the end of February 1217 then, the papacy had outlined the process by 
which it hoped the twentieth might be administered. However, study of the 
registers reveals that like many administrative procedures, the model put forward 
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inscriptis appareat evidenter pecuniam quam ut premissum est sub testimonialibus litteris secum 
attulerint esse crucesignatis fideliter et utiliter distributam’; Pressutti 381. 
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was subjected to modification when it was put into practice. Right from the outset 
there were different methods of collection for different churches. Even before the 
general letter of 21 November 1216, Honorius had sent a letter to the abbot of 
Cluny on 12 November  instructing the order - which was allowed to collect its 
own twentieth - to make collection and transfer it to Aymard, treasurer of the 
Paris Temple.
39
 This decision was presumably made in response to the abbot’s 
lobbying. 
 The levying of the twentieth is important because it is the only aspect of 
papal government and the crusade under Honorius that was clearly a programme 
of action that the curia formulated and then carried out. Yet like the other aspects 
of papal government examined in this thesis, the curia’s efforts to collect and 
transfer the twentieth to the crusaders were often ad hoc and changed according to 
petitioners’ requests. Funds from the twentieth were awarded to local crusaders 
throughout the Fifth Crusade as prescribed in the papal letter of 21 November, but 
this also ran alongside more centralised collection under papal officials and the 
transfer of funds through the Paris Temple and the papal curia. Writing the history 
of the collection and transfer of the twentieth is complex, but this reflects the 
reality of the curia’s administration. The complications should not be glossed over 
in order to make the case for a neat policy of the initial local collection and 
transportation of the twentieth being superseded by centralised collection and 
transfer, as some have tended towards.
40
 Input from outside the curia again played 
a large role in papal decision-making on administering the twentieth. Honorius’s 
decisions were often driven by petitions (to award the funds to local crusaders) 
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and by urgent requests for aid from the crusaders in Egypt (when the pope stepped 
in to order collection and transfer through the Paris Temple, see below). 
Given that Honorius had provided set rules for the appointment of local 
crusaders to carry the twentieth with them, most of the decisions on this matter 
were presumably made locally, but nevertheless, a number of decisions were 
brought before the curia. Throughout the crusade Honorius granted the twentieth 
to local magnates who petitioned for it. In a letter issued on 2 December 1216, 
Honorius granted the provosts Albert of Salzburg and Frederick of Berchtesgaden 
the right to take their local twentieth with them on their crusade.
41
 A similar letter 
was also sent to the archbishop of Salzburg, who is listed as an in eundem modum 
recipient. On 14 May 1218, Honorius granted the crusader bishop of Brescia the 
twentieth from his diocese, to be spent on the crusade with the advice of the legate 
Pelagius.
42
 In the same month, a flurry of papal documents were issued 
concerning the crusader Count William of Holland, who was petitioning the pope 
to set his affairs in order before crusading. On 21 May 1218, William, previously 
excommunicated in 1216 for abducting the wife of Count Louis of Loos (among 
other crimes), was awarded the twentieth from Holland, Zeeland, and east Frisia 
for his crusade, and on 23 May, the on-going legal case between him and Louis 
was suspended until after his return.
43
 William was also issued a document on 23 
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May that prevented him from being excommunicated again while he was on 
crusade.
44
  
A similar case of a reformed enemy of the Church receiving the twentieth 
came on 5 July 1218 when Hervé, count of Nevers, in trouble over the validity of 
his marriage and his repeated attacks on the monastery of Vézelay, was granted 
the twentieth from his lands.
45
 On the same day a letter was issued to the clergy in 
Hervé’s lands letter ordering collection.46 Again, this grant resulted from a 
petition (‘petitionem vestram’), sent by Hervé and the other crusaders assembling 
at Genoa, who, as we have seen, also requested that Cardinal Robert of Courçon 
be sent to accompany the army.
47
 This was followed up by another letter on 13 
February 1219 to Hugo, the dean, treasurer and sacrist of Nevers, ordering him to 
collect the twentieth and alms and send them on to Hervé, and also states 
explicitly that Hervé had originally petitioned for the award of the twentieth 
(‘nobis fecit humiliter supplicari’).48 
Three documents were issued to Milo, crusader bishop-elect of Beauvais, 
on 12 November, 15 December, and 29 December 1218. These three documents 
awarded him the twentieth from Beauvais and Reims, money from collection 
chests, and money from the redemption of vows (excluding that already granted to 
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Philip Augustus for the Albigensian Crusade) respectively, to take with him and 
his contingent.
49
 
On 26 February 1219 the abbot of Polirone (in northern Italy) was 
permitted to divide the twentieth among local crusaders, funding three knights and 
four foot-soldiers with horses, arms and victuals for three years, again in response 
to petitioning.
50
 On 6 July of that year, Savaric de Mauleon was awarded the 
twentieth from Poitiers, having incurred a debt of 1,200 silver marks to Sienese 
merchants in preparing for his crusade.
51
 
A year later, in July 1220, Honorius was still allowing the twentieth to be 
distributed and transported to the East by local crusaders intending to crusade in 
1221 - clearly he had not changed the twentieth collection policy to a purely 
centralised system, even at this late stage in the adminstration of the Fifth 
Crusade. Honorius’s approach to the collection and transfer of the tax was still 
being determined to a large extent by petitioners. On 7 July 1220 Honorius issued 
a reply to a letter of the crusader Ugrinus, archbishop of Kalocsa, in which 
Ugrinus had written to the pope requesting permission to delay his departure 
because the Hungarian contingent was not ready to leave.
52
 Honorius granted him 
an extension until Easter 1221, or failing that, as late as the Feast of the Nativity 
of John the Baptist (24 June). Although the twentieth had already been awarded to 
this contingent, even now, after centralised collection had been implemented 
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elsewhere (see below), Honorius allowed the Hungarian contingent to keep it 
rather than ordering its immediate despatch to Pelagius. In a letter issued the day 
before, on 6 July, Honorius had instructed Robert, bishop of Veszprém, to 
preserve the twentieth for his countrymen until they were ready to depart.
53
 As 
Powell has highlighted, by allowing devolved collection, distribution and transfer, 
Honorius was trying to curry favour with tax payers by demonstrating that their 
taxes were being used to support local crusaders.
54
 
This survey of the pope’s awards of the twentieth to local crusaders 
demonstrates an aspect of the papacy’s administration of the twentieth that is 
crucial to understanding the way the curia collected and transferred the tax. These 
cases brought before the pope involved predominantly high profile and 
controversial cases from the western nobility that were far from the norm - one of 
the recipients of the twentieth was a kidnapper, another a repeat attacker of a 
monastery, and yet another was crippled with debt. That Honorius was still 
authorising the twentieth to be transported to the East with local crusaders 
throughout the crusade disproves the notion that the twentieth’s administration 
was a policy of devolution advancing ever onward towards centralisation. That is 
not to say that more centralised control did not take place towards the end of the 
crusade, but it does reveal that there was not a single policy of collection and 
transfer in place - rather petitions and outside initiative still played an important 
role.  
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The cases that made it as far as the papal curia and were recorded in 
Honorius’s register were the high profile exceptions to the rules that Honorius had 
circulated throughout Christendom in November 1216 and February 1217. It is 
probable that the twentieth was being allocated to local contingents of crusaders 
throughout the crusade according to the pope’s rules without need for recourse to 
the curia. To employ a cliché beloved of historians: this absence of evidence for 
devolved distribution should not be taken as evidence of absence. It must also be 
borne in mind that rejected petitions leave no documentary record; there could 
have been more petitions requesting local allocation that were unsuccessful. 
 
Centralised Collection and Transfer 
Honorius did employ more centralised methods of collecting and transferring the 
twentieth, but it is vital to recognise that these co-existed alongside devolved 
methods - the two were not mutually exclusive. Papal collectors were despatched, 
papal legates were used as collectors in situ, and money was transferred through 
the houses of the Hospitallers and Templars in Paris for direct despatch to 
Pelagius (see below). Indeed, one of the most compelling pieces of evidence for 
the lack of a coherent centralisation policy comes from November 1216. The 
order issued on 12 November to the abbot of Cluny to pay the twentieth to 
Aymard mentioned above was part of a pair - the other was sent to Aymard 
himself on the same day, instructing him to expect receipt, and this only days 
before the general letter was sent out ordering local collection and distribution.
55
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The functioning of papal government was driven by this ad hoc approach to 
solving problems, hence this first example of a more centralised collection of the 
twentieth coming even before the order for devolved collection teams was issued 
by the curia on 21 November. 
During the crusade Honorius stepped in to order further collections of the 
twentieth and sent orders for funds to be made over to papal officials. This was 
partially autonomous and undertaken on the curia’s own initiative, but it is clear 
that a significant number of Honorius’s interventions to collect the twentieth and 
ship it to the crusaders were prompted by the crusaders’ own calls for financial 
assistance. The papacy’s involvement in this aspect of the twentieth’s collection - 
the use of papal officials and more centralised transfer through the houses of the 
Military Orders in Paris - is best thought of as semi-autonomous. While there are 
clear and indisputable links between the receipt of crusader reports begging for 
financial assistance and flurries of curial activity, equally there are papal orders to 
transfer the twentieth that cannot be directly connected to a specific crusader call 
for aid. Instead they should be interpreted as part of Honorius’s on-going efforts 
to support the crusade that were made on his own initiative, but set against a 
background of pressing calls for aid from the East. 
In February 1218 the papal legate for the crusade, Pelagius, was readying 
to make the passage to Egypt, and this seems to have prompted Honorius to write 
to the archbishop of Magdeburg on 23 February, ordering the collection of the 
twentieth.
56
 The following day Honorius despatched a letter to the archbishop of 
Toledo, ordering the collection of the twentieth there and for the figures to be sent 
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to the curia so that Pelagius might know the level of funds available to support the 
crusade.
57
 
In August 1218 Honorius received the crusaders’ second despatch (written 
on 15 June) requesting reinforcements.
58
 Another crusader report (no longer 
extant), written after the 15 June despatch, also arrived at the curia around this 
time, explaining the dire financial situation and urgently petitioning for money to 
pay for siege machines and galleys in particular, which had not been a specific 
request in the letter of 15 June. This, together with the inclusion of Pelagius as an 
author (who arrived too late to have had a hand in the June letter), marks it out as 
distinct. This appears to have led Honorius to issue a letter on 5 October 
addressed to the clergy of Spain announcing the arrival of Master Cintius and his 
chaplain Huguico, which marked the beginning of centralised collection.
59
 
Honorius explained that the crusaders had written to the curia expressing their 
desperate need for siege machines and ships, which the curia was unable to 
finance because the camera was exhausted, having already spent over twenty 
thousand marks of silver on the crusade. Honorius therefore ordered that these 
papal agents be allowed to collect the twentieth along with the usual census levy.  
                                                 
57
 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 229r: ‘Cum igitur tempus immineat passagii generali fraternitati vestre per 
apostolica scripta precipiendo mandamus quatinus singuli per vestras dioceses vicesimam tam 
exemptarum ecclesiarum quam aliarum diligentissime colligatis, et unusquisque quantotius nobis 
significet eorum que collegerit quantitatem, ut ea cognita legato ad partes Ierosolimitanas ituro 
cautius iniungere valeamus, qualiter habere se debeat inveniendo numero galearum et aliis 
faciendis que pertinent ad ipsius negotium Terre Sancte.’; Pressutti 1116. 
58
 Copied into the papal letter sent to the crusaders at Genoa (see chapter two): Reg. Vat. 10, fols 
9v-10r; Pressutti 1581. 
59
 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 16v: ‘Sane venerabilis frater noster patriarcha et karissimus in Christo filius 
noster Iohannes illustris rex Ierosolimitanus, magistri quoque Hospitalis et Templi, et universi 
principes ac barones exercitus Christiani existentis in partibus transmarinis suis nobis litteris 
intimarunt, quod tam importabiles expensas facere compelluntur, tum in machinis et galeis, tum in 
alio bellico apparatu, quod nisi ad eas faciendas subveniamus eisdem, eas nullatenus poterunt 
sustinere, sed non absque confusione quod Deus avertat ab incepto desistere compellentur. Cum 
autem pro navigio Romanorum in quo ultra viginti milia marcharum argenti expendimus camera 
nostra pene penitus sit exhausta’; Pressutti 1634. 
 288 
 
The letter of 5 October was connected to another letter, issued on 27 
November, which Honorius sent to the archbishop of Sens, the crusaders in his 
diocese, and the archbishops of England and France in an attempt to secure 
manpower to reinforce the expedition.
60
 This was also followed up with letters 
issued in January 1219 assigning papal agents as collectors and coordinating its 
transfer through the Paris Temple. On 2 January 1219 Honorius wrote to the 
archbishop of Bremen and the bishop of Riga ordering that the twentieth be 
assigned to the Templar cubicularius Martin and the Hospitaller marshal John.
61
 
Two days later, on 4 January, Honorius addressed another letter ordering the same 
to all the clergy of Germany.
62
 On 17 January a similar letter was sent throughout 
Hungary, stating that the pope was acting in response to the crusaders’ 
supplications (‘clamant ad nos preces supplices’) and assigning the papal chaplain 
Accontius to collect the country’s twentieth.63 A papal official named Stephen and 
an assistant also appear to have been appointed for France, because on 19 January 
Honorius sent orders to the collectors noted above for Spain, Germany and 
Hungary, and it was also recorded in the register that a copy was despatched to 
him and his associate: ‘In eundem modum scriptum est fratri Stephano et socio 
eius in Francia destinatis.’64  
In a letter to Pelagius and the masters of the Hospitallers and Templars in 
the East dated 23 January, Honorius notified them to expect the transfer of the 
money that they had petitioned for to pay for siege machines and galleys, which 
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amounted to five thousand marks, of which the masters of the Military Orders 
were to receive half each.
65
 That Pelagius was not awarded total control over this 
twentieth is interesting in itself, and further nuances his controversial role on the 
crusade (see chapter five). More relevant to our purpose here is the statement that 
this money was to pay for machines and galleys, which supplies evidence that the 
crusaders’ petitions, written in the summer of 1218, had led to a chain of papal 
decisions authorising the immediate despatch of funds to the East to support them. 
The allocation of papal agents to parts of Christendom did indeed amount to 
centralisation, but this was in response to specific needs in Egypt, and as 
demonstrated above, did not entirely replace the local allocation of the twentieth, 
as the letters to the Hungarian crusade contingent from July 1220 prove. Indeed, 
Cazel has also argued that the papal agents sent out supplemented - rather than 
replaced - the original collectors.
66
 
The Paris Temple (and to a lesser extent the Paris Hospital) played an 
important role in the centralised collection and transfer of the twentieth. From at 
least the reign of Philip Augustus to that of King Philip IV (1285-1314), the Paris 
Temple served as the French royal treasury.
67
 At around the same time, from the 
second half of the twelfth century, the papacy also began using the Templars to 
deposit, exchange, and transfer money.
68
 Indeed, the way in which Honorius 
administered the twentieth at the Paris Temple was very similar to how Philip 
Augustus used it to manage his own tax collections: by the end of the twelfth 
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century, Philip had begun depositing surplus tax collection funds at the Temple, 
which the Temple would pay out on receipt of a royal mandate.
69
 Joshua Prawer 
noted that during the development of the Military Orders, when the papacy 
awarded them long lists of privileges, it was quick to realise the utility of having 
an international order with houses throughout the West and the Holy Land that 
was in direct obedience to the pope.
70
 These attributes thus made the Military 
Orders the ideal institutions through which to transfer money directly to the Fifth 
Crusade, because money deposited with the Templars in the West for instance, 
could be withdrawn from one of its houses in the East.
71
 
As noted above, according to the evidence in the papal registers, the Paris 
Temple seemed to play a larger role than the Hospitallers in the transfer of the 
Holy Land twentieth to the East, although this could merely be a distortion of the 
evidence caused by selective registration. Léopold Delisle has drawn attention to 
the fact that the treasurer of the Paris Temple from 1202-27, Brother Aymard, had 
travelled to Italy and met Innocent III after Lateran IV.
72
 Delisle also noted that at 
the time of the Fifth Crusade, Aymard was handling financial transactions for the 
French nobility as well as the crown.
73
 From the inception of his appointment as 
treasurer, Aymard had implemented an effective system of accounting for Philip 
Augustus that consolidated all state revenues and took into account the expenses 
incurred by the Temple and royal officials in carrying out their state duties, a 
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system so effective, Ignacio de la Torre states, that during the thirteenth century it 
was copied and introduced to other countries.
74
 Thus Aymard must have appeared 
one of the most experienced and suitable individuals to oversee the transfer of the 
Church’s twentieth, and this perhaps explains why the Templars of Paris appeared 
to play a more high profile role than the Hospitallers. 
On 5 April 1219 Honorius wrote to the bishops of Noyon and Meaux in 
response to their communication regarding the twentieth, which the bishops had 
collected for two years along with donations from collection boxes and money 
from the redemption of vows, and then transferred to Aymard (only half of which 
was destined for the Holy Land - the other half had been reserved for the 
Albigensian Crusade, see below).
75
 This letter highlights a crucial aspect of the 
twentieth’s collection that goes habitually unmentioned. When collection was 
made, it was often not the full three years’ twentieth, but rather a portion of it, as 
was the case in this letter, which ordered that two years’ twentieth be transferred 
(again probably resulting from pressure from the crusaders). Therefore the orders 
for more centralised collection of the twentieth - the use of papal officials and the 
Paris Temple - did not necessarily totally supersede local collection and 
distribution. Rather these devolved methods could very well have continued after 
the orders for centralised collection were carried out, creating a situation where 
parallel systems were in operation simultaneously. Unlike orders for centralised 
control, which by their very nature resulted in the issue of papal documents, the 
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operation of devolved collection did not leave a large paper trail because, if 
handled correctly at a local level, it did not need to be brought before the pope and 
therefore lead to the creation of papal documents.  
By contrast, orders needed to be issued in order for money to be 
transferred from the Paris Temple to Pelagius. Thus we have more evidence for 
centralised control, such as Honorius’s written instruction to Aymard on 15 June 
1219.
76
 In at least one instance, however, Aymard did not follow the pope’s 
protocol, and transferred money to Egypt without a special papal mandate. 
Honorius despatched a letter to him on 6 August 1220, in which the pope rebuked 
Aymard for allegedly sending thirteen thousand marks of silver to the East 
without papal order and commanded him not to transfer any more money without 
a special mandate.
77
 
A batch of papal letters despatched in July 1220 illustrate Honorius’s use 
of the Paris Temple and Hospital to transfer funds to the crusaders. On 1 July 
Honorius sent orders to Aymard to transfer six thousand marks of silver from the 
English twentieth to Pelagius, and if this was not sufficient, the pope instructed 
him to make up the deficit from other papal funds in the Temple.
78
 At the same 
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time Honorius also wrote to Pelagius, telling him to expect six thousand marks of 
silver from Aymard, although the pope omitted the original source of the 
twentieth.
79
 Honorius also wrote to the Paris Hospital ordering that it transfer 
either four, five, or six thousand marks of silver, also from the English twentieth, 
to Pelagius in the next passage.
80
 On 4 July Honorius ordered the archbishop of 
Benevento to transfer the twentieth (which the bishop of Avellino had assigned to 
him) directly to the curia, cutting out the Military Orders of Paris entirely, which 
made practical sense given the proximity of Benevento to the curia and its 
position as part of the Papal State.
81
 
A papal letter of 24 July 1220 sent to Pelagius outlines the allocation of 
the twentieth from the summer of 1218 to July 1220, offering us important 
information on the papacy’s administration of the tax.82 The letter lists the 
recipients of the twentieth which had resulted from centralised transfer - mainly 
Pelagius - but also mentions the multi magnates et potentes crucesignati who had 
received the twentieth from local distribution.
83
 Devolved distribution did not 
require the documentation that centralised distribution did, and as a result these 
many recipients are not listed, but it is important that they are not ignored in 
favour of those who are named in the document.  
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Despite the difficulties of trying to standardise all the different currencies, 
Powell estimated that the sums in these letters totalled 775, 461 marks.
84
 Using 
this figure in any meaningful way beyond agreeing with Powell that Pelagius was 
using the funds sent to him to support ‘a very large army’, is probably not 
possible.
85
 Yet the letter does reveal an important insight into the pope’s overall 
administration of the twentieth that is not always allowed by the study of 
individual collection mandates. Honorius stated that collection and distribution 
had been carried out locally, but when he saw that money was being detained in 
the West at a regional level waiting for the departure of local crusade contingents, 
he switched to sending out papal chaplains ad diversas partes mundi to collect 
any remaining twentieth.
86
 Arguably then this was a change in policy at the curia 
made on the initiative of Honorius. Yet the collection and transfer of the twentieth 
still demonstrates aspects of responsive papal government, such as the influence 
of petitioning, and the evidence that devolved collection still took place after more 
centralised efforts were imposed. Powell has similarly argued that ‘Honorius was 
not innovating a more efficient administrative structure but responding to a 
specific set of problems.’87 
 After the issue of this report to Pelagius Honorius despatched a number of 
other letters ordering centralised control of the twentieth.  On 18 August 1220 
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Honorius sent an order to his legate in England, Pandulf, that he should count out 
the twentieth, the census, and Peter’s Pence, attach his seal to it, and then transfer 
it to the Templars and Hospitallers of Paris, while sending a written account of the 
sums involved to the curia.
88
 A letter dated 12 January 1221 was addressed to the 
bishop of Albenga, ordering him to send the twentieth - amounting to ninety-six 
Genoese pounds - to the curia, or else to entrust it to the archbishop of Genoa.
89
 
On 25 March Honorius ordered the archbishop of Salzburg to transfer the 
twentieth to the Holy Land.
90
 
A case could be made for increasing centralisation as the crusade wore on, 
and the elements of more centralised control outlined here appear to support this. 
But such an interpretation would be too simple and misleading to suffice. While 
centralised control was preferable to the pope because it prevented money sitting 
idly in the West when it was needed on the crusade - something mentioned by the 
pope himself in his letters of 24 July 1220 - it appears to have supplemented, 
rather totally supplanted, devolved collection. It is important to remember that 
only a few days after the more centralised initiatives of early July 1220, Honorius 
granted retention of the Hungarian twentieth to the bishop of Veszprém until the 
Hungarians’ planned 1221 departure, and that the example of the transfer from 
Benevento to the curia was not a true case of centralisation because it was part of 
the Papal State anyway. When taken as a whole, the evidence rather points to the 
                                                 
88
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co-existence of devolved administration of the twentieth with more centralised 
control. These were simply two different approaches to getting the same job done. 
Despite recognising the advantages that centralisation offered, Honorius was still 
persuaded by petitions to permit local collection throughout the crusade. 
 
Diversion 
Not all of the twentieth collected in aid of the Holy Land was delivered to the 
armies of the Fifth Crusade. Instead, as a result of pressure from other theatres of 
war - Spain and the south of France - Honorius made two major diversions of 
some of the twentieth to support the reconquista and the Albigensian Crusade. 
 When Honorius authorised the ‘Second’ Albigensian Crusade in August 
1218, he hoped that Philip Augustus would participate in it.
91
 Philip, however, had 
been reluctant to intervene personally in the south of France since hostilities had 
begun under Innocent III.
92
 As part of the negotiations aimed at securing the 
king’s participation, on 5 September 1218 Honorius issued a letter which offered 
Philip Augustus half of the Holy Land twentieth collected from France to fund a 
royal crusade against the southern French heretics.
93
 Scholars have written that 
Honorius made the offer of the twentieth to try and entice Philip to crusade, and 
while it should not be forgotten that the diversion fitted into a long series of 
Franco-papal negotiations, careful attention to the narratio of the letter suggests 
that it was actually Philip himself who asked (‘postulasti’) for the French 
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twentieth to be used in support of the Albigensian Crusade in a previous letter.
94
 
Therefore it should be interpreted more as the positive response to a diplomatic 
request than a change of policy formulated at the curia. 
 Honorius immediately issued letters on the same day to the clergy of 
Narbonne, Auch, Vienne, Aix, Arles, and Embrun, who were to divert their Holy 
Land twentieths to the Albigensian Crusade, and to the papal legate Bertrand, who 
was to receive it.
95
 Richard Kay has written that this diversion had already been 
planned by the pope, which explains why Honorius was able to issue the orders to 
Bertrand and the clergy.
96
 The diversion of the twentieth must have been planned 
before 5 September, or else Honorius would not have immediately ordered the 
clergy and legate to start transferring the twentieth if he was awaiting Philip’s 
response. But this does not preclude the possibility that the idea to divert the 
twentieth originated at the royal, rather than papal, court. Despite this grant, Philip 
did not participate personally, but sent his son Louis instead.
97
 
 The next major diversion came on 9 February 1219, when Honorius 
allowed Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo (who was actually defrauding the 
twentieth - see below) half of the Holy Land twentieth from Toledo and Segovia 
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to be retained to fund the reconquista in response to his requests.
98
 Again, this 
was a diversion made by the pope in response to pressure from outside the curia. 
A later letter of 4 July 1220 addressed to Rodrigo states that the grant had been 
made in response ‘ad preces tuas’.99 Honorius was reluctant to divert the 
twentieth, but managed to retain - at least nominally - half of the tax for the Holy 
Land. Just prior to his treachery being discovered though, on 13 February 1220 
Honorius inclined to grant Rodrigo, who held the position of legatus natus, the 
whole twentieth from his province, probably on account of the good reports of his 
actions sent to the curia by the papal chaplain Huguico, who was in league with 
him.
100
 All these reluctant diversions were immediately revoked however as soon 
as the fraud was discovered on 4 July 1220.
101
 
 Similarly, in response to his requests (‘preces’), after much careful 
deliberation, on 1 April 1219 Honorius granted William, bishop of Châlons-sur-
Marne, the whole of his local Holy Land twentieth to use on campaign against the 
southern French heretics, by special grace (‘de speciali gratia’).102 Three days 
later, however, Honorius issued another document to William limiting the grant: 
half was to be used to support the planned royal crusade in the south of France, 
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while the other half was to be retained to support the Fifth Crusade.
103
 That this 
change in decision was made so rapidly is perplexing, although behind the 
decision probably lies lobbying from another interested party; the imminent 
departure of Louis to the south (who left in May) provides a clue.
104
 
  The few diversions of the twentieth to support crusading in other theatres 
outlined here were driven by petitions rather than papal initiative, and crucially, 
were granted despite Honorius’s reluctance. When news of the failure of the Fifth 
Crusade reached the curia in early November 1221, within days (15 November) 
Honorius allowed a tax of a full twentieth to be levied from the French clergy for 
three years in order to support the Albigensian Crusade, imposed on the same 
terms as the 1215 twentieth.
105
 
 
Exemption 
Cazel wrote that ‘exemptions from the [twentieth] tax fill the papal registers’, 
implying that collection cannot have been very effective.
106
 Yet careful 
examination of the registers and original letters reveals this statement to be 
incorrect. There are in fact only thirteen cases of Honorius exempting particular 
religious houses and churches from payment of the twentieth, including 
exemptions granted to the Premonstratensian (a reissue), Grandmontine, and 
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Teutonic Orders.
107
 There is the possibility that exemptions were granted without 
being registered at the curia by the petitioners, but it would have been ill-advised 
not to do so, and even the poverty-stricken monks of S. Marco of Mantua 
discussed below decided to register their exemption privilege alone, distinct from 
other documents granted by Honorius at the same time. Therefore it seems 
reasonable to argue that the register copies represent most, if not all, of the 
exemptions granted by Honorius. 
 The existence of only thirteen exemption privileges demonstrates that 
exemption from paying the twentieth was by no means easy to get, and that 
Honorius planned to collect the tax from almost all the clergy. The first exemption 
recorded in the registers was issued to the prior of the Holy Sepulchre in 
Jerusalem and dated 8 July 1217.
108
 The document was addressed to all clerics 
who should examine it, and it prevented the prior and his brothers transmarina 
from being compelled to pay the twentieth, as had been occurring.
109
 This petition 
for exemption was also made at the same time as a petition for the confirmation of 
existing privileges granted by previous popes, a request that was frequently made 
by institutions looking to safeguard their interests when a new pope was 
elected.
110
 
 Of the other exemptions granted, most were on account of pleas of 
poverty. The exemption granted to the prior and brothers of S. Marco of Mantua 
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on 31 March 1218 was in response to just such a petition.
111
 Like the monks of the 
Holy Sepulchre, those of S. Marco also took the opportunity to petition for the 
confirmation of existing privileges while they were at the curia, which was issued 
on 4 April 1218.
112
 Nevertheless, unlike the document issued exempting them 
from paying the twentieth, the monks decided not to pay to have this confirmation 
registered because of the deliberately and prohibitively high cost of registration.
113
 
As a poor monastery, it was presumably decided that it was worth having a copy 
of the tax exemption preserved in the curia’s records - where the administration of 
the twentieth was taking place - as insurance in case of loss and as a preventative 
against future attempts at collection. The confirmation of existing privileges, on 
the other hand, must not have been deemed worth the cost of registration, given 
that the monastery probably held the original documents along with confirmations 
by Honorius’s predecessors, and may even have registered them under one of his 
predecessors.
114
 This suggests that despite the selective registration practised at 
Honorius’s curia, if a poverty-stricken monastery such as S. Marco’s was willing 
to pay for registration, then the registers probably contain most if not all of the 
exemptions granted (aside from those granted to the Teutonic Order, see below). 
 The nuns of S. Lorenzo in Amalfi were exempted from paying the 
twentieth on account of their poverty in an incredibly short document issued on 21 
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May 1218, that is atypical in that it resulted not from petition, but from the input 
of the legate Hugolino.
115
 Given the small number of exemptions from the 
twentieth, perhaps Hugolino’s influence at the curia was decisive in the award of 
the privilege in this case, and is something which dovetails with the findings from 
chapter five on legatine influence over papal decisions. On 21 June 1218 the 
provost and canons of Montjoux were also granted exemption because they could 
not pay the twentieth.
116
 It seems that the scribes of the papal chancery either used 
the document issued to the nuns of S. Lorenzo the month before - or some other 
chancery formulary - as a template when composing the letter to Montjoux, which 
replicates the last sentence almost exactly: ‘a prestatione vicesime duximus 
absolvendos, presentes vobis litteras in testimonium concedentes’. 
 A number of other grants were made on grounds of poverty. On 1 
December 1218, Stephen, bishop of Nantes, was granted an exemption for him 
and his clergy out of compassion because of the count of Brittany’s exactions.117 
On 11 March 1219 Honorius also granted exemption to the nuns of Fontevrault, 
despite residing in lands from which the twentieth had been awarded to Count 
Hugh of La Marche and Savaric de Mauleon, because although a shining example 
of the faith, Fontevrault claimed to suffer from extreme poverty.
118
 The brothers 
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of the hospital of Roncesvalles also successfully petitioned for exemption on 28 
May 1219 so that they could focus funds on their hospital.
119
 On 5 February 1220, 
the bishop of Piacenza was granted exemption, as part of a batch of at least three 
documents resulting from petitions issued on the same day concerning affairs in 
his diocese, which he paid to have registered.
120
 On 19 January 1222, in a late, 
post-crusade exemption, Honorius granted the petition of the prior of S. Frediano 
of Lucca.
121
 Another late exemption was awarded on 5 July 1223 to the monks of 
Scilla as a reward.
122
 Presumably these late exemptions were sought by those who 
had not paid up until that point anyway. 
Whole orders also received exemption from the tax. When the twentieth 
was levied, only the Cistercian and Premonstratensian orders were exempted. This 
changed on 28 May 1219 when, presumably in response to lobbying, the 
Grandmontine Order was also exempted.
123
 On 16 July 1220, the exemption for 
the Premonstratensian Order was reissued.
124
 As part of a large batch of privileges 
granted by Honorius in January 1221 in return for their high-profile involvement 
at the curia in the negotiations between the pope and Frederick II before his 
imperial coronation, the Teutonic Knights were also awarded exemption from the 
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twentieth on 19 January.
125
 Probably on account of cost, the Order chose not to 
have these documents registered at the curia, and instead recorded copies of the 
original documents in their own cartulary. 
When one plots the location of exempt institutions on a map (Map 6, p. 
305), it is striking that most were geographically close to the Papal State (cf. Map 
4, p. 107) - there is a striking dearth of evidence for successful exemption 
petitions from central and northern Europe. This perhaps suggests that poor 
institutions from these outlying regions simply could not afford to travel to 
petition the curia for exemption, or that those further away from the curia simply 
chose to commit fraud when performing their self-assessment tax. 
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Map 6. Exemptions from the twentieth tax 
 
Fraud, Theft, and Non-Payment 
Given that the twentieth was a self-assessed tax, it is not surprising that some 
decided to try and cheat the system. Innocent III had ordered preachers of the 
Fifth Crusade to conduct themselves in an exemplary manner when it came to 
collecting money for the crusade, yet not all abided by this instruction, and several 
subdelegati were accused (and found guilty) of stealing from collection boxes, 
and the contemporary Walther von der Vogelweide criticised the papacy’s 
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perceived avarice in poetry.
126
 Abbot Gervase of Prémontré’s letter of 1217 to 
Honorius reveals disturbances in which collection trunks were thrown out of 
churches when it was discovered that the money was being siphoned off and 
would not be spent on supporting poor local crusaders as had been assumed.
127
 
 The worst and most famous abuse in the collection of the twentieth came 
from Spain, where Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo, also a papal legate, petitioned 
for diversion of the Holy Land twentieth to use in fighting the Moors, stole a large 
amount, and found a willing accomplice in one of the papal officials that Honorius 
despatched to Spain, who joined in with the fraud. The Spanish Church had been 
extremely reluctant to pay the twentieth from the beginning, and was still 
smarting from Lateran IV, where their pleadings for exemption on grounds of 
poverty from supporting the reconquista fell on deaf ears.
128
 The Spanish Church 
therefore, spearheaded by Archbishop Rodrigo, actively sabotaged the collection 
of the twentieth.
129
 One of the letters issued at the start of Honorius’s reign on 1 
December 1216 was a response to what the curia considered the paltry doubts and 
uncertainties of the dean and chapter of Compostella over payment of the 
twentieth, with reminders that the tax was levied with the authority of the Lateran 
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Council, and took the opportunity to once again make the threat of 
excommunication against those found guilty of fraud.
130
  
Elsewhere in the Iberian Peninsula we know that fraud was being detected 
at least as early as January 1218, because on 12 January, the archbishop of Braga 
successfully petitioned for the power to absolve clerics who had confessed to 
committing fraud in payment of the twentieth.
131
 Honorius also instructed him to 
send any such wrongdoers to the curia. The archbishop also petitioned for six 
other documents regarding his other affairs, which were all issued between 10 and 
12 January and registered as a group.
132
 The archbishop had obviously waited to 
collect a decent amount of business together that would make the long trip to the 
curia (or that of a representative) worthwhile, which raises the possibility that the 
fraud could have been discovered months before the document granting powers of 
absolution was issued. 
 By 1 July 1220, the fraud being committed in Spain, and the papal 
chaplain Huguico’s implication in it, had become known at the curia, (probably 
through another papal agent in Spain, Master Gonzalo García) which prompted 
the despatch of a number of letters to Spain and Egypt on that day.
133
 One letter 
was sent to the archbishop of Tarragona, charging him to investigate Huguico’s 
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abuses and enquire into the amounts collected in his diocese.
134
 Another was sent 
to Archbishop Rodrigo, who was reprimanded for his role in the crime, which had 
disgraced the curia.
135
 Honorius then moved to investigate the extent of the crime, 
and ordered Pelagius to look into the receipts that he had received from the Paris 
Hospital.
136
 The order to Pelagius is illuminating in another way, because it also 
suggests that the Spanish twentieth had been transferred to the East via this 
Hospitaller house, on which we have less surviving evidence than the role of the 
Templars of Paris, presumably because Honorius favoured use of the Temple. 
Honorius then wrote to the Paris Hospital, ordering that they despatch four, five, 
or six thousand marks of silver from the English twentieth in the next passage 
(mentioned above), presumably to make up for any deficit from the defrauded 
Spanish twentieth.
137
 Honorius ordered the Paris Hospital to make up this transfer 
from other papal funds held there, or any other money - which the curia would 
reimburse them for - if the English twentieth was not sufficient: evidence that 
Honorius seems to have had an agreed system of credit with the Hospital. 
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Three days later, on 4 July, Honorius issued another letter to Rodrigo, 
revoking the earlier diversion of half of the Holy Land twentieth to fight the 
reconquista: the money was now destined for Egypt.
138
 Peter Linehan has 
criticised the way that Honorius dealt with Rodrigo as ‘fumbling incompetence’ 
which he claims was symptomatic of his relations with the Spanish Church in 
general, a statement which does have elements of truth in it.
139
 Nonetheless, 
Honorius was also a victim of circumstance, with the legate-archbishop and a 
papal official, probably receiving the support of many Spanish clerics at 
grassroots level, succeeding in their deception of the pope by depriving him of 
accurate information on which to base decisions. What cannot be explained away 
is why Rodrigo was not removed from office, and even more incredibly, why on 
15 January 1222 the pope ordered the archbishop of Tarragona to transfer 
twentieth funds to him.
140
 
 Fraud and non-payment were by no means a rare occurrence, as the papal 
registers reveal. The Spanish case above represents the most detailed evidence we 
possess, and it is not possible to trace fraud, theft, and non-payment in such detail 
for other cases, on which we know next to nothing except that fraud was 
committed. Nevertheless, throughout Honorius’s pontificate, the pope issued 
letters in response to the petitions of archbishops, bishops, and abbots, awarding 
them the power to absolve those excommunicated for committing crime regarding 
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the twentieth, and these documents can be revealing in a different way.
141
 These 
letters represent the end result of detection and confession of crime at a local 
level, and can tell us a number of things about the efficacy of the tax collection.  
 Firstly, they prove that the threat of excommunication was carried out - it 
was not an empty threat, and also testifies to the loyalty of the majority of the 
Church hierarchy in carrying out the papal mandates to excommunicate those 
found guilty. The poor nuns of S. Maria de Rocca in Lucedio must have thought 
that this was ruthlessly effective when they were excommunicated for non-
payment, before being absolved when their poverty became known at the curia.
142
 
 Secondly, the petitions for power of absolution were common enough to 
imply that fraud was certainly not unheard of, and given that the tax was self-
assessed, common sense informs us that many more clerics must have committed 
fraud without being discovered or admitting their guilt. There is no way of telling 
how widespread abuses in the payment and collection of the twentieth were, with 
only the Spanish case being known about in detail, and the papal letters granting 
power of absolution being general rather than specific in scope. The letters 
employed catch-all language that allowed bishops and abbots to absolve multiple 
cases at their discretion, without having to petition the papacy again, such as ‘eos 
qui fraudem in solutione vicesime commiserunt’.143 We must bear in mind also 
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that even more documents regarding this could have been issued without being 
registered. 
 Thirdly, plotting the location of the petitioners on a map reveals a trend for 
exemption and crime (Maps 6 and 7, pp. 305, 312). Whereas those who 
successfully petitioned the pope for exemption tended to live closer to the curia, 
those who were excommunicated for committing fraud and non-payment tended 
to live much further away. This suggests that those clergy who were more distant 
from the curia might have been more likely to attempt to evade the tax. That there 
was no reported crime in England, where a legate a latere (who was also the papal 
camerarius) played an important role in the country’s governance is also very 
instructive.
144
 There is the possibility, however, that the dense cluster of detection 
around northern France could signify more active prosecution of offenders by the 
Church authorities in that region, rather than a propensity among more distant 
clerics to commit crime. The limitations of the evidence do not allow any 
conclusive statement on this matter, but it does seem highly suggestive that those 
who were more distant from the curia were also more likely to commit fraud or to 
try and get away without paying. 
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Map 7. Detected fraud, theft, and non-payment of the twentieth tax 
 
The Fifth Crusade and its Aftermath 
The twentieth was used in Egypt to fund specific crusade offensives, to support 
poor crusaders, and to further the crusade as a whole. The legate Pelagius played 
an instrumental role in spending the twentieth, but he did not do this alone. A 
papal letter issued on 7 September 1219 in reply to Pelagius informed him that the 
pope was putting all his effort into sending money from the West, included the 
amounts that he could expect to receive from various sources, and outlined how 
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the legate was to distribute the twentieth on the crusade.
145
 This letter is important 
because it reveals that Honorius sent Pelagius slightly differing instructions for 
the distribution of the twentieth depending on its origin - something which has 
hitherto gone unnoticed in the historiography.  
The twentieth which the legate received resulting from centralised 
collection was to be spent to further the crusade generally, in agreement with John 
of Brienne, the patriarch of Jerusalem, the foremost Roman princes, and the 
masters of the Hospitallers, Templars, and Teutonic Knights.
146
 Honorius’s 
instructions for the distribution of the twentieth collected and distributed among 
local crusade contingents was slightly different. The legate was to spend the 
money on needy crusaders and for the aid of the crusade, but the money was 
ideally to be spent amongst those contingents which had brought their local 
twentieth with them, and for this, Honorius wrote that Pelagius only required the 
agreement of the masters of the Military Orders.
147
  This essentially accelerated 
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the process by removing red tape and it reinforced the high priority given to local 
Christian communities in raising and financing contingents of warriors for the 
Fifth Crusade. Pelagius’s important role in spending the twentieth certainly lent 
him influence among the crusade leadership, but Honorius was very specific that 
Pelagius was to work with the rest of the crusade leadership, which brings into 
question some of the statements in the historiography that exaggerate the legate’s 
role.
148
 
 An example of Pelagius spending the twentieth to support a specific 
offensive comes from 1219, when he proposed and supported an attack on 
Damietta by the Genoese, Pisans, and Venetians, supported by copious funds from 
the common store.
149
 Another comes from 1220, when he was urging action but 
getting no response, so he used the twentieth to hire French and German 
mercenaries.
150
 The outcome, however, was less successful, since the mercenaries, 
though happy to take the legate’s money, were less enthusiastic about actually 
fighting. 
 Pelagius was not the only one to fund offensive initiatives on the crusade. 
Oliver of Paderborn, who had preached the Fifth Crusade and enjoyed close links 
with the pope, also famously financed an ingenious floating siege machine made 
by lashing two ships (cogs) together in 1218.
151
 Although Oliver’s role in this is 
no secret despite his own modesty in the Historia Damiatina, what is not common 
knowledge is where he got the money to fund it. Jacques de Vitry wrote that 
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Oliver’s siege machine had cost two thousand marks - a very large sum that 
simply cannot have been drawn from his own personal finances.
152
 The answer 
can perhaps be found in the Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum, a neglected 
chronicle that was composed in Oliver’s home region, which gives a slightly 
different figure spent on the siege machine - one thousand six hundred marks - but 
states that this money came ex puris elemosinis (‘from alms’).153 The evidence 
from the author of the Gesta - potentially an eyewitness to the collection of alms 
and the tax in the Rhineland, who may even have contributed towards it - suggests 
therefore, that Oliver was in command of funds from the Rhineland, at least 
consisting of alms, and probably extending to the twentieth as well. Oliver was 
indeed spending it among his local contingent as ordered by Honorius, because 
his Historia notes that it was the Germans and Frisians who provided the supplies 
and the labour, and subsequently manned the machine during its deployment in 
the assault on Damietta’s chain tower.154 
 The twentieth was certainly useful in supporting the crusaders’ initiatives, 
but it was never designed to fund the entire crusade. Shortage of funds among the 
crusaders was still a grave concern, as evidenced by the letter sent on 20 
September 1220 by the master of the Templars, Peter de Montacute, to the bishop 
of Elne, in which Peter complained that the deficiency of money in that month 
was so bad that the army was unable to maintain its ships for any great length of 
time.
155
 Peter ended his letter saying that the Templars and all the other crusaders 
were oppressed by such great costs in carrying out the crusade that they would be 
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unable to continue unless reinforced in the next passage.
156
 This evidence for the 
impoverished state of the army is corroborated by Jacques de Vitry, who wrote in 
a letter to leading figures in the West (including Honorius and Duke Leopold of 
Austria) dated 18 April 1221, that the poverty among the army was so great that 
barely four or five knights could be maintained. Jacques went on that the situation 
was exacerbated by the absence of any powerful secular rulers apart from Count 
Matthew of Sicily, who retained as many knights as he could at his own expense, 
and noted that Pelagius was rationing the twentieth to try and sustain the army.
157
 
 Honorius appears to have left the spending decisions entirely up to the 
crusade leadership and he is only recorded to have intervened on one occasion. On 
30 November 1220, the pope issued two letters on the subject of funding the 
crusade of Duke Louis of Bavaria, which stemmed from discussions with the 
emperor at the time of his coronation eight days earlier (see chapter two). 
Honorius wrote to Louis, allowing him to delay his departure on crusade from 
March until August if Frederick did not pay him the five thousand marks that he 
had promised.
158
 At the same time, Honorius wrote to Pelagius, and ordered him 
to set aside two thousand marks to fund Louis’s crusade.159 Apart from this 
instance, which had its roots in negotiations with the emperor, Honorius made no 
other recorded attempts to intervene in the expenditure of the twentieth. 
Honorius’s order would surely have come as a blow to Pelagius if the army was as 
impoverished as Peter de Montacute and Jacques de Vitry claim, yet evidence 
from Oliver of Cologne’s Historia reveals that Pelagius was still able to draw 
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from the twentieth to fund the final march on Cairo in the summer of 1221. Oliver 
estimated that of around four thousand archers marching with the army, maybe 
two and a half thousand of them were mercenaries, and noted that the legate was 
able to pay generous wages to knights and for the arming of ships.
160
 This could 
have been the result of the transfer of another portion of the twentieth, recently 
received from the West, or it could point to the common store of the twentieth 
being rationed strictly by the legate in preparation for the ‘big push’. That the 
crusade army was short of cash, however, is not in doubt. 
When news of the Fifth Crusade’s failure reached the West, Abbot 
William of Andres complained vividly that the whole Church had been wounded 
and disembowelled by paying the enormous twentieth for three years, which had 
been for nothing now that the crusade had ended in disaster.
161
 Of the few studies 
that exist on the papacy’s administration of the twentieth, none have questioned 
what happened to it after the Fifth Crusade. The answer is a diffuse scattering of 
collections, distributions, and exemptions. The twentieth had only been levied for 
three years, but delays in collection meant that it was still being collected in 1221, 
and money was still sitting in the system awaiting transfer to Egypt when the Fifth 
Crusade failed.
162
 This is the first attempt to analyse what happened to the money. 
 Despite the end of the crusade, collection of the twentieth due from the 
clergy still went ahead, which Honorius claimed would be put towards the 
defence of the Holy Land. On 15 January 1222, the pope chased up the troubled 
collection of the Spanish twentieth, and sent out a collection mandate to the 
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archbishop of Tarragona ordering him to pay up.
163
 Paul Freedman has discovered 
two previously unknown papal letters to Spain from August and September 1222 
which ordered the archbishop of Tarragona and his suffragans to pay the remnants 
of the overdue twentieth to the papal representative and Hospitaller knight 
Gonzalo, and awarded him the powers to collect the twentieth and absolve 
excommunicates.
164
 On 27 October 1223, Honorius wrote to the bishop of Gurk, 
noting that his predecessor had failed to pay the twentieth, and that if he wanted to 
retain the curia’s favour, he should transfer it to the papacy without delay.165 
Similarly, on 20 January 1224, Honorius ordered that Simon, archbishop of 
Bourges, should deposit the Holy Land twentieth along with money from vow 
redemptions from his diocese and those of Clermont and Limousin at the church 
of St Victor in Paris.
166
 On 16 November 1226 Honorius also followed up the 
twentieth being held by the bishop of Turin, whose predecessor had been awarded 
the local twentieth to take with him on crusade but died before he could depart.
167
 
Many of the petitions for powers of absolution discussed above were also 
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presented at the curia after the failure of the crusade.
168
 Conversely, only two 
exemptions were registered after the Fifth Crusade, on 19 January 1222 to the 
prior of S. Frediano of Lucca, and on 5 July 1223 to the monks of Scilla.
169
 
 Money from the twentieth appears to have been collected centrally in the 
camera apostolica after the crusade, given the order to the bishop of Gurk above, 
and also a pair of letters issued on the subject of the crusade of William VI of 
Montferrat (d.1225). On 7 February 1224, Honorius wrote to the Latin emperor 
informing him of William’s gathering crusade to Thessalonica - which was under 
threat from the Greeks - and announced that William had been granted fifteen 
thousand silver marks from money collected for the Holy Land.
170
 The letter of 7 
February 1224 does not reveal where this money was being drawn from, but an 
earlier letter despatched to William of Montferrat himself on 28 May 1222 
acknowledged that the fifteen thousand marks - promised to him by Hugolino 
during his Italian legation - was to be drawn from the camera apostolica, which 
demonstrates that the curia was collecting the remnants of the twentieth and 
storing them centrally to fund the next Holy Land crusade.
171
 The letter also 
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remarks that the money had been destined for the next Holy Land crusade to be 
launched by the papacy, but this was obviously diverted in response to events in 
Thessalonica. Nevertheless, despite the redirection of funds, Honorius still wanted 
those crusaders who had originally taken Holy Land vows to continue on to 
campaign there as well after the Thessalonica crusade.
172
  
There was also the question of how to deal with the twentieth collections 
that had been granted to local crusade contingents which never departed and were 
still in possession of the funds. A batch of three documents was issued to the 
Premonstratensian abbot of Middelburg on 12 May 1225: one was a grant to 
absolve those guilty of defrauding the twentieth provided they make amends;
173
 
another concerned his role as a crusade preacher in Flanders and Brabant;
174
 and 
the third was an order to compel the bishop of Cambrai, Henry duke of Brabant, 
and anyone else who had been awarded the twentieth for the crusade, to put the 
money honestly towards the Holy Land crusade by transferring it to the 
Hospitallers and Templars.
175
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eis in proximo preterito passagio a sede apostolica indultarum ipsam sibi deberi pecuniam 
asserentes, eam interminis suis fere totaliter receperunt, et residuum exigere non desistunt, 
Templarii quoque Hospitalarii et quidam alii quedam de huiusmodi pecunia receperunt, quare quid 
tibi super hiis sit agendum instrui postulasti.’; Pressutti 5483. 
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 Preaching and the allocation of remnants of the twentieth also occurred in 
Norway. In 1226 the archbishop of Nidaros wrote to the pope declaring the desire 
of Duke Skule Bårdsson to crusade, but lamenting that he could not prepare to 
leave because of a lack of money to pay for his passage (‘naulum’). Honorius 
responded by writing to the archdeacon of Hetland on 4 November 1226, ordering 
that the twentieth from Nidaros be awarded to Skule.
176
 On the same day, 
Honorius also wrote back to the archbishop of Nidaros, and instructed him to 
preach the crusade in support of the expedition.
177
 This two-stage reaction to 
outside initiative provides another good example of responsive papal government 
in action, and by awarding money and ordering preaching, illustrates the pope’s 
role as a supporter or sponsor of crusading. 
 
Conclusions 
When Powell considered ‘whether papal financial planning and administration 
was adequate’ for the Fifth Crusade, he concluded that ‘no final answer is 
possible. The temptation to provide qualitative evaluations of quantitative 
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 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 147v: ‘sicut tam ipse quam venerabili fratri nostri Nidrosiensis 
archiepiscopus et eius suffraganei suis nobis litteris intimarunt, nos congruo volentes eum auxilio 
in tam pio proposito adiuvare, vicesimam ecclesiasticorum proventuum per predictorum 
archiepiscopi et suffraganeorum dioceses, Terre Sancte subsidio secundum statuta generalis 
concilii deputatam eidem duci duxus concedendam.’; Pressutti 6039. 
177
 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 147v: ‘Cum sicut ex litteris tuis accepimus et utique acceptamus, dilectus 
filius nobilis vir dux Norwegie crucesignatus ad Terre Sancte subsidium cum numerosa 
crucesignatorum multitudine magnifice se accingat offerens omnibus secum transfretare volentibus 
gratis navigium sine naulo, ut tue predicationis tuba exercitatus populus Christianus ad dicte Terre 
subsidium fortius animetur fraternitati tue monemus attente per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes 
quatinus in provincia tua evangelizes, et evangelizari facias sollempniter verbum crucis 
commonefaciendo universos et singulos ut in hoc necessitatis articulo succurant Christo modis 
omnibus quibus possunt’; Pressutti 6038. 
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questions is tantalizing but much too risky.’178 I am inclined to agree. It is possible 
though to draw some conclusions on the way in which the twentieth was 
administered and its implications for the model of responsive papal government. I 
have sought to demonstrate in this chapter that the collection and distribution of 
the twentieth was arguably one of the few examples of proactive papal policy-
making, but crucially, that it still demonstrates many of the aspects of responsive 
papal government which have been set out throughout this thesis - it is thus the 
exception that proves the rule.  
Centralisation did occur at the curia’s behest when Honorius saw that 
money required in the East was tied up in the West, though it must be 
remembered that it did not entirely replace local collection and distribution, but 
supplemented it. The power of petitioning over papal decision-making is nowhere 
more evident than the grant of the local twentieth to the Hungarians in early July 
1220, only a few days after orders for centralised collection had been sent out. 
The petitions for exemptions and powers of absolution have also proved 
illuminating on the subject of petitioners’ (or would-be petitioners’) proximity to 
the curia and the likelihood of making a supplication. The implementation of the 
collection and distribution policy for the twentieth was not simple and clean, but 
messy and complicated. It did not develop in a linear progression, and this was 
largely due to petitions and external pressures which were outside Honorius’s 
control. 
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Conclusion 
 
The first aim of this thesis has been to subject Honorius’s pontificate to detailed 
scrutiny in order to repair a significant historiographical gap. It is hard to judge 
the personality of a medieval pope using his letters alone, which were often more 
the products of collegial composition and chancery formularies than his own 
thought. Yet thorough study of Honorius III and his curia in the administration of 
crusading to the Holy Land allows us to move one step closer to Honorius the 
man. Honorius came from a different background to that of his peers; he was not a 
university-educated nobleman, but a self-made man, a Roman who owed 
everything in life to the Church. He was a pope simultaneously conciliatory and 
forgiving, but also sharp and skilful in diplomacy. Honorius was mild in the sense 
that he was not rash, but he was neither weak nor naive as he has been frequently 
portrayed in the fragmented historiography on his pontificate.
1
  
Aside from the rare instances (such as October 1219) when the pope 
became noticeably frustrated, Honorius emerges from his negotiations with 
Frederick II as a slick and professional diplomat. Arguably he handled the 
emperor in a superior manner to his immediate successor, Gregory IX, who drew 
the Papal State into armed conflict with Frederick. Honorius’s administration was 
not a complete success, however, and his failure to remove Archbishop Rodrigo 
of Toledo (also a legatus natus) from office after discovering his fraud in 
                                                 
1
 Keutner, Papsttum, 12; Kantorowicz, Frederick, 96; Donovan, Pelagius, 105; Runciman, 
Crusades, 164; Van Cleve, Frederick, 108-09; Mayer, Crusades, 220; Kelly, Dictionary, 190. 
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collecting the twentieth tax, and then entrusting him again with its transfer, is 
difficult to explain away. But this represents a rare blunder from Honorius’s 
pontificate, which is outweighed by his diplomatic successes, epitomised perhaps 
by Frederick II’s grant of the Constitutio in basilica beati Petri at the imperial 
coronation in 1220.  
Honorius was not a mere emulator of Innocent III. He possessed a firm 
grasp of the authority of his office, and was much more innovative than has been 
recognised in the historiography. Examination of his arengae for the first time has 
revealed a pope and curia who were intellectually vibrant and self-confident. In 
his theological conception of his office, Honorius expounded a similar but discrete 
vision to that of Innocent. Some of this can be explained by his upbringing. 
Honorius was a pope unafraid of taking his own path, and for that, other aspects 
of his pontificate deserve further attention, especially his theology in his letter 
arengae and sermons, which remain largely unexplored. 
This thesis has made a number of original contributions to the 
historiography on the crusades. It has been argued for the first time that Andrew II 
appears to have been Honorius’s favoured choice as the leader of the entire Fifth 
Crusade. The date of Frederick II’s nomination as the papally-sanctioned leader of 
the crusade has been pushed back to the end of 1218, after Andrew II abandoned 
the crusade, and in direct response to an entreaty from the crusaders themselves. 
The role of Honorius (and/or his curial staff) as the creator of original arengae on 
the subject of crusading has been demonstrated for the first time. Pelagius’s role 
on the Fifth Crusade has been reassessed by placing his crusade legation in the 
context of Honorius’s other legates and thirteenth-century legation more broadly. 
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This thesis has also put forward the first comprehensive study of the management 
of the 1215 tax of a twentieth, shedding valuable light on the papacy’s financial 
machinery in the early thirteenth century. 
 The second aim of this thesis has been to propound a model of responsive 
papal crusade government. Building upon the findings of scholars such as Duggan 
and Bombi, who have argued against looking for coherent papal crusade policies 
which were proactively implemented, this study has taken the arguments of 
Morris and Zutshi for responsive papal government, which explicitly exclude the 
crusades, and sought to extend the model to include them.
2
 The evidence from 
Honorius’s pontificate clearly demonstrates that, despite being dedicated to 
recovering the Holy Land, his administration of crusading to the Holy Land 
should be thought of as predominantly responsive in nature. There was no defined 
papal crusade policy in the sense of a preconceived course of political action that 
Honorius planned and implemented. Rather, the vast majority of his policy 
decisions regarding the crusade were determined by the influence of petitioners 
and diplomats presenting business at the curia.  
Honorius’s crusade policy was to recover the Holy Land by securing 
Frederick II’s departure on crusade and to attempt to protect the integrity of the 
Papal State in the process. But in working towards achieving these aims, the pope 
was steering St Peter’s ship through choppy waters, responding to the changing 
requests and demands from the lay powers rather than formulating his own 
premeditated policy. It was largely the lay powers who were setting the agenda of 
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 Duggan, ‘Alexander’, 44-45; Bombi, ‘Teutonic’, 457-58; Morris, Monarchy, 218-19; Zutshi, 
‘Petitioners’, 293. 
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Honorius’s crusade diplomacy, in response to which the pope’s decisions 
fluctuated. He took a proactive stance on occasion, as witnessed in the 
development of original arengae, the moves towards centralised crusade tax 
collection, and his participation in papal-imperial colloquia. Yet this proactive 
behaviour was disproportionately small compared with the responsive operation 
of papal government. 
 The responsive nature of Honorius’s diplomacy is most evident in the lack 
of consistency in papal decisions on matters such as the indulgence for crusading 
in Livonia, the sudden limitation of Bishop William of Châlons-sur-Marne’s 
twentieth grant, and the operation of centralised tax collection in tandem with 
local distribution. There was also a frequent bending of rules, such as allowing 
Frederick II to postpone departure time and again without levelling the threatened 
sentence of excommunication against him (although it is clear that some German 
crusaders who did not have the pope’s ear were not so fortunate). Papal legates 
operated with a great deal of autonomy, and Honorius seems to have been 
responding to them rather than using them as vessels through which to impose a 
papal policy on the provinces of Christendom. That no important crusade 
decisions were taken when Honorius was not interacting with the lay powers at 
the curia or in papal-imperial colloquia demonstrates how important the initiative 
of the lay powers was in creating crusade business at the curia and prompting the 
subsequent issue of documents. Many of Honorius’s decisions can also be traced 
directly back to initiative from outside the curia. Supplications from the crusaders 
in Egypt spurred Honorius to approach Frederick to join the Fifth Crusade, and to 
send out papal representatives to collect money for financing specified siege 
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equipment. Frederick also set his own timetable of departure to which the pope 
acquiesced, and the emperor publicised deadlines for crusaders from his territories 
and threatened them with excommunication via Honorius. 
 One important question that arises from this research is how specific was 
responsive crusade government to Honorius? A direction for future research 
would be to consider how responsive the operation of papal government was in 
other periods by pursuing comparative study. Was Honorius a particularly 
responsive pope - more so than Innocent III or Gregory IX? Did this simply derive 
from the contemporary circumstances: was Honorius not faced with situations 
where he needed to make policy? The political position of the papacy shifted over 
time. The role of the early thirteenth-century papacy in the political landscape was 
very different from that of the eleventh-century papacy for instance, or the 
fourteenth-century papacy at Avignon; papal government may have operated more 
or less responsively under different temporal and geographic conditions. Another 
direction for new research would be to test the limits of the model of responsive 
government further. The examination of papal crusade administration has 
provided rich results: one can discern proactive elements of policy set against a 
backdrop of overwhelmingly responsive operation. Because popes took more 
initiative in their political affairs than in routine ecclesiastical administration, such 
as the granting of benefices or the auditing of legal cases, research into the 
papacy’s other political affairs could enhance the model of responsive papal 
government.  
This thesis does not claim that papal government was universally and 
equally responsive in operation throughout the Middle Ages. But it does argue 
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that, on the subject of the Holy Land crusades, the pontificate of Honorius III was 
characterised by its responsive operation, and suggests that the model of 
responsive papal government could be applied to the study of the medieval papacy 
more broadly in further research. 
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Appendix: Pelagius’s Appointment Mandate 
 
The mandate Honorius III issued to Pelagius, cardinal-bishop of Albano (1213-
30), on 12 June 1218 appointed him as legate a latere for the Fifth Crusade. 
Although he had already been designated as legate for the crusade in July 1217, 
Pelagius was not formally appointed until this document was issued. Pelagius was 
awarded the full powers of a legate a latere, along with special papal reserved 
powers. The pope cautioned him to use these powers wisely and to proceed 
discreetly in executing his office. Despite controversy in the historiography over 
Pelagius’s role and powers on the Fifth Crusade, his appointment mandate was 
standard for a thirteenth-century legate a latere (see chapter five). The original 
does not survive, therefore the text is transcribed from the contemporary copy 
made in Honorius’s register; it has never been published. 
 
Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 265r; Pressutti 
1433. 12 June 1218. 
Pelagio, Albanensi episcopo, apostolice sedis legato. 
Cum aliquos ex fratribus nostris exigentibus variis ecclesie necessitatibus ad 
varias provincias destinamus, sic debemus iniuncte illis legationis onus 
iurisdictione auctoritatis ecclesiastice compensare ne ipsorum fiat labor inanis si 
tenuis eis fuerit collata potestas cum plerique ipsorum presumant propositum 
impedire, quos presumptionem suam intellexerint non posse districtionis 
ecclesiastice gladio prohibere. Cum ergo te in ultramarinum provinciam de 
fratrum nostrorum consilio non tam ecclesie quam totius populi Christiani 
exigente necessitate a nostro latere destinemus, plene legationis officium tue 
discretioni committimus, ut evellas, destruas, dissipes, edifices, et plantes, iuxta 
quod quelibet sollicitudine tua cognoveris indigere. Ut autem nichil tibi desit ex 
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illis que ad plenitudinem legationis pertinent exequende, plenariam tibi auctoritate 
presentium concedimus facultatem, ut cum necesse fuerit vice nostra illa etiam 
exequaris que nostro sunt speciali privilegio reservata, firmiter inhibentes nequis 
processum tuum provocationis obiectu audeat impedire. Tu ergo tamquam vir 
providus et discretus sic deferas apostolice sedis honori, sicut tibi vides ab ipsa 
deferri, ut et nos consulas in quibus videris consulendos et plenitudinem nostre 
auctoritatis requiras, in quibus eam cognoveris requirendam, et sic modeste 
procedas in omnibus et discrete, ut et que agenda sunt agas, et ab illis abstineas a 
quibus fuerit abstinendum, ac talem te omnibus exhibere procures, ne cui merito 
possis esse suspectus. Datum Rome, apud Sanctum Petrum, II Idus Iunii, 
pontificatus nostri anno secundo. 
331 
 
Bibliography 
 
Manuscripts 
Arles, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS 60 
Kew, The National Archives, SC 7/18/14 
London, British Library, MS Burney 351 
Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticana 9-13, 15, 18, 21 
 
Printed Sources 
Acta imperii inedita seculi XIII: Urkunden und Briefe zur Geschichte des 
Kaiserreichs und des Königreichs Sicilien in den Jahren 1198 bis 1273, ed. 
Eduard Winkelmann (Innsbruck, 1880) 
Acta imperii selecta: Urkunden deutscher Könige und Kaiser, ed. J.F. Böhmer, ii 
(Innsbruck, 1870) 
Alberic of Trois Fontaines, Chronicon, in Testimonia, ed. Röhricht, 92-96 
Andrea, Alfred J., Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade (rev. edn, 
Leiden, 2008) 
Annales de Dunstaple, in Testimonia, ed. Röhricht, 64-66 
Annales Placentini Guelfi, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH SS, 18 (Hannover, 1863), 411-57 
Bird, Jessalynn, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell, eds., Crusade and 
Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall 
of Acre, 1187-1291 (Philadelphia, PA, 2013) 
Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae opuscula theologica, ed. Claudio 
Moreschini (Munich, 2000) 
Burchard of Biberach, Chronicon, in Testimonia, ed. Röhricht, 155-58 
Burchardi et Cuonradi Uspergensium Chronicon, ed. Otto Abel and L. Weiland, 
MGH SS, 23 (Hannover, 1874), 333-83 
Chronica regia Coloniensis (Annales maximi Colonienses), ed. George Waitz, 
MGH SrG, 18 (Hannover, 1880) 
332 
 
Chronicon de gestis Hungarorum, in Testimonia, ed. Röhricht, 232-33 
Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard de Trésorier, ed. Louis de Mas Latrie (Paris, 
1871) 
Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus et civilis, ed. G. Fejér, iii (Buda, 
1829) 
Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, ed. L. Weiland, MGH 
Const., 2 (Hannover, 1896) 
I Cristiani e il favoloso Egitto: Una relazione dall’Oriente e la storia di Damietta 
di Olivero da Colonia, ed. and trans. Giancarlo Andenna and Barbara Bombi 
(Genoa-Milan, 2009) 
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Volume I, Nicaea I to Lateran V, ed. and 
trans. Norman P. Tanner (London, 1990) 
Decretales ineditae saeculi XII, ed. Walther Holtzmann, Stanley Chodorow and 
Charles Duggan, Monumenta Iuris Canonici Series B, 4 (Vatican City, 1982) 
The Deeds of Pope Innocent III by an Anonymous Author, trans. James M. Powell 
(Washington, DC, 2004) 
Diplomatic Documents Preserved in the Public Record Office: Volume I, 1101-
1272, ed. Pierre Chaplais (London, 1964) 
La documentación pontificia de Honorio III (1216-1227), ed. Demetrio Mansilla 
(Rome, 1965) 
Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum, ed. Carl Rodenberg, 3 
vols (Berlin, 1883-94) 
L’Estoire de Eracles Empereur, in Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: 
Historiens Occidentaux, 2 (Paris, 1859) 
Ex Andrensis monasterii chronico, in RHGF, 18 (Paris, 1879), 568-83 
Ex Chronico S. Martini Turonensi, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH SS, 26 (Hannover, 
1882), 458-76 
Flores Historiarum, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 3 vols, RS, 95 (London, 1890) 
Die Formularsammlung des Marinus von Eboli, ed. Fritz Schillmann (Rome, 
1929) 
Gabrieli, Francesco, Arab Historians of the Crusades, trans. E.J. Costello 
(London, 1969) 
Gauthier Cornut, De susceptione coronae spineae Iesu Christi, in RHGF, 22 
(Paris, 1865), 26-32 
Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum, in Quinti, ed. Röhricht, 29-56 
333 
 
Gesta obsidionis Damiate, in Quinti, ed. Röhricht, 73-115 
Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne, ed. Henri d’Arbois de Jubainville, 
v (Paris, 1863) 
Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris, ed. A. Chroust, MGH SrG, n.s., 5 
(Berlin, 1928), 1-115 
Historia diplomatica Friderici secundi, ed. J.L.A. Huillard-Bréholles, 6 vols 
(Paris, 1852-61) 
The Historia Occidentalis of Jacques de Vitry: A Critical Edition, ed. John 
Frederick Hinnebusch (Fribourg, 1972) 
Jacques de Vitry, Lettres, in Serta Mediaevalia: Textus varii saeculorum x-xiii in 
unum collecti, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum, 171 (Turnhout, 2000) 
—— Lettres de la Cinquième Croisade, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, trans. G. Duchet-
Suchaux (Turnhout, 1998) 
The Letters and Charters of Cardinal Guala Bicchieri: Papal Legate in England, 
1216-1218, ed. Nicholas Vincent (Woodbridge, 1996) 
Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12
th
-13
th
 Centuries, 
ed. and trans. Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate (Farnham, 2010) 
The Letters of Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) Concerning England and Wales: A 
Calendar with an Appendix of Texts, ed. C.R. Cheney and Mary G. Cheney 
(Oxford, 1967) 
Le Liber Censuum de l’Église Romaine, ed. P. Fabre, L. Duchesne, and G. Mollat, 
3 vols (Paris, 1889-1952) 
Lucas of Tui, Chronicon mundi, in Testimonia, ed. Röhricht, 212-13 
Memoriale Fratris Walteri de Coventria, ed. William Stubbs, 2 vols, RS, 58 
(London, 1872-73) 
Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium, i (Zagreb, 1868) 
Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, in Die Schriften, ed. Hoogeweg, 161-
280 
Opera omnia, ed. C.A. Horoy, 5 vols (Paris, 1879-82) 
Die päpstlichen Kanzleiordnungen von 1200-1500, ed. Michael Tangl (Innsbruck, 
1894) 
Papsturkunden in Spanien vorarbeiten zur Hispania Pontificia: I. Katalanien, ed. 
Paul Kehr (Berlin, 1926) 
Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office, 2 
vols (London, 1901-03) 
334 
 
Patrologiae cursus completa, series Latina, ed. J.P. Migne, ccxvi, ccxvii (Paris, 
1855) 
Petitions to the Crown from English Religious Houses, c.1272-c.1485, ed. 
Gwilym Dodd and Alison K. McHardy (Woodbridge, 2010) 
The Political Songs of England from the Reign of John to that of Edward II, ed. 
and trans. Thomas Wright (London, 1839) 
Quinti belli sacri scriptores minores, ed. Reinhold Röhricht (Geneva, 1879) 
Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum, ed. Joseph Stevenson, RS, 66 
(London, 1875) 
RHGF, 17, 19 (Paris, 1878, 1880) 
Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. Petrus Pressutti, 2 vols (Rome, 1888-95) 
Regesta Pontificum Romanorum ab condita ecclesia ad annum post Christum 
natum MCXCVIII, ed. P. Jaffé, 2 vols (2nd edn, Leipzig, 1885-88) 
Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani (MXCVII-MCCXCI), ed. Reinhold Röhricht 
(Innsbruck, 1893) 
Regesto delle Pergamene, ed. Giovanni Mongelli, ii (Rome, 1957) 
Regestum Innocentii III papae super negotio Romani imperii, ed. Friedrich Kempf 
(Rome, 1947) 
Die Register Innocenz’ III., ed. Othmar Hageneder et al., 11 vols to date (Graz-
Cologne-Rome-Vienna, 1964-) 
Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. C. Bourel de La Roncière, J. de Loye, P. de 
Cenival, and A. Coulon, 3 vols (Paris, 1902-59) 
Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. Élie Berger, 3 vols (Paris, 1884-97) 
Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. Lucien Auvray, 4 vols (Paris, 1896-1955) 
Registri dei Cardinali Ugolino d’Ostia e Ottaviano degli Ubaldini, ed. Guido 
Levi, Fonti per la storia d’Italia, 8 (Rome, 1890) 
Rogeri de Wendover liber qui dicitur Flores Historiarum, ed. Henry G. Hewlett, 3 
vols, RS, 84 (London, 1886-89) 
Ryccardi de Sancto Germano notarii chronica, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH SrG, 53 
(Hannover, 1864) 
Sacrae antiquitatis monumenta historica, dogmatica, diplomatica, ed. Charles 
Louis Hugo, i (Etival, 1725) 
Le sacramentaire Grégorien: Ses principales formes d’après les plus anciens 
manuscrits, ed. Jean Deshusses, i (Fribourg, 1971) 
335 
 
Sancti Bernardi Opera, ed. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais, iii (Rome, 1963) 
Sawirus ibn al-Mukaffaʽ, History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church: 
Known as the History of the Holy Church, trans. Antoine Khater and O.H.E. Khs-
Burmester, iii (Cairo, 1970)  
Die Schriften des kölner Domscholasters, späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und 
Kardinal-Bischofs von S. Sabina, ed. H. Hoogeweg (Tübingen, 1894) 
Selected Letters of Pope Innocent III concerning England (1198-1216), ed. and 
trans. C.R. Cheney and W.H. Semple (London, 1953) 
Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, ed. Ernest Strehlke (Berlin, 1869) 
Testimonia minora de quinto bello sacro e chronicis occidentalibus, ed. Reinhold 
Röhricht (Geneva, 1882) 
Thomas of Cantimpré, The Collected Saints’ Lives: Abbot John of Cantimpré, 
Christina the Astonishing, Margaret of Ypres, and Lutgard of Aywières, ed. 
Barbara Newman, trans. Margot H. King and Barbara Newman (Turnhout, 2008) 
Thomas of Split, Historia Salonitanorum atque Spalatinorum pontificum/History 
of the Bishops of Salona and Split, ed. and trans. Olga Perić, Damir Karbić, 
Mirjana Matijević Sokol, and James Ross Sweeney (Budapest, 2006) 
Tolosanus of Faenza, Chronicon, in Testimonia, ed. Röhricht, 240-42 
Die Urkunden der deutschen Könige und Kaiser: Die Urkunden Friedrichs II., 
1212-1217, ed. Walter Koch, Klaus Höflinger, Joachim Spiegel, and Christian 
Friedl, MGH DD F II, 14:2 (Hannover, 2007) 
Die Urkunden der deutschen Könige und Kaiser: Die Urkunden Friedrichs II., 
1218-1220, ed. Walter Koch, Klaus Höflinger, Joachim Spiegel, and Christian 
Friedl, MGH DD F II, 14:3 (Hannover, 2010) 
Vetera monumenta slavorum meridionalium, ed. August Theiner, 2 vols (Rome, 
1863-75;  repr. Osnabrück, 1968) 
Vitis Aquilonia, ed. Johannes Vastovius (Cologne, 1623) 
William of Tudela and an Anonymous Successor, The Song of the Cathar Wars: A 
History of the Albigensian Crusade, trans. Janet Shirley (Aldershot, 1996) 
 
Secondary Works 
Abulafia, David, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (London, 1988) 
Arnold, Benjamin, ‘Emperor Frederick II (1194-1250) and the Political 
Particularism of the German Princes’, Journal of Medieval History, 26 (2000), 
239-52 
336 
 
Asbridge, Thomas, The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land (London, 2010) 
Baldwin, John W., The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French 
Royal Power in the Middle Ages (Berkeley, CA, 1986) 
Bárány, Attila, ‘Crusades and Crusading in Hungarian Historiography’, in Csaba 
Lévai, ed., Europe and the World in European Historiography (Pisa, 2006), 129-
48 
Barber, Malcolm, The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle 
Ages (Harlow, 2000) 
Barbiche, Bernard, ‘Diplomatie, diplomatique et théologie: les préambules des 
lettres de légation (XIII
e
-XVII
e
 siècle)’, in idem, Bulla, Legatus, Nuntius: Études 
de diplomatique et de diplomatie pontficales (XIII
e
-XVII
e
 siècle) (Paris, 2007), 
147-56 
Barraclough, Geoffrey, ‘Formulare für Suppliken aus der ersten Hälfte des 13. 
Jahrhunderts’, Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht, 115 (1935), 435-56 
—— The Medieval Papacy (London, 1968) 
—— Papal Provisions: Aspects of Church History Constitutional, Legal and 
Administrative in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1935)  
—— Public Notaries and the Papal Curia: A Calendar and Study of a 
Formularium Notariorum Curie from the Early Years of the Fourteenth Century 
(London, 1934) 
Bartoloni, Franco, ‘Suppliche pontificie dei secoli XIII e XIV’, Bullettino 
dell’Istituto storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano, 67 (1955), 
1-188 
Blumenthal, Uta-Renate, ‘Papal Registers in the Twelfth Century’, in Peter 
Linehan, ed., Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Medieval 
Canon Law, Cambridge 23-27 July 1984 (Vatican City, 1988), 135-51 
Bock, Friedrich, ‘Originale und Registereinträge zur Zeit Honorius III’, Bullettino 
dell’“Archivio Paleografico Italiano”, n.s., 2/3 (1956/57), 101-16 
Bolton, Brenda, ‘Celestine III and the Defence of the Patrimony’, in John Doran 
and Damian J. Smith, eds., Pope Celestine III (1191-1198): Diplomat and Pastor 
(Farnham, 2008), 317-53 
—— ‘Faithful to Whom? Jacques de Vitry and the French Bishops’, Revue 
Mabillon, n.s., 9 (70) (1998), 53-72 
—— ‘For the See of Simon Peter: The Cistercians at Innocent III’s Nearest 
Frontier’, in eadem, Innocent, II: 1-20 
—— Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Care (Aldershot, 
1995) 
337 
 
—— ‘Philip Augustus and John: Two Sons in Innocent III’s Vineyard?’, in 
eadem, Innocent, V: 113-34 
—— ‘Rome as a Setting for God’s Grace’, in eadem, Innocent, I: 1-17 
—— ‘“Serpent in the Dust: Sparrow on the Housetop”: Attitudes to Jerusalem and 
the Holy Land in the Circle of Pope Innocent III’, in R.N. Swanson, ed., The Holy 
Land, Holy Lands, and Christian History: Papers Read at the 1998 Summer 
Meeting and the 1999 Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society, 
Studies in Church History, 36 (Woodbridge, 2000), 154-80 
—— ‘Too Important to Neglect: The Gesta Innocentii PP III’, in eadem, 
Innocent, IV: 87-99 
Bombi, Barbara, Novella plantatio fidei: Missione e crociata nel nord Europa tra 
la fine del XII e i primi decenni del XIII secolo (Rome, 2007)  
—— ‘L’Ordine Teutonico nell’Italia centrale: La casa romana dell’Ordine e 
l’ufficio del procuratore generale’, in Hubert Houben, ed., L’Ordine Teutonico nel 
Mediterraneo: Atti de Convegno internazionale di studio Torre Alemanna 
(Cerignola)-Mesagne-Lecce, 16-18 ottobre 2003 (Galatina, 2004), 197-215 
—— ‘Petitioning between England and Avignon in the First Half of the 
Fourteenth Century’, in Ormrod, et al., eds., Petitions, 64-81 
—— ‘The Teutonic Order and the Papacy’, in Isabel Cristina Ferreira Fernandes, 
ed., As Ordens Militares: Freires, Guerreiros, Cavaleiros, Actas do VI Encontro 
sobre Ordens Militares, i (Palmela, 2012), 455-64 
Boyle, Leonard E., ‘The Compilatio quinta and the Registers of Honorius III’, in 
idem, Pastoral Care, Clerical Education and Canon Law, 1200-1400 (London, 
1981), XI: 9-19 
—— ‘Innocent III’s View of Himself as Pope’, in Sommerlechner, ed., 
Innocenzo, i, 5-20 
—— A Survey of the Vatican Archives and of its Medieval Holdings (rev. edn, 
Toronto, 2001) 
Bozóky, Edina, La politique des reliques de Constantin à Saint Louis: Protection 
collective et légitimation du pouvoir (Paris, 2006) 
Bradbury, Jim, Philip Augustus: King of France, 1180-1223 (Harlow, 1998) 
Brenk, Beat, ‘The Sainte-Chapelle as a Capetian Political Program’, in Virginia 
Chieffo Raguin, Kathryn Brush, and Peter Draper, eds., Artistic Integration in 
Gothic Buildings (Toronto, 1995), 195-213 
Brentano, Robert, Two Churches: England and Italy in the Thirteenth Century 
(new edn, Berkeley, CA, 1988) 
338 
 
Bresslau, Harry, Handbuch der Urkundenlehre für Deutschland und Italien, 3 
vols (3rd edn, Berlin, 1958-60) 
Carocci, Sandro, Il nepotismo nel medioevo: Papi, cardinali e famiglie nobili 
(Rome, 1999) 
—— and Marco Vendittelli, ‘Onorio III.’, in Manlio Simonetti, Girolamo Arnaldi, 
Mario Caravale, and Giuseppe Martina, eds., Enciclopedia dei papi, 3 vols 
(Rome, 2000), ii, 350-62 
Carpenter, D.A., The Minority of Henry III (London, 1990) 
Cazel Jr, Fred A., ‘Financing the Crusades’, in Kenneth M. Setton, gen. ed., A 
History of the Crusades, 6 vols (2nd edn, Madison, 1969-89), vi, 116-49 
—— ‘The Legates Guala and Pandulf’, in P.R. Coss and S.D. Lloyd, eds., 
Thirteenth Century England II: Proceedings of the Newcastle upon Tyne 
Conference, 1987 (Woodbridge, 1988), 15-21 
Cheney, C.R., ‘England and the Roman Curia under Innocent III’, Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 18 (1967), 173-86 
—— ‘The Letters of Pope Innocent III’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 35 
(1952/53), 23-43 
—— ‘The Papal Legate and English Monasteries in 1206’, English Historical 
Review, 46 (1931), 443-52 
—— Pope Innocent III and England (Stuttgart, 1976) 
Chrissis, Nikolaos G., Crusading in Frankish Greece: A Study of Byzantine-
Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204-1282 (Turnhout, 2012) 
Ciacconius, Alphonsus, Vitae, et res gestae pontificum romanorum et S.R.E. 
cardinalium, ii (Rome, 1677) 
Clausen, Johannes, Papst Honorius III. (1216-1227): Eine Monographie (Bonn, 
1895) 
Claverie, Pierre-Vincent, ‘L’apparition des Mongols sur la scène politique 
occidentale (1220-1223)’, Le Moyen Age: Revue d’histoire et de philologie, 105 
(1999), 601-13 
—— Honorius III et l’Oriente (1216-1227): Étude et publication de sources 
inédites des Archives vaticanes (ASV) (Leiden, 2013) 
—— L’ordre du Temple en Terre Sainte et à Chypre au XIIIe siècle, 3 vols 
(Nicosia, 2005) 
Cole, Penny J., The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095-1270 
(Cambridge, MA, 1991) 
339 
 
Constable, Giles, ‘The Financing of the Crusades in the Twelfth Century’, in B.Z. 
Kedar, H.E. Mayer, and R.C. Smail, eds., Outremer: Studies in the History of the 
Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem presented to Joshua Prawer (Jerusalem, 1982), 
64-88 
Costen, Michael, The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade (Manchester, 1997) 
D’Avray, D.L., ‘Lay Kinship Solidarity and Papal Law’, in Pauline Stafford, Janet 
L. Nelson and Jane Martindale, eds., Law, Laity and Solidarities: Essays in 
Honour of Susan Reynolds (Manchester, 2001), 188-99 
—— Medieval Marriage: Symbolism and Society (Oxford, 2005) 
—— Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis (Cambridge, 2010) 
Dall’Aglio, Francesco, ‘Crusading in a Nearer East: The Balkan Politics of 
Honorius III and Gregory IX (1221-1241)’, in Michel Balard, ed., La Papauté et 
les croisades/The Papacy and the Crusades: Actes du VIIe Congrès de la Society 
for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East/Proceedings of the VIIth 
Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East 
(Farnham, 2011), 173-83 
De la Torre, Ignacio, ‘The London and Paris Temples: A Comparative Analysis of 
their Financial Services for the Kings during the Thirteenth Century’, in Judi 
Upton-Ward, ed., The Military Orders: Volume 4, On Land and by Sea 
(Aldershot, 2008), 121-27 
De Wesselow, Thomas, ‘The Date of the St Francis Cycle in the Upper Church of 
San Francesco at Assisi: The Evidence of Copies and Considerations of Method’, 
in William R. Cook, ed., The Art of the Franciscan Order in Italy (Leiden, 2005), 
113-67 
Delisle, Léopold, Mémoire sur les opérations financières des Templiers (Paris, 
1889; repr. Geneva, 1975) 
Dodd, Gwilym, Justice and Grace: Private Petitioning and the English 
Parliament in the Late Middle Ages (Oxford, 2007) 
Donovan, Joseph P., Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade (Philadelphia, PA, 1950) 
Doran, John, ‘A Lifetime in the Service of the Roman Church’, in idem and 
Damian J. Smith, eds., Pope Celestine III (1191-1198): Diplomat and Pastor 
(Farnham, 2008), 31-79 
Duggan, Anne J., ‘Alexander ille meus: The Papacy of Alexander III’, in Peter D. 
Clarke and Anne J. Duggan, eds., Pope Alexander III (1159-81): The Art of 
Survival (Farnham, 2012), 13-49 
—— ‘De consultationibus: The Role of Episcopal Consultation in the Shaping of 
Canon Law in the Twelfth Century’, in Bruce C. Brasington and Kathleen G. 
Cushing, eds., Bishops, Texts and the Use of Canon Law around 1100: Essays in 
Honour of Martin Brett (Aldershot, 2008), 191-214 
340 
 
—— ‘Making Law or Not? The Function of Papal Decretals in the Twelfth 
Century’, in Peter Erdö and SZ. A. Szuromi, eds., Proceedings of the Thirteenth 
International Congress of Medieval Canon Law, Esztergom, 3-8 August 2008 
(Vatican City, 2010), 41-70 
Duggan, Charles, ‘Decretal Letters to Hungary’, in idem, Decretals and the 
Creation of ‘New Law’ in the Twelfth Century: Judges, Judgements, Equity and 
Law (Aldershot, 1998), V: 5-31 
Egger, Christoph, ‘Papst Innocenz III. als Theologe: Beiträge zur Kenntnis seines 
Denkens im Rahmen der Frühscholastik’, Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 30 
(1992), 55-123 
—— ‘A Theologian at Work: Some Remarks on Methods and Sources in 
Innocent III’s Writings’, in Moore, ed., World, 25-33 
Epstein, Steven A., Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996) 
Eubel, Conrad, Hierarchia catholica medii aevi, i (2nd edn, Münster, 1913) 
Fedorenko, Gregory, ‘The Crusading Career of John of Brienne, c.1210-1237’, 
Nottingham Medieval Studies, 52 (2008), 43-79 
Ferguson, Paul C., Medieval Papal Representatives in Scotland: Legates, 
Nuncios, and Judges-Delegate, 1125-1286 (Edinburgh, 1997) 
Fichtenau, Heinrich, Arenga: Spätantike und Mittelalter im Spiegel von 
Urkundenformeln (Graz-Cologne, 1957) 
Figueira, Robert C., ‘The Classification of Medieval Papal Legates in the Liber 
Extra’, Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 21 (1983), 211-28 
—— ‘The Medieval Papal Legate and His Province: Geographical Limits of 
Jurisdiction’, in idem, ed., Plenitude of Power: The Doctrines and Exercise of 
Authority in the Middle Ages, Essays in Memory of Robert Louis Benson 
(Aldershot, 2006), 73-105 
—— ‘Papal Reserved Powers and the Limitations on Legatine Authority’, in 
James Ross Sweeney and Stanley Chodorow, eds., Popes, Teachers, and Canon 
Law in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY, 1989), 191-211 
Fischer, Andreas, ‘Herrscherliches Selbstverständnis und die Verwendung des 
Häresievorwurfs als politisches Instrument: Friedrich II. und sein Ketzeredikt von 
1224’, Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken, 87 
(2007), 71-108 
Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Iben, ‘Alexander III and the Crusades’, in Peter D. Clarke 
and Anne J. Duggan, eds., Pope Alexander III (1159-81): The Art of Survival 
(Farnham, 2012), 341-63 
341 
 
—— ‘Pope Honorius III and Mission and Crusades in the Baltic Region’, in Alan 
V. Murray, ed., The Clash of Cultures on the Medieval Baltic Frontier (Farnham, 
2009), 103-22 
—— The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, 1147-1254 (Leiden, 2007) 
Forey, A.J., ‘The Crusading Vows of the English King Henry III’, The Durham 
University Journal, 65 (1972/73), 229-47 
—— The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries 
(Basingstoke, 1992) 
Froehlich, Karlfried, ‘Saint Peter, Papal Primacy, and the Exegetical Tradition, 
1150-1300’, in Christopher Ryan, ed., The Religious Roles of the Papacy: Ideals 
and Realities, 1150-1300 (Toronto, 1989), 3-43 
Freedman, Paul, ‘Two Letters of Pope Honorius III on the Collection of 
Ecclesiastical Revenues in Spain’, Römische Historische Mitteilungen, 32/33 
(1990/91), 37-40 
Giles, Keith R., ‘The Emperor Frederick II’s Crusade, 1215-c.1231’, unpublished 
PhD thesis, Keele University (1987) 
Goldsmith, Linda, ‘John of Brienne (d.1237)’, in Alan V. Murray, ed., The 
Crusades: An Encyclopedia, 4 vols (Santa Barbara, CA, 2006), ii, 690-91 [see 
also works under Linda Ross] 
Gottlob, Adolf, Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugs-steuern des 13. Jahrhunderts: Ihre 
rechtliche Grundlage, politische Geschichte und technische Verwaltung 
(Heiligenstadt, 1892) 
Grousset, René, Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem: III. 
1188-1291, L’anarchie franque (Paris, 1936; new edn 2006) 
Hamilton, Bernard, ‘King Consorts of Jerusalem and their Entourages from the 
West from 1186 to 1250’, in idem, Crusaders, Cathars and the Holy Places 
(Aldershot, 1999), II: 13-24 
—— The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church (London, 
1980) 
Harper-Bill, Christopher, ‘The Diocese of Norwich and the Italian Connection, 
1198-1261’, in John Mitchell, ed., England and the Continent in the Middle Ages: 
Studies in Memory of Andrew Martindale, Proceedings of the 1996 Harlaxton 
Symposium (Stamford, 2000), 75-89 
Haskins, Charles H., ‘Two Roman Formularies in Philadelphia’, in Miscellanea 
Francesco Ehrle: Scritti di Storia e Paleographia, iv (Rome, 1924), 275-86 
Hausmann, Friedrich, ‘Österreich unter den letzten Babenbergern (Friedrich I., 
Leopold VI., Friedrich II.)’, in Erich Zöllner, ed., Das babenbergische Österreich 
(976-1246) (Vienna, 1978), 54-68 
342 
 
Haverkamp, Alfred, Medieval Germany, 1056-1273, trans. Helga Braun and 
Richard Mortimer (Oxford, 1988) 
Hechelhammer, Bodo, ‘Der Diplomat: Kaiser Friedrich II. (*1194, †1250)’, in 
Hans-Jürgen Kotzur, ed., Die Kreuzzüge: Kein Krieg ist heilig (Mainz, 2004), 
306-11 
—— Kreuzzug und Herrschaft unter Friedrich II.: Handlungsspielräume von 
Kreuzzugspolitik (1215-1230) (Ostfildern, 2004) 
Hiestand, Rudolf, ‘Friedrich II. und der Kreuzzug’, in Arnold Esch and Norbert 
Kamp, eds., Friedrich II.: Tagung des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom im 
Gedenkjahr 1994 (Tübingen, 1996), 128-49 
—— ‘Ierusalem et Sicilie rex - Zur Titulatur Friedrichs II.’, Deutsches Archiv für 
Erforschung des Mittelalters, 52 (1996), 181-89 
Hold, Hermann, ‘Autoritative Rhetorik: Eine Untersuchung an Arengen in 
Schreiben des Avignonser Papsttums’, Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 40 (2002), 
175-97 
Housley, Norman, Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land (New 
Haven, CT, 2008) 
Imkamp, Wilhelm, Das Kirchenbild Innocenz’ III. (1198-1216) (Stuttgart, 1983) 
Jackson, Peter, The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410 (Harlow, 2005) 
Jasper, Detlev, and Horst Fuhrmann, Papal Letters in the Early Middle Ages 
(Washington, DC, 2001) 
Jotischky, Andrew, Crusading and the Crusader States (Harlow, 2004) 
—— The Perfection of Solitude: Hermits and Monks in the Crusader States 
(University Park, PA, 1995) 
Kantorowicz, Ernst, Frederick the Second, 1194-1254, trans. E.O. Lorimer (New 
York, 1931) 
Kay, Richard, ‘The Albigensian Twentieth of 1221-3: An Early Chapter in the 
History of Papal Taxation’, Journal of Medieval History, 6 (1980), 307-15 
—— The Council of Bourges, 1225: A Documentary History (Aldershot, 2002) 
Kelly, J.N.D., The Oxford Dictionary of Popes, rev. Michael J. Walsh (2nd edn, 
Oxford, 2010) 
Keutner, Adalbert, Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes 
Honorius III. (1216-1227) (Münster, 1935) 
Kosztolnyik, Z.J., Hungary in the Thirteenth Century (New York, 1996) 
343 
 
Koziol, Geoffrey, ‘The Early History of Rites of Supplication’, in Millet, ed., 
Suppliques, 21-36 
Kristó, Gyula, Histoire de la Hongrie Médiévale: Tome I, Le temps des Árpáds 
(Rennes, 2000) 
Kroppman, Hubert, Ehedispensübung und Stauferkampf unter Innocenz IV.: Ein 
Beitrag zur Geschichte des päpstlichen Ehedispensrechtes (Berlin, 1937) 
Lawrence, C.H., ‘The Thirteenth Century’, in idem, ed., The English Church and 
the Papacy in the Middle Ages (rev. edn, Stroud, 1999), 119-56 
Linder, Amnon, Raising Arms: Liturgy in the Struggle to Liberate Jerusalem in 
the Late Middle Ages (Turnhout, 2003) 
Linehan, Peter, The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century 
(Cambridge, 1971) 
—— and Patrick Zutshi, ‘Fiat A: The Earliest Known Roll of Petitions signed by 
the Pope (1307)’, English Historical Review, 122 (2007), 998-1015 
Lloyd, Simon, English Society and the Crusade, 1216-1307 (Oxford, 1988) 
Logan, F. Donald, Excommunication and the Secular Arm in Medieval England: 
A Study in Legal Procedure from the Thirteenth to the Sixteenth Century 
(Toronto, 1968) 
Loud, G.A., ‘The Papal “Crusade” against Frederick II in 1228-1230’, in Michel 
Balard, ed., La Papauté et les croisades/The Papacy and the Crusades: Actes du 
VIIe Congrès de la Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin 
East/Proceedings of the VIIth Conference of the Society for the Study of the 
Crusades and the Latin East (Farnham, 2011), 91-103 
Lunt, William E., Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327 
(Cambridge, MA, 1939) 
—— ‘The Financial System of the Mediaeval Papacy in the Light of Recent 
Literature’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 23 (1909), 251-95 
—— Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, 2 vols (New York, 1934) 
—— The Valuation of Norwich (Oxford, 1926) 
Madden, Thomas F., Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice (Baltimore, MD, 
2003) 
Maier, Christoph T., Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in 
the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1994) 
Maleczek, Werner, Papst und Kardinalskolleg von 1191 bis 1216: Die Kardinäle 
unter Coelestin III. und Innocenz III. (Vienna, 1984) 
Mann, Horace K., The Lives of the Popes in the Middle Ages, xiii (London, 1914) 
344 
 
Manselli, Raoul, ‘Onorio III e Federico II: revisione d’un giudizio?’, Studi 
Romani, 11 (1963), 142-59 
Mansilla, Demetrio, ‘El Cardenal hispano Pelayo Gaitán (1206-1230), 
Anthologica Annua, 1 (1953), 11-66 
Mayer, Hans Eberhard, The Crusades, trans. John Gillingham (2nd edn, Oxford, 
1988) 
Metcalf, D.M., Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East in the Ashmolean 
Museum, Oxford (London, 1983) 
Militzer, Klaus, ‘From the Holy Land to Prussia: The Teutonic Knights between 
Emperors and Popes and their Policies until 1309’, in Jürgen Sarnowsky, ed., 
Mendicants, Military Orders, and Regionalism in Medieval Europe (Aldershot, 
1999), 71-81 
Millet, Hélène, ed., Suppliques et Requêtes: Le Gouvernement par la Grâce en 
Occident (XII
e
-XV
e
 siècle)(Rome, 2003) 
Moore, John C., Pope Innocent III (1160/61-1216): To Root Up and to Plant 
(Leiden, 2003) 
—— ed., Pope Innocent III and his World (Aldershot, 1999) 
—— ‘The Sermons of Pope Innocent III’, Römische Historische Mitteilungen, 36 
(1994), 81-142 
Morris, Colin, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250 
(Oxford, 1989) 
Morton, Nicholas, ‘The Defence of the Holy Land and the Memory of the 
Maccabees’, Journal of Medieval History, 36 (2010), 275-93 
—— ‘In subsidium: The Declining Contribution of Germany and Eastern Europe 
to the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1221-91’, German Historical Institute London 
Bulletin, 33 (2011), 38-66 
—— The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land, 1190-1291 (Woodbridge, 2009) 
Neininger, Falko, Konrad von Urach († 1227): Zähringer, Zisterzienser, 
Kardinallegat (Paderborn, 1994) 
Norgate, Kate, The Minority of Henry the Third (London, 1912) 
Ormrod, W. Mark, ‘Introduction: Medieval Petitions in Context’, in idem, et al., 
eds., Petitions, 1-11 
—— Gwilym Dodd, and Anthony Musson, eds., Medieval Petitions: Grace and 
Grievance (York, 2009) 
345 
 
Pacifico, Marcello, Federico II e Gerusalemme al tempo delle crociate: Relazioni 
tra cristianità e islam nello spazio euro-mediterraneo medievale, 1215-1250 
(Caltanissetta-Rome, 2012) 
Paravicini Bagliani, Agostino, ‘Curie (XIe-XIIIe siècle)’, in Philippe Levillain, ed., 
Dictionnaire historique de la papauté (Paris, 2003), 505-11 
—— ‘Honorius III, Pope (died 1227)’, in André Vauchez, Barrie Dobson, and 
Michael Lapidge, eds., Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages, trans. Adrian Walford, 2 
vols (Cambridge, 2000), i, 688 
Partner, Peter, The Lands of St Peter: The Papal State in the Middle Ages and the 
Early Renaissance (London, 1972) 
Pegg, Mark Gregory, A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle 
for Christendom (New York, 2008) 
Pellegrini, Amedeo, ‘Le crociate in terrasanta e la parte che vi ebbero i Lucchesi 
(1095-1278)’, Studi e documenti di storia e diritto, 19 (1898), 379-91 
Pennington, Kenneth, ‘Johannes Teutonicus and Papal Legates’, Archivum 
Historiae Pontificiae, 21 (1983), 183-94 
—— ‘The Legal Education of Pope Innocent III’, in idem, Popes, Canonists and 
Texts, 1150-1550 (Aldershot, 1993), I: 70-77 
Perry, Guy, ‘The Career and Significance of John of Brienne: King of Jerusalem, 
Emperor of Constantinople’, unpublished DPhil thesis, Oxford University (2009) 
Phillips, Jonathan, Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades (London, 
2009) 
—— The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom (New Haven, 
CT, 2007) 
Pitz, Ernst, Papstreskript und Kaiserreskript im Mittelalter (Tübingen, 1971) 
—— Papstreskripte im frühen Mittelalter: Diplomatische und 
rechtsgeschichtliche Studien zum Brief-Corpus Gregors des Grossen 
(Sigmaringen, 1990) 
Pixton, Paul B., ‘Die Anwerbung des Heeres Christi: Prediger des Fünften 
Kreuzzuges in Deutschland’, Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters, 
34 (1978), 166-91 
—— The German Episcopacy and the Implementation of the Decrees of the 
Fourth Lateran Council, 1216-1245: Watchmen on the Tower (Leiden, 1995) 
Pokorny, Anton, Die Wirksamkeit der Legaten des Papstes Honorius III. in 
Frankreich und Deutschland (Krems, 1886) 
Poole, Reginald L., Lectures on the History of the Papal Chancery down to the 
Time of Innocent III (Cambridge, 1915) 
346 
 
Powell, James M., Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221 (Philadelphia, PA, 1986) 
—— ‘Church and Crusade: Frederick II and Louis IX’, Catholic Historical 
Review, 93 (2007), 251-64 
—— ‘Frederick II and the Church: A Revisionist View’, Catholic Historical 
Review, 48 (1963), 487-97 
—— ‘Frederick II and the Rebellion of the Muslims of Sicily, 1200-1224’, in 
idem, The Crusades, the Kingdom of Sicily, and the Mediterranean (Aldershot, 
2007), XIV: 13-22 
—— ‘Frederick II, the Hohenstaufen, and the Teutonic Order in the Kingdom of 
Sicily’, in Malcolm Barber, ed., The Military Orders: Fighting for the Faith and 
Caring for the Sick (Aldershot, 1994), 236-44 
—— ‘Honorius III and the Leadership of the Crusade’, Catholic Historical 
Review, 63 (1977), 521-36 
—— ‘Honorius III’s Sermo in Dedicatione Ecclesie Lateranensis and the 
Historical-Liturgical Traditions of the Lateran’, Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 
21 (1983), 195-209 
—— ed., Innocent III: Vicar of Christ or Lord of the World? (2nd edn, 
Washington, DC, 1994) 
—— ‘Pastor Bonus: Some Evidence of Honorius III’s Use of the Sermons of 
Pope Innocent III’, Speculum, 52 (1977), 522-37 
Prawer, Joshua, The Crusaders’ Kingdom: European Colonialism in the Middle 
Ages (London, 1972) 
Pryor, John H., ‘The Crusade of Emperor Frederick II, 1220-29: The Implications 
of the Maritime Evidence’, The American Neptune, 52 (1992), 113-32 
—— Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the 
Mediterranean, 649-1571 (Cambridge, 1988) 
Purcell, Maureen, Papal Crusading Policy, 1244-1291: The Chief Instruments of 
Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Final Loss of 
Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre (Leiden, 1975) 
Queller, Donald E., and Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest 
of Constantinople (2nd edn, Philadelphia, PA, 1997) 
Rabikauskas, Paul, Diplomatica pontificia (6th edn, Rome, 1998) 
Raccagni, Gianluca, The Lombard League, 1167-1225 (Oxford, 2010) 
Rader, Olaf B., Friedrich II.: Der Sizilianer auf dem Kaiserthron, eine Biographie 
(Munich, 2010) 
347 
 
Rainini, Marco, ‘Guala da Bergamo e la curia romana (1219-1230): Relazioni, 
incarichi e problemi di definizione’, in Maria Pia Alberzoni and Claudia Zey, eds., 
Legati e delegati papali: Profili, ambiti d’azione e tipologie di intervento nei 
secoli XII-XIII (Milan, 2012), 129-58 
Reuter, Timothy, ‘Episcopi cum sua militia: The Prelate as Warrior in the Early 
Staufer Era’, in idem, ed., Warriors and Churchmen in the High Middle Ages: 
Essays Presented to Karl Leyser (London, 1992), 79-94 
Richardson, H.G., ‘Letters of the Legate Guala’, English Historical Review, 48 
(1933), 250-59 
Riley-Smith, Jonathan, The Crusades: A History (2nd edn, London, 2005) 
—— The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277 (London, 
1973) 
—— The Knights Hospitaller in the Levant, c.1070-1309 (Basingstoke, 2012) 
Rist, Rebecca, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245 (London, 2009) 
—— ‘Papal Policy and the Albigensian Crusades: Continuity or Change?’, 
Crusades, 2 (2003), 99-108 
Robinson, I.S., The Papacy, 1073-1198: Continuity and Innovation (Cambridge, 
1990) 
Robson, Michael, The Franciscans in the Middle Ages (Woodbridge, 2006) 
Rodenberg, Carl, ‘Ueber die Register Honorius III., Gregors IX. und Innocenz 
IV.’, Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde, 10 
(1885), 509-78 
Röhricht, Reinhold, Studien zur Geschichte des fünften Kreuzzuges (Innsbruck, 
1891) 
Róna-Tas, András, Hungarians and Europe in the Early Middle Ages: An 
Introduction to Early Hungarian History, trans. Nicholas Bodoczky (Budapest, 
1999) 
Roscher, Helmut, Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge (Göttingen, 1969) 
Ross, Linda, ‘Frederick II: Tyrant or Benefactor of the Latin East?’, Al-Masaq: 
Islam and the Medieval Mediterranean, 15 (2003), 149-59 [see also works under 
Linda Goldsmith] 
Rousseau, Constance M., ‘A Papal Matchmaker: Principle and Pragmatism during 
Innocent III’s Pontificate’, Journal of Medieval History, 24 (1998), 259-71 
Rudt de Collenberg, Wipertus H., ‘Les dispenses matrimoniales accordées à 
l’Orient Latin selon les Registres du Vatican d’Honorius III à Clément VII (1223-
1385)’, Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome: Moyen-Age, Temps modernes, 89 
(1977), 11-93 
348 
 
Runciman, Steven, A History of the Crusades, iii (Cambridge, 1954) 
Sayers, Jane E., Innocent III: Leader of Europe, 1198-1216 (London, 1994) 
—— Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of Honorius III 
(1216-1227) (Cambridge, 1984) 
—— Papal Judges Delegate in the Province of Canterbury, 1198-1254: A Study 
in Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and Administration (Oxford, 1971) 
—— ‘Petitioners at the Papal Court’, in Walter Koch, Alois Schmid, and Wilhelm 
Volkert, eds., Auxilia Historica: Festschrift für Peter Acht zum 90. Geburtstag 
(Munich, 2001), 379-88 
—— ‘Proctors Representing British Interests at the Papal Court, 1198-1415’, in 
Stephan Kuttner, ed., Proceedings of the Third International Congress of 
Medieval Canon Law: Strasbourg, 3-6 September 1968 (Vatican City, 1971), 143-
63 
Schaller, Hans Martin, ‘Die Kanzlei Kaiser Friedrichs II.: Ihr Personal und ihr 
Sprachstil, 2. Teil’, Archiv für Diplomatik, 4 (1958), 264-327 
Schein, Sylvia, Gateway to the Heavenly City: Crusader Jerusalem and the 
Catholic West (1099-1187) (Aldershot, 2005) 
Schimmelpfennig, Bernhard, The Papacy, trans. James Sievert (New York, 1992) 
—— Das Papsttum: Von der Antike bis zur Renaissance, rev. Elke Goez (6th edn, 
Darmstadt, 2009) 
Schmidt, Hans-Joachim, ‘The Papal and Imperial Concept of plenitudo potestatis: 
The Influence of Pope Innocent III on Emperor Frederick II’, in Moore, ed., 
World, 305-14 
Siberry, Elizabeth, Criticism of Crusading, 1095-1274 (Oxford, 1985) 
Smalley, Beryl, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (3rd edn, Oxford, 1983) 
Smith, Thomas W., ‘The College of Cardinals under Honorius III: A Nepotistic 
Household?’, in John Doran and Charlotte Methuen, eds., The Church and the 
Household, Studies in Church History, 50 (forthcoming, 2014) 
—— ‘Honorius III and the Crusade: Responsive Papal Government versus the 
Memory of his Predecessors’, in Peter D. Clarke and Charlotte Methuen, eds., The 
Church on its Past, Studies in Church History, 49 (Woodbridge, 2013), 99-109 
Sommerlechner, Andrea, ed., Innocenzo III: Urbs et Orbis, Atti del Congresso 
Internazionale Roma, 9-15 settembre 1998, 2 vols (Rome, 2003) 
Stürner, Wolfgang, ‘Federico II, re di Gerusalemme’, in Giosuè Musca, ed., Il 
Mezzogiorno normanno-svevo e le Crociate: Atti delle quattordicesime giornate 
normanno-sveve Bari, 17-20 ottobre 2000 (Bari, 2002), 159-75 
349 
 
—— Friedrich II., 1194-1250, 2 vols (1992-2000; repr. in one vol., Darmstadt, 
2009) 
Swanson, Robert, ‘Universis Christi Fidelibus: The Church and its Records’, in 
Richard Britnell, ed., Pragmatic Literacy: East and West, 1200-1300 
(Woodbridge, 1997), 147-64 
Sweeney, James Ross, ‘Hungary in the Crusades, 1169-1218’, International 
Historical Review, 3 (1981), 467-81 
—— ‘Innocent III, Hungary and the Bulgarian Connection: A Study in Medieval 
Papal Diplomacy’, Church History, 42 (1973), 320-34 
Thouzellier, Christine, ‘La Légation en Lombardie du Cardinal Hugolin (1221): 
Un Épisode de la Cinquième Croisade’, Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique, 45 
(1950), 508-42 
Throop, Palmer A., Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and 
Crusade Propaganda (Amsterdam, 1940) 
Thumser, Matthias, ‘Aldobrandino Orsini (1217-1221), ein Kardinal Honorius’ 
III.’, Römische Historische Mitteilungen, 32/33 (1990/91), 41-49 
—— Rom und der römische Adel in der späten Stauferzeit (Tübingen, 1995) 
Tierney, Brian, The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300 (Toronto, 1988) 
Tillmann, Helene, Die päpstlichen Legaten in England bis zur Beendigung der 
Legation Gualas (1218) (Bonn, 1926) 
Tolan, John, Saint Francis and the Sultan: The Curious History of a Christian-
Muslim Encounter (Oxford, 2009) 
Tyerman, Christopher, England and the Crusades, 1095-1588 (Chicago, 1988) 
—— God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (London, 2006) 
Ullmann, Walter, A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (London, 
1972; repr. with additions, 1974) 
—— ‘Some Reflections on the Opposition of Frederick II to the Papacy’, in idem, 
Scholarship and Politics in the Middle Ages: Collected Studies (London, 1978), 
V: 3-26 
Urban, William, The Teutonic Knights: A Military History (Barnsley, 2003) 
Van Cleve, Thomas Curtis, ‘The Crusade of Frederick II’, in Kenneth M. Setton, 
gen. ed., A History of the Crusades, 6 vols (2nd edn, Madison, 1969-89), ii, 429-
62 
—— The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen: Immutator Mundi (Oxford, 
1972) 
350 
 
—— ‘The Fifth Crusade’, in Kenneth M. Setton, gen. ed., A History of the 
Crusades, 6 vols (2nd edn, Madison, 1969-89), ii, 377-428 
Veszprémy, László, ‘The Crusade of Andrew II, King of Hungary, 1217-1218’, 
Iacobus: revista de estudios jacobeos y medievales, 13/14 (2002), 87-110 
Vincent, Nicholas, ‘The Election of Pandulph Verracclo as Bishop of Norwich 
(1215)’, Historical Research, 68 (1995), 143-63 
—— The Holy Blood: King Henry III and the Westminster Blood Relic 
(Cambridge, 2001) 
—— Peter des Roches: An Alien in English Politics, 1205-1238 (Cambridge, 
1996) 
Von Heckel, Rudolf, ‘Das Aufkommen der ständigen Prokuratoren an der 
päpstlichen Kurie im 13. Jahrhundert’, Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle: Scritti di 
Storia e Paleographia, ii (Rome, 1924), 290-321 
Von Raumer, Friedrich, Geschichte der Hohenstaufen und ihrer Zeit, iii (3rd edn, 
Leipzig, 1857) 
Watts, John, The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500 (Cambridge, 2009) 
Waley, Daniel, The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century (London, 1961) 
Weigl, Herwig, ‘Ein Prokurator um sechs Gulden und ein Buch für die Zukunft: 
Taverninus von Novara, Bischof Konrad III. von Freising und das bischöfliche 
“Notizbuch”’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Ősterreichische Geschichtsforschung, 
112 (2004), 238-71 
Weiler, Björn K.U., Henry III of England and the Staufen Empire, 1216-1272 
(Woodbridge, 2006) 
—— ‘Henry III’s Plans for a German Marriage (1225) and their Context’, in 
Michael Prestwich, Richard Britnell, and Robin Frame, eds., Thirteenth Century 
England VII: Proceedings of the Durham Conference, 1997 (Woodbridge, 1999), 
173-88 
Williamson, Dorothy M., ‘Some Aspects of the Legation of Cardinal Otto in 
England, 1237-41’, English Historical Review, 64 (1949), 145-73 
Zey, Claudia, and Maria Pia Alberzoni, ‘Legati e delegati papali (secoli XII-XIII): 
stato della ricerca e questioni aperte’, in Maria Pia Alberzoni and Claudia Zey, 
eds., Legati e delegati papali: Profili, ambiti d’azione e tipologie di intervento nei 
secoli XII-XIII (Milan, 2012), 3-27 
Zimmermann, Heinrich, Die päpstliche Legation in der ersten Hälfte des 13. 
Jahrhunderts: Vom Regierungsantritt Innocenz’ III. bis zum Tode Gregors IX. 
(1198-1241) (Paderborn, 1913) 
351 
 
Zutshi, Patrick, ‘Letters of Pope Honorius III concerning the Order of Preachers’, 
in Frances Andrews, Christoph Egger, and Constance M. Rousseau, eds., Pope, 
Church and City: Essays in Honour of Brenda M. Bolton (Leiden, 2004), 269-86 
—— ‘The Origins of the Registration of Petitions in the Papal Chancery in the 
First Half of the Fourteenth Century’, in Millet, ed., Suppliques, 177-91  
—— ‘The Personal Role of the Pope in the Production of Papal Letters in the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’, in Walter Pohl and Paul Herold, eds., Vom 
Nutzen des Schreibens: Soziales Gedächtnis, Herrschaft und Besitz im Mittelalter 
(Vienna, 2002), 225-36 
—— ‘Petitioners, Popes, Proctors: The Development of Curial Institutions, 
c.1150-1250’, in Giancarlo Andenna, ed., Pensiero e sperimentazioni istituzionali 
nella ‘Societas Christiana’ (1046-1250) (Milan, 2007), 265-93 
—— ‘Petitions to the Pope in the Fourteenth Century’, in Ormrod, et al., eds., 
Petitions, 82-98 
—— ‘Pope Honorius III’s Gratiarum Omnium and the Beginnings of the 
Dominican Order’, in Anne J. Duggan, Joan Greatrex, and Brenda Bolton, eds., 
Omnia disce: Medieval Studies in Memory of Leonard Boyle, O.P. (Aldershot, 
2005), 199-210 
—— ‘Proctors acting for English Petitioners in the Chancery of the Avignon 
Popes (1305-1378)’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 35 (1984), 15-29 
